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Thesis Abstract 
 
The thesis traces ethnographically the discursive, ideological and political processes 
through which connections between the Cypriot diaspora in the UK and Cyprus are 
imagined, articulated and (re)produced through peace politics and Cypriotist discourses 
that emphasise the need for reconciliation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots based 
on a common Cypriot identity. The fieldwork research was conducted between 2006 
and 2008 in London and Cyprus, taking place at a very particular historical period, 
when a larger space apparently opened for British Cypriots’ involvement in the politics 
‘at home’; I follow here their modes of political engagement across a number of actual 
sites and ‘imagined’ social fields –from community associations in London to online 
Cypriot networks; and from organised party groups in the UK to informal communal 
crossings of the Cypriot Green Line. The thesis ultimately presents an ethnographic 
account of Cypriotism and how individuals employ, perform and (re)define it within a 
transnational nexus of inter-related contexts, revealing that far from popular 
understandings of it as a unifying discourse, Cypriotism is also divisive and internally 
contested. 
 
Whereas anthropological work on Cyprus has been prolific in studying and analysing 
ethnic nationalisms extensively, Cypriotism in its own right has not been problematised 
enough beyond being treated as a counter-discourse to other dominant ideologies. The 
perspective of the diaspora helps to crystallise how discursive battles and exclusive 
ideas of ‘who is a Cypriot’ simultaneously challenge and (re)produce difference among 
Cypriotists. Moreover, to challenge the dichotomy between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
nationalisms of Western-centric discourses, it is argued here that the boundaries 
between Cypriotism and ethnic nationalism are more blurred than often assumed, 
especially as they co-exist and are employed in the cultural repertoires of Cypriots. 
 
The aims of the thesis, therefore, are threefold; first, it endeavours to illustrate 
empirically how connections between the Cypriot diaspora in the UK and Cyprus are 
constructed through ‘peace politics’ and how political subjectivities develop in such a 
transnational context by looking at the ways multiple agents mobilise, articulate and 
perform particular identities through the language of Cypriotism. To do this, the 
research methodologically integrates the ‘ethnography of the Cypriot diaspora’ with the 
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‘ethnography of Cyprus’, which have developed to some extent as two distinct study 
fields, through multi-sited fieldwork both in the UK and Cyprus. Moreover, with its 
focus on Cypriotism and how a Cypriot nation is (re)imagined within it, the thesis aims 
to contribute theoretically to ‘the anthropology of Cyprus’ by participating in ongoing 
discussions on nationalism and counter-nationalism, history and memory, identity and 
cultural ‘authenticity’. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
‘Haji-Marcos pursed his lips and shook his head. He 
remembered a time when there wasn’t a cigarette paper 
between Orthodox Christian and Muslim. They worked 
together, played together, sang and danced together, 
celebrated each other’s weddings, mourned each other’s 
deaths. And why not? They shared the same space, 
spoke the same vernacular. As did the other people of 
Cyprus. Maronites, Armenians and Latins. Cypriots all.’  
(from ‘The Cypriot’ by Koumi 2006: 21) 
 
 
In August 2007, the annual ‘Conference of Overseas Cypriots’ was taking place in its 
customary location, at the Hilton hotel in Nicosia. The event that is supported by the 
Republic of Cyprus and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs brings together representatives 
of the Greek Cypriot diaspora every year in the summer as an opportunity to reconnect 
Cypriots abroad with their ‘motherland’. It is also an occasion for the World Federation 
of Overseas Cypriots (POMAK) to hold meetings and plan its own organisation and 
action. Political figures and representatives of local authorities rarely miss the chance to 
make an appearance every year at the Hilton conference hall to express their support for 
the Cypriot communities abroad and their commitment to co-operating with them. In 
2007, the President of the Republic, Tassos Papadopoulos, addressed the opening 
ceremony of the event and religious figures, such as the Archbishop of Cyprus, also 
appeared on the speaker’s podium. 
 
My fieldwork plan had taken me to Cyprus that summer in order to follow London 
Cypriots during their holidays and to trace their cultural practices, social interactions 
and political activities during their stay in the island. Many of the UK ‘community 
representatives’, who were sitting in the first rows of the Hilton conference room -
middle-aged Greek Cypriot men in their majority- were individuals with a strong public 
profile amongst Cypriots in London through their roles in community organisations, 
media, political parties and activist groups and some had already been central 
informants and interlocutors in my research.  
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After spending long hours in the conference hall, many of them reacted to the fact that 
the largest part of the sessions was spent on detailed organisational discussions rather 
than on what they considered topics of major importance and for which they had 
primarily made the trip to Cyprus; namely, potential solutions of ‘the Cyprus problem’. 
The post-conference informal discussions reflected disenchantment with the event and 
some of the UK Cypriots found their participation in it futile. As one of them declared, 
‘I came here to talk about the future of Cyprus, but we have been talking very little 
about this. If things remain the same, I will not come back to Cyprus again, I’m tired. 
After all, we are fine in London, we live together [meaning Greek and Turkish Cypriots] 
and we have no problems’.  
 
 This statement echoes popular and widespread representations of Cypriots’ 
‘coexistence’ in London as ‘peaceful’ and undisrupted in comparison to a divided 
Cyprus. Such discourses have been reproduced by academic writings on the diaspora in 
the UK (cf. Constantinides 1977; Ladbury 1977) and through media reports and 
analyses. A BBC article (27/05/2005), for instance, highlights that 
‘In London, where many Cypriots have settled, the situation in their 
home country appears not to have any dividing effect. A walk along 
Green Lanes1 in North London reveals many Turkish-Cypriot shops 
sitting next to Greek-Cypriot ones. Greek-Cypriot community centres 
welcome their Turkish counterparts and vice-versa.’ 
 
Similar ideas have also underlined government funding policies towards Cypriot 
organisations, so that the Cypriot Community Centre (CCC) in Wood Green was 
established in the early 1980s with finances from Haringey Council to support inter-
ethnic co-operation amongst all Cypriots and to represent their local community. More 
importantly, such representations are (re)produced by some Cypriots in London, who, 
mainly through a language of Cypriotism2, have claimed for themselves an ‘authentic 
Cypriotness’, for which co-existence and tolerance are a prerequisite. By no means all 
Cypriots in London are Cypriotists, however such understandings are quite widespread 
and project life in London as a paradigm of how peace could potentially be restored in 
                                                 
1
 Green Lanes is a long North London road that runs through numerous boroughs, where a large number 
of Cypriot residencies, businesses and organisations are located. Its name’s coincidental closeness to the 
Green Line in Cyprus invites for unavoidable comparisons between the two contexts. 
2
 Unlike Greek and Turkish nationalisms that are presented by Cypriotists to have historically dominated 
in and divided Cyprus, Cypriotism aims to promote a common identity and unity among all Cypriots. The 
term is extensively discussed in chapter 2.  
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Cyprus; of how the iconic Green Line, the ceasefire line that divides Cyprus into two 
parts, could mirror Green Lanes, a North London street, where Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot shops stand next to each other and which is often employed as emblematic 
evidence that symbiosis between the two communities is possible. 
 
It is precisely within this framework of diasporic ‘Cypriotism’ that the disappointment 
of London Cypriot representatives at the 2007 Conference in Nicosia has to be 
analysed, as a reaction to the limited opportunities for political contribution and debate 
presented to them at the event. Having been long-term supporters of peace and re-
unification and politically outspoken, many interpreted the political climate in the 
conference -and in the island more broadly- as an obvious manifestation of the lasting 
effects of the ‘post-Annan’ period. The rejection of the UN-backed re-unification plan, 
named after the Secretary General Kofi Annan, in 2004 led to an era of conflicting 
emotions, deflated hopes and political fatigue in Cyprus and the ‘Cypriotist’ language of 
some UK Cypriots appeared ill-timed and almost inappropriate in such context.  
 
By the summer of 2008, however, the political scenery and overarching atmosphere in 
Cyprus had shifted, mainly due to the presidential elections and the victory of Dimitris 
Christofias, the long term secretary of communist AKEL (Progressive Party of the 
Working People [Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou]), in February of the same 
year. Previously peripheral Cyprio-centric ideas became more centralised not only in the 
political repertoire and agenda of the state but also in the everyday discourses of 
Cypriots. Although, naturally, not everyone welcomed enthusiastically the electoral 
result, many UK Cypriotists discovered in the new status quo emerging opportunities 
for their participation in Cypriot politics. Even those, who had declared unwillingness 
the year before to travel to Cyprus and participate in yet another conference, returned to 
the Hilton venue in August 2008 with renewed hopes and expectations. 
 
The above description of the shifting attitudes of UK Cypriots towards a conference at 
‘home’ encapsulates what this thesis is essentially about: the discursive, ideological and 
political processes through which connections between the diaspora and Cyprus are 
imagined, articulated and (re)produced. The fieldwork research took place at a very 
particular historical period, when a larger space apparently opened for British Cypriots’ 
involvement in the politics ‘at home’, and I trace ethnographically their modes of 
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political engagement across a number of actual sites and ‘imagined’ social fields –from 
community associations in London to online Cypriot networks; and from organised 
party groups in the UK to informal communal crossings of the Cypriot Green Line. The 
thesis ultimately presents an ethnographic account of Cypriotism and how individuals 
employ, perform and (re)define it within a transnational nexus of inter-related contexts, 
revealing that far from popular understandings of it as a unifying discourse, Cypriotism 
is also divisive and internally contested. 
 
The research for this project has been largely prompted by Anderson’s (1998) work on 
‘long-distance nationalism’. Anderson (1998) has coined the term to describe the role of 
diasporas in their homeland’s political scene. Contrary to theories of globalisation that 
saw movement and the development of Western multicultural urban centres as the end 
of nationalism, he argues that mass migration and the development of mass 
communications have made long-distance nationalism possible and he examines ways, 
in which diasporas maintain or fuel ethnic differences and conflict, through physical, 
virtual or material intervention in their ‘homelands’. Along the same trend of thought a 
large body of literature has developed focusing on the articulation and development of 
nationalism within diasporas and the impact of such processes on the politics of the 
home country, in relation, for instance, to Sri Lankan (McDowell 1996), Kurdish 
(Griffiths 2000, 2002; Østergaard-Nielsen 2002; Wahlbeck 1998, 1999), Bosnian 
(Eastmond 1998; Al-Ali, Black and Koser 2001) and many other diasporic communities 
(Sorenson 1990; Van Hear 1998; Skrbiš 1999; Ellis and Khan 2002; Al-Ali and Koser 
2002).  
 
However, not all diasporas appear to promote ethnic nationalism and sustain conflicts. 
Cypriots in the UK, as already highlighted, are commonly presented in public 
discourses as a ‘peaceful diaspora’, whose ‘peacefulness’ is typically underscored in a 
twofold way; first, in that Cypriots have not been a ‘trouble-making’ community for 
their host country unlike other perceived radicalised migrant communities and, second, 
in that they have practised co-existence in the diaspora and advocated for peace ‘at 
home’. This research was motivated by a great interest to study this ‘long-distance 
peace activism’ -to paraphrase and turn Anderson’s term around- partly with the 
intention to contribute to the ongoing academic discussions on the politicisation of 
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diasporas from a quite underrepresented perspective that focuses away from diasporic 
involvement in maintaining conflict.  
 
However, the main stimulus for the study was an increasing theoretical and political 
concern that such popular and generic representations of ‘peace’ and ‘peacefulness’ 
reproduce polarised ideas of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ diasporas, a distinction that has 
particularly grown in Western imagination after 9/11 and the ‘securitisation’ of migrant 
communities, whose activities have been progressively more closely monitored and 
heavily controlled (Kalra, Kaur and Hutnyk 2005:1). The major issue with terms such as 
‘peace’, ‘development’ or ‘democracy’ in such discourses is that originating from a 
Western perspective and used in a de-contextualised way they dismiss and veil the 
particular ways, in which these processes take place on the ground and are embedded in 
the historical and socio-political specificities of different locales. In other words, as the 
thesis argues, when the term ‘peaceful’ is applied unquestionably to describe the 
Cypriot diaspora, internal power dynamics and struggles are masked in the process of 
(self-) representation and ideas of ‘peace’ contribute to reinforcing some of the 
conditions and ideologies that are in reality root causes of the conflict. To move away 
then from strict distinctions between conflict-perpetuating and peace-supporting 
diasporas of Western-centric discourses, it is suggested here that ‘peace’, very much 
like ‘conflict’ has to be dissected and contextualised. The thesis argues that ‘peace 
politics’ by UK Cypriots cannot be analysed without examining how they connect to 
particular cultural ideas and pre-existing power dynamics and struggles on inter-
personal, intra-diasporic and transnational levels.  
 
However, there is also another distinction inherent in the conceptualisation of diasporas 
as ‘bad’ and ‘good’ that associates the former with negative and divisive ethnic 
nationalisms and the latter with positive and unifying civic nationalisms (Brown 1999). 
‘Peace politics’ by UK Cypriots is often articulated through a language of Cypriotism, 
which is perceived in public discourses both in Cyprus and in the diaspora as a 
nationalism necessary for Cypriots to overcome Greek and Turkish ethnic nationalisms 
and unite around a common identity (cf. An 2011). Whereas anthropological work on 
Cyprus has been prolific in studying and analysing ethnic nationalisms extensively, 
Cypriotism in its own right has not been problematised enough beyond being treated as 
a counter-discourse to other dominant ideologies. However, through an ethnographic 
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lens, this thesis suggests that far from a unifying and homogenising ideological 
discourse, Cypriotism is internally debated and contested and the perspective of the 
diaspora helps to crystallise how discursive battles and exclusive ideas of ‘who is a 
Cypriot’ simultaneously challenge and (re)produce difference among Cypriotists. 
Moreover, to challenge the dichotomy between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nationalisms, it is 
argued here that the boundaries between Cypriotism and ethnic nationalism are more 
blurred than often assumed, particularly in the ways, in which they co-exist and are 
employed in the cultural repertoires of Cypriots. 
 
The aims of the thesis, therefore, are threefold; first, it endeavours to illustrate 
empirically how connections between the Cypriot diaspora in the UK and Cyprus are 
constructed through ‘peace politics’ and how political subjectivities develop in such a 
transnational context by looking at the ways multiple agents mobilise, articulate and 
perform particular identities through the language of Cypriotism. To do this, the 
research methodologically integrates the ‘ethnography of the Cypriot diaspora’ with the 
‘ethnography of Cyprus’, which have developed to some extent as two distinct study 
fields, through multi-sited fieldwork both in the UK and Cyprus. Moreover, with its 
focus on Cypriotism and how a Cypriot nation is (re)imagined within it, the thesis aims 
to contribute theoretically to ‘the anthropology of Cyprus’ by participating in ongoing 
discussions on nationalism and counter-nationalism, history and memory, identity and 
cultural ‘authenticity’. 
 
The following section (1.1) presents the history of the ‘Cyprus conflict’ through official 
and unofficial competing narratives in order to offer a background context for the rest of 
the thesis. It is followed by a review of the anthropological literature on nationalisms in 
Cyprus as well as studies on the Cypriot diaspora, in order to illustrate the ways in 
which the thesis builds on and converges from this body of work and to set its 
theoretical framework (1.2). The third part of the chapter (1.3) discusses the 
methodological approach of the research, presents the fieldwork sites and analyses some 
of the challenges that emerged during research. The final part (1.4) offers an overview 
of the thesis by outlining and summarising its main chapters. 
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1.1 The History(-ies) of the Cyprus Conflict. 
It has become commonplace in most recent academic accounts of the ‘Cyprus problem’ 
to acknowledge that historiography and competing narrations of the past have played a 
major role in the (re)production of the conflict (Papadakis 2005; 2008). It is, therefore, 
almost an impossible task to trace historically the Cyprus conflict without relying on 
and recycling to some extent these historiographic traditions, their language and 
concepts. The most efficient way to deal with this limitation is to acknowledge a priori 
the contested character of major events and to present -whenever possible- how they are 
debated and presented by different sides. This section offers a brief overview not only 
of some of the important historical periods and aspects of the conflict but also of some 
competing understandings around them, as they are articulated in official accounts, 
public discourses and individual narratives. 
      *** 
The island of Cyprus is located in the south Mediterranean, in a strategic position 
between Europe, Asia and Africa, which is often presented in popular narratives as one 
of the main reasons that Cyprus has been conquered and colonised so many times 
during its history (c.f. Hitchens 1997). Making claims to a Hellenic past and lineages, 
Greek Cypriots often emphasise on the arrival of ancient Greeks in 1200 B.C. as the 
first colonisers of the island; many Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, see 1571 as a 
starting historical point, since this was the year that the island was passed over to the 
Ottoman Turks, after being occupied by Venetians between 1489 and 1571 and a 
Lusignan dynasty of Jerusalem France between 1191 and 1489 (Calotychos 1998: 5). 
On the other hand, it is characteristic that those who support a common Cypriot identity 
in order to distance themselves from the dominant nationalist narratives give greater 
emphasis on the numerous conquerors of Cyprus and explain Cypriot culture as a result 
of long historical processes of mixing and exchange. ‘Who knows where we are from? 
Cyprus was conquered so many times’, is a representative expression of such Cyprio-
centric approach echoed in everyday discussions. 
 
In 1878 the Ottomans rented Cyprus to the British and in 1914 the island was officially 
annexed to the British empire as part of its colonies. At that time the island consisted of 
73.9% Orthodox Greeks and 24.4% Moslem Turks (ibid.). During the Ottoman period, 
the two communities operated separately, with the Orthodox Church of Cyprus having 
been given control over the affairs of Greek Cypriots. A similar system of dealing 
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separately with the two communities was also maintained by the British rulers, 
especially in the realms of education, religion and cultural affairs. The British, however, 
administratively, placed the Greeks and the Turks on the same level. For the Greeks, 
who had been subordinated to Turkish custom and law during the Ottoman Empire, this 
meant ‘rising up’, whereas the Turks were ‘pulled down’ (Loizos 1981:41).  During the 
British rule, the idea of union (enosis) with Greece started to become popular among 
Greek Cypriots, however, any moves to gain alignment with Greece during that period 
were quashed. English became a common language and British-style institutions were 
established on the island (Fisher 2001: 309). But it was during that period, as Bryant 
(2004: 2) argues, that identity became singular and ethnic, the outcome of which she 
describes as ‘ethnic estrangement’, ‘or the process by which people one knows may 
nevertheless appear to be or to become strangers’. 
 
During the four centuries before independence, Muslim Turks lived dispersed 
throughout the island, both in separate villages and mixed villages with the Christian 
Greeks. With the exception of some occasional violent events, social relationships 
between the two groups were relatively harmonious (Loizos 1981:40) and it was not 
unusual for Orthodox Greeks and Moslem Turks to co-operate to ‘further their interests’ 
(Calotychos 1998:5), although intermarriage was not a common practice. In terms of 
language, as it was mentioned before, English was used by both communities, while at 
the same time each group maintained their separate languages. It is important to note, 
however, that, whereas 40% of Turkish Cypriots spoke Greek, most of Greek Cypriots 
did not speak any Turkish. 
 
What is often not fully accounted for in historical narrations of the conflict is the mass 
emigration from Cyprus that peaked in the 1950s and 1960s. As Anthias (1992: 4) 
argues, to unearth the reasons of migration one has to locate it within the colonial 
context. The British colonialists failed to instigate industrial development into what was 
already a problematic agricultural economy suffering from heavy underemployment. 
Many of the protagonists of this thesis left their villages at that time in order to find jobs 
and a better life in the UK. They preferred Britain as they were familiar with the 
colonial context and also because an established Cypriot community had already existed 
in London since the 1930s. However, although migration from Cyprus to the UK has 
been categorised as economic, many Cypriot migrants, especially those from a leftist 
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background, rank their reasons of migrating first as political and then as economic, or at 
least they emphasise in their accounts on a strong interconnection between the two. Mr. 
Demetriadis, who arrived in London in 1952 at the age of twenty-one, came from ‘a 
right-wing family of farmers’, as he describes it, from a village near Nicosia. In his 
teens, he was sent by his parents to Larnaca to attend school and it was there that he 
discovered Marxism through sessions that students had secretly organised. ‘Whereas I 
graduated with good marks and I did very well in the exams, I couldn’t find a job. I was 
rejected many times until one day the muhtaris [muhtar in Turkish, the village head] 
told me “Why don’t you change your ideology? Because otherwise you are not going to 
get a job.” They wouldn’t give me a job because some people said that I was 
‘communistaros’ [translated very loosely as ‘hard-core communist’ with negative 
connotations in this case]. After that I just decided to leave and come to England’.  
 
 As new ideologies emerged in the 1940s and 1950s, anti-Communist rhetorics also 
surfaced during the same period (Anthias and Ayres 1983), which partly explains 
experiences of marginalisation and exclusion as articulated by Mr. Demetriadis. In 
1947, for instance, the Archbishop publicly declared communism as incompatible with 
Hellenism and Christianity, implying that a real Greek Orthodox could not be a 
communist (Kızılyürek 1999: 50, Loizides 2007: 176). 
 
In 1955 the quest for union with Greece (enosis) was intensified and EOKA (National 
Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) was formed as a self proclaimed liberating movement 
against British colonialism. The group engaged in guerrilla warfare and operated under 
the leadership of Georgios Grivas (Markides 1977). The reaction to the guerrilla 
movement resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives, and alienated the Turkish population 
who responded to enosis with a call for the partition of the island (taksim) into two 
separate communities (Loizos 1981). The Turkish Cypriots aligned themselves with the 
British and established the TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization) (Papadakis 
1998:149), which engaged in limited intercommunal fighting with the Greek Cypriots, 
until a ceasefire was implemented in 1958 (Fisher 2001:310). 
 
It was not only the Turkish Cypriots, who were excluded from the language of 
liberation and patriotism of EOKA, but also leftists and communists. EOKA’s 
leadership saw the communists as outside the national community and as threats to their 
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struggle and decided to form allies with the Church of Cyprus and other conservative 
agents (Loizides 2007: 176). Mr. Andreas, an EOKA fighter, who now lives as a 
pensioner in Larnaca, was sharing with me and his daughter, who was visiting him from 
the UK, his stories in the organisation, when I asked him about their anti-communist 
agenda. ‘We never really had an anti-communist agenda’, he said, ‘it’s true that you 
couldn’t be a member if you were a communist, because we suspected that they could 
be traitors. But, you know, some communists helped indirectly. I had a communist 
friend, who had a lot of knowledge about bombs and sometimes I’d ask his help. And if 
there were attacks on leftists, this had most of the times to do with interpersonal 
problems and tensions. We didn’t have an order to kills leftists’.  
 
Mr. Andreas’s interpretation of the EOKA agenda did not, however, correspond with 
that of communists and leftists, who not only see their exclusion from the EOKA 
struggle as a direct attack on their ideology but they often present the organisation as 
anti-communist in its genesis, with a primary focus on expunging communism from the 
island (see chapter 3). This is a common argument in popular critiques of EOKA that 
present the goal of the organisation as threefold including ‘the expulsion of the colonial 
rule, the subordination of the Turkish Cypriots and the weakening of the Communists’ 
(Igoumenides 1999: 31 cited in Loizides 2007: 176). 
 
Although the level of EOKA’s anti-communist strategy is debated across different 
ideological positions and historical interpretations, it is commonly accepted that the 
operations of EOKA and TMT broke to a large extent horizontal relationships between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots, who had been members of AKEL3 and 
PEO (Pancyprian Federation of Labour) and participated with Greek Cypriots in 
working-class struggles and strikes, were forced to leave such organisations under the 
pressure and threats by TMT (Anthias and Ayres 1983: 69). At the same time, AKEL 
demonstrated an ambivalent stance towards enosis. Its long-term support for self-
determination that in cases was perceived to imply union with Greece and its inability –
or what some of its critics frame as ‘unwillingness’- to directly oppose Hellenic 
chauvinism resulted to its failure to unite and incorporate Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
into the anti-colonial struggle (ibid.: 76). AKEL supporters often distance themselves 
                                                 
3
 Although, as Adams (1971: 44) argues, AKEL was not successful in approaching Turkish Cypriots and, 
therefore, Turkish Cypriot membership in the party remained quite limited. 
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from the nationalist forces that have contributed to the Cyprus conflict by claiming that 
‘the Left has no blood in their hands’, implying that they have not participated in inter-
communal conflict and violence. At the same time, in these narratives, AKEL’s shifting 
stance towards enosis is highly underplayed and rarely debated. 
 
In 1960, Greek and Turkish Cypriots accepted an independence document that was 
drafted by Britain, Greece and Turkey, who were to act as guarantors to protect the 
sovereignty of the new state (Papadakis 1998: 152). The 1960 Constitution was a 
complex power-sharing arrangement with both a national legislature and two communal 
chambers, and a cabinet, public service, police force and army (Fisher 2001: 310). In the 
newly formed state, Archbishop Makarios became the first President of the Republic of 
Cyprus, a clear proof of the strong continuing link between church and state, and Dr. 
Fazil Kutchuk, in the capacity of the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, was 
appointed as the Vice-President. 
 
The 1960 agreement, however, did not bring an end to the already existing inter-
communal tensions and both groups maintained the same political style by seeking to 
gain advantages within the same arrangement. The quest for enosis did not diminish 
and, simultaneously, Turkish Cypriots continued to pursue the idea of a bi-communal 
and bi-zonal political solution as articulated through the language of taksim. Within this 
political climate of antagonism, Greek Cypriots eventually proposed alterations to the 
original agreement, which would reduce the autonomy and representation of the Turkish 
Cypriots (Calotychos 1998: 7). As expected the proposed amendments were rejected by 
the Turkish Cypriot side, and these events were followed by a period of inter-communal 
violence and hostility (Loizos 1981; Papadakis 1998). 
 
The number of mixed villages and areas dropped during this period, as thousands of 
Turkish Cypriots and some Greek Cypriots fled their houses to safer areas. In the years 
1963-1964 and 1967, the Turkish Cypriots suffered the greater losses and many of them 
moved to areas that gradually became their armed enclaves (Patrick 1976; Loizos 1981; 
Papadakis 1998; Fisher 2001). In the narratives of many Turkish Cypriots life in the 
enclaves is remembered as a time of violence, insecurity and poverty. Mr. Ibrahim, for 
instance, who moved to the UK after 1974, is a committed leftist and participates in bi-
communal events in London, recalls the ‘enclave years’ by saying: ‘I know it was not 
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all Greek Cypriots who did horrible stuff and I understand that everything happened 
because of nationalism and nationalists. However, I can never forget those times in the 
enclaves. I could see sometimes Greek Cypriot men waving women’s underwear and 
saying “This is Ayșe’s4” and making horrible sexual jokes. It was a really bad time that 
I could never forget’. 
 
The increasing level of violence led to concerns in NATO and ultimately to the 
involvement of the UN. The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)5 was 
established in March 1964 and remains on the island to this day. Hostility and 
intercommunal violence continued in the remainder of the 1960s and the early 1970s 
‘punctuated by intermittent crises sparking Turkish involvement and repeated calls for 
enosis by nationalist elements in the Greek-Cypriot community’ (Fisher 2001:310). 
 
The rise of a military junta in Greece also caused great political implications for Cyprus. 
With the support of the junta, EOKA B, a paramilitary pro-enosis organisation, was 
formed and started a series of attacks, killings and violent episodes against the 
government and members of the left-wing party (Hitchens 1997:71). All this violence 
culminated in a coup in 1974 and the situation erupted into major crisis. Whereas, 
initially, the fighting started between the coupists and left-wing supporters of Makarios, 
it was later followed by attacks on the Turkish Cypriot villages and enclaves. Turkey 
responded to the events with military intervention and Turkish forces moved to occupy 
37% of the Northern part of the island (Papadakis 1998:152). The existing regime 
collapsed and the two sides were now separated. The dividing line, known as the ‘Green 
line’ that had been drawn in Nicosia by UN forces to deal with inter-communal 
violence, was now extended to separate the island into two parts. 
 
The Turkish invasion caused the exodus of about 160,000 Greek Cypriots to the south 
of the island, creating a complicated refugee problem (see Zetter 1998). Subsequent to 
                                                 
4
 Ayșe is a common Turkish name. In this particular narrative, Greek Cypriots appear to utilise the name 
in order to imply rape and assault. For the uses of rape both as a war strategy and a metaphor during 
conflict as well as for a broader analysis of the connections between nationalism and women, Yuval 
Davies and Anthias’s ‘Woman-Nation-State’ (1989) offer comprehensive discussions on the topic. 
5
 For more information on UNFICYP, see James (1989), who examines in detail the extent to which UN 
peace-keeping forces in Cyprus have fulfilled their purpose and how they could contribute to re-
conciliation. Ker-Lindsay (2005) provides a comprehensive history of the UN presence in Cyprus 
between 1964 and 2004. In a different publication, Ker-Lindsay (2006) examines the shifts in the agenda 
of the UN peace-keeping forces in Cyprus and speculates about their future in the island. 
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the ceasefire, an agreement on the voluntary regrouping of populations resulted in 
approximately 40,000 Turkish Cypriots moving to the North, while the approximately 
10,000 Greek Cypriots who remained in the north were pressured to go south. Thus the 
events of 1974, in which several thousand people were killed or went missing, had the 
effect of creating two separate ethnic zones on the island (Calotychos 1998: 8). 
 
In 1975, the Turkish Cypriot community declared itself as the Turkish Federated State 
of Cyprus, with Rauf Denktaș as its first leader. The northern part of Cyprus officially 
declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983. 
While the south part of the island, essentially the Greek Cypriot administration, gained 
international recognition and legitimacy as the official Republic of Cyprus, the state of 
northern Cyprus is only recognised by Turkey and it is treated internationally as an 
illegal non-state (ibid.: 9). At the same time, Greek Cypriots increasingly started 
dissociating their self-definition from Greece and Turkey and focusing on a Cypriot 
identity. Although Attalides (1979:57-80) describes the existence of a ‘Cypriot 
consciousness’ before 19746, Papadakis (1998: 153), however, argues that only after 
1974 Cypriotness emerged as a symbolic resource for the state’s official agenda to seek 
re-unification. 
 
In 1990, the Republic of Cyprus initiated a unilateral application to join the European 
Union, which further alienated the Turkish Cypriots. As Argyrou (1996: 43) highlights, 
regardless of their ideological divisions on the national issues, all political parties in 
Cyprus reproduced a Eurocentric rhetoric, in which Cyprus was portrayed as ‘an 
integral part of Europe’. Even AKEL, although it expressed a concern about the EU 
application, did not take an explicit anti-European stance. According to the author, 
AKEL’s initial cautionary reaction was motivated more by an attempt to maintain its 
public façade as a communist party, rather than because of any ideological objections to 
the ‘Europeaness’ of Cyprus (ibid: 48). 
 
Before the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU in 2004, hopes were momentarily raised 
about the possibility for reunification. In November 2002, UN Secretary-General Kofi 
                                                 
6
 At the same time, Attalides underlines that this ‘Cypriot consciousness’ was never properly formulated 
or fully articulated. 
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Annan released a plan7 for the reunification of the island and the solution of the Cyprus 
problem and the leaders of the northern and southern Cyprus engaged in rounds of 
negotiations. During the negotiations, Denktaș, the leader of northern Cyprus, opened 
the Green Line in 2003, in his effort to demonstrate a diplomatic expression of good 
will. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots could now cross the line for the first time in 
decades. Although the official Greek Cypriot side accepted the Denktaș’s 
announcement with reluctance, in the first weeks of the opening people poured in their 
thousands to cross and visit their old houses, neighbourhoods and friends. After long 
term division and isolation of the two communities, the possibility to cross opened new 
debates about the meanings of the opening and its possible significance for the future of 
Cyprus (Cockburn 2004: 7).   
 
After countless rounds of negotiations, the Annan plan was placed before the two 
communities in a vote in the reunification referendum of 24 April 2004. Political 
discussions on the plan took interesting and, in cases, unexpected directions to the 
extent that, as Vural and Peristianis (2008: 40) suggest, ‘seem to have transformed the 
historical division between left and right into a much more complex confrontation’.  
The strongest supporters of the plan appeared to be the leftist CTP (the Republican 
Turkish Party) on the Turkish Cypriot side and the right-wing DISI (Democratic Rally) 
on the Greek Cypriot side. Tassos Papadopoulos, the President of the Republic at the 
time, as well as his political party DIKO (Democratic Party) strongly campaigned 
against the plan. A ‘No’ position was adopted by the Turkish Cypriot right-wing parties 
too. What was noticeable, however, is that AKEL, although it initially supported the 
plan, in a last minute manoeuvre invited its supporters to reject it. The official 
justification of the shift was that the plan needed to be further improved in order to 
become accepted by the majority of Greek Cypriots. Whilst the proposal received a 65% 
favourable vote from the Turkish community, the Greek Cypriot community rejected it 
                                                 
7
 In reality, there was a series of previously drafted versions that led to the final proposed plan, the Annan 
V or what is most commonly referred to as the ‘Annan Plan’. A detailed version of the Annan plan can be 
found on the United Nations specially created website, on www.cyprus-un-plan.org. For a comprehensive 
analysis of the Plan as well as the referendums and their results, see Varnava and Faustmann’s (2009) 
‘Reunifying Cyprus. The Annan plan and Beyond’.  
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by over 75%8. Reunification therefore did not take place, and whereas the whole island 
joined the European Union on 1 May 2004, EU legislation only applies in the 
recognised Republic of Cyprus and is suspended in the north part until a solution of the 
‘Cyprus problem’ is achieved.  
 
After four years, in February 2008, Christofias was elected president of the Republic of 
Cyprus, while CTP9’s Mehmet Ali Talat was already head of the state in TRNC. That 
was the first time in Cypriot modern history that the two communist parties and old 
allies were in power simultaneously on either side of the Green Line and such political 
synchronicity inevitably raised hopes for some Cypriots, who welcomed it as a great 
opportunity for a faster achievement of ‘peace’ and ‘reunification’. Indeed shortly after 
Christofias’s election, and just after fieldwork for the thesis ended, the two leaders 
embarked on a long series of face-to-face ‘peace talks’ in search for a settlement of the 
Cyprus issue.  
 
 
1.2 Re-viewing ‘the Anthropology of Cyprus’: From researching ethnic        
nationalism(s) to researching Cypriotism 
 
It is quite widely accepted that ‘the Anthropology of Cyprus’ developed mainly after 
Peter Loizos’s ethnographic study of a Greek Cypriot village, Argaki, which he first 
visited in the mid-1960s. It is worth noting that, like some of the protagonists of this 
thesis, Loizos’s own father had been a Greek Cypriot, one of the first communists in 
Cyprus, who left the island on his own volition in the 1930s after being in conflict with 
the Church because of his ideological position (1981:3). When Loizos arrived in 
Argaki, he found himself quite unexpectedly ‘returning’ to a place that he had never 
known or experienced before. He embarked on a study of local power structures and 
                                                 
8
 For the reasons of the rejection of the Annan plan outlined officially by the Greek Cypriots, see the 
‘Letter by the President of the Republic, Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, to the UN Secretary-General, Mr 
Kofi Annan, dated 7 June, which circulated as an official document of the UN Security Council’ on the 
Cypriot Ministry of the Interior website, www.moi.gov.cy. Sözen and Özersay (2007) also discuss the 
reasons behind the rejection of the Annan plan by the Greek Cypriot community arguing that Greek 
Cypriots were not ready to commit to the levels of power-sharing with Turkish Cypriots that were 
proposed in the plan. 
9
 According to Panayiotou (2006: 272), ‘[t]he T/C Left re-emerged autonomously in the 1970s within the 
officially Kemalist Republican Turkish Party, CTP, but it was excluded from power (much like AKEL) 
before the 1990s. The CTP’s “historical moment” arrived after 2000, when it came to express (in electoral 
terms) the social movement against the nationalist establishment, with the declared aim to support a 
solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis of a form of Cypriot civil patriotism’. 
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politics and their connection to broader political processes on a national level, which 
resulted to his first book titled ‘The Greek Gift’ (1975a). What Loizos did not know at 
the time of his arrival is that the people of Argaki in a few years time, as a result of the 
1974 coup and then the Turkish intervention, would have to leave their village and 
become refugees. Quite unconventionally, Loizos managed to follow the life trajectories 
of his informants across the span of almost four decades, documenting their refugee 
experiences and mechanisms of re-adjustment almost immediately after 1974 (1981) 
and more recently publishing on the impact of displacement on the livelihood and health 
of the same Argaki people and their descendents (2008). 
 
Although anthropological work in Cyprus has engaged with issues such as kinship, 
gender, honour and patronage, tradition and modernity (see Peristiany 1966; Sant Cassia 
1982, 1993; Argyrou 1993), the majority of the literature generated especially after 
1974 has concentrated mainly around the study of the conflict. There are some 
insightful ethnographic accounts of Northern Cyprus (Navaro-Yashin 2003a, 2003b, 
2006), however, most post-conflict ethnography has focused on the southern part of the 
island with a number of studies offering a comparative analysis of aspects of the 
conflict on both sides (Bryant 2004, Papadakis 2005). Studies on inter-ethnic relations, 
population exchanges, refugees, land issues and missing persons have offered a micro-
level understanding of the situation and this type of literature has dominated 
anthropological research in Cyprus for the past three decades (see Loizos 1975a, 1975b, 
1981, 1988; Papadakis 1993, 1994; Calotychos 1998; Sant Cassia 1999, 2005; 
Papadakis, Peristianis and Welz 2006).  
  
Most of this work has focused on the dividing aspects of the conflict, in order to unveil 
the processes and operations of nationalism. For the ethnographers of the conflict, 
understanding and deconstructing nationalism became a major quest in explaining how 
violence and division comes about, becomes consolidated and is reproduced. Sant 
Cassia (1999), for instance, analyses the separate campaigning techniques of Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots in relation to their missing persons. He studies mainly photographic 
material and official publications that unravel the differences in the representation of 
suffering between the two sides. According to Sant Cassia (1999:26), ‘[…] the 
differences are relatable not just to their different persuasive strategies, but also to 
different approaches to photography, to experience and memory’. 
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During the period of conflict and inter-communal violence, in the years between 1963 
and 1974, it is estimated that 2,000 persons, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, 
disappeared and for a long time few of the bodies had only been recovered (ibid.)10. The 
official campaigns in relation to the missing persons by both sides have been consistent 
and powerful, however, diametrically different in their approaches. Greek photography 
seems to emphasise absence in the representation of the missing, attempts to construct a 
continuity with the past, aims at emotion, is subtitled with questions and draws on 
individual memories. On the other hand, Turkish photographic material tends to 
construct a presence, does not maintain continuity with the past, adopts a realistic 
approach, is subtitled mainly by statements and seeks to evoke and construct collective 
memories.  
 
Sant Cassia (ibid.) argues that the different approaches reflect the differences in the 
nationalist rhetorics and the official accounts of the conflict between the two sides. 
Material culture has often been brought into the foreground in studies of nationalism, in 
order to illustrate how national identity becomes embodied in the context of the 
nationalist project (Lowenthal 1985; Hewison 1987; Handler 1988). Papadakis (1994) 
has also focused on material culture in order to illustrate the articulation of Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalisms, in his study of Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot museums. Bryant (2004) has examined the historical production and lineages of 
what she calls ‘two conflicting styles of nationalist imagination’ that were (re)produced 
by respective elites in both communities and then gained particular appeal amongst the 
masses. Within the colonial context, Christians and Muslims in Cyprus were turned into 
Greeks and Turkish respectively. Such transformations were based on particular 
understandings of and claims to history that were produced and –more importantly- 
embodied through various processes and institutions, not least through knowledge 
systems and educational traditions. Greek Cypriots, therefore, emphasise on a 
primordial understanding of history, according to which Cyprus has always been 
                                                 
10
 In the past few years, especially since 2006 a group of scientists of both Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
background have launched a successful project that has led to the discovery and exhumation of the bodies 
of many missing persons. Sevgül Uludağ, a Turkish Cypriot journalist, who has taken up a leading role in 
searching for information on missing persons and opening publicly one of the most taboo topics in 
Cyprus describes the politics around the issue, individual trajectories and findings in her book ‘Oysters 
with the Missing Pearls’ (2006).  
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Hellenic; on the other hand, Turkish Cypriots take historical contingency (the Ottoman 
conquest of Cyprus in 1571) as their social basis. 
 
However, the major question here that most of the literature tries to address is how, 
when and why nationalism(s) as an ideology and political project has gained so much 
acceptance and popularity amongst Cypriots. To answer this question, Sant Cassia 
(1999) argues in relation to official nationalist campaigns on missing persons, that the 
specific approaches draw their success by building upon and reflecting the particular 
memories and experiences of the people. He explores these memories and experiences 
through the analysis of religious symbolism. Although cautious about his suggestions, 
Sant Cassia draws parallels between the campaign photographs and Christian and 
Islamic iconography and goes further to establish a connection between current 
cosmological perspectives and theological tradition. Although he focuses on religious 
symbolism and dogma analysis, explaining less how such symbolisms and religious 
doctrine manifest themselves in peoples’ everyday lives, he manages, however, to 
demonstrate how nationalist symbols and rhetorics are patterned in the shape of local 
experiences and memories, and illustrate, to a large extent, the popular appeal of 
nationalism. 
 
Highlighting the connection between processes of nationalism and local experiences and 
conditions is a task that Papadakis (1998) also undertakes in his own ethnographic 
accounts of the Cypriot conflict. Many theorists have treated nationalism as a process 
mainly articulated from above (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983), whereas others, in order 
to explain the mass popularity of nationalism, have developed primordialist arguments 
that see nations based on pre-existing ethnic cores, or ethnies (Smith 1991: 37), thus, 
dangerously naturalising nationalism. Papadakis, however, seeks to synthesise the two 
approaches by presenting how nationalism is internally contested among Greek 
Cypriots.  
 
He isolates two models of nationalism: the ‘Greek’ model and the ‘Cypriot’ model, 
which he associates with the major right-wing and left-wing parties respectively11. The 
                                                 
11
 In the Republic of Cyprus, the major right-wing party is named Dimokratikos Sinayermos [Democratic 
Rally] (DISI), whereas the major left-wing party is called Anorthotiko Komma Erghazomenou Laou 
[Party of the Uprising of the Working People] (AKEL).  
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Right stereotypically support enosis with Greece, emphasise their Greek identity on the 
expense of their Cypriot identity, and present history as an eternal struggle against their 
major threat, the Turks. On the other hand, the Left stress their ‘Cypriotness’ rather than 
‘Greekness’, react with suspicion to the idea of enosis and express their desire for 
rapprochement, independence and the reunification of Cyprus. 
 
In order to present nationalism as a contested process, Papadakis then diverts attention 
to the individual supporters of these parties, illustrating how ‘grand narratives’ are 
linked with local and personal history (1998:151). One of the main themes of this 
discussion ‘concerns the ways in which such narratives express self-justification and 
assign blame to other agents’ (ibid.). As Bhabha (1990) has characteristically argued, 
the nation’s construction needs to be searched within social life and in the ambivalence, 
in which it is narrated top-down and by those who live it.  
 
Papadakis became alerted to the inherent link between ‘the national’ and ‘the personal’, 
when the personal biographies he was determined to collect would often turn into 
political commentaries on local or national history interweaved with personal 
experiences. As he testifies, 
 
I gradually realized that personal narratives consistently evolved 
into wider commentaries as the narrators addressed certain key 
historical junctures. At such junctures individuals were inevitably 
incorporated into events of wider significance even if they had not 
been active participants. The ways in which people became 
involved, however, were not uniform, because these trajectories 
depended on the actors’ respective political affiliations (1998:160). 
 
As suggested here, nationalism is not a one-way but a dialectical process. The parties’ 
rhetorics gain appeal because they are adapted on their supporters’ personal experiences 
and memories; on the other hand, these experiences and memories are shaped and re-
constructed through peoples’ exposure to the ‘grand narratives’ of nationalism. At the 
same time, subscribing to political parties’ ideologies does not carry the same meaning 
for everyone. Papadakis’s informants justify their membership in political parties 
presenting a wide variety of reasons and engage in self-reflection and criticism. 
Therefore, ‘if anything unites Greek Cypriots in a community, it is their participation in 
 20
a debate about what constitutes the nation, not some shared conception of “the nation”’ 
(Papadakis 1998:162). 
 
It is then possible to examine how individuals have the potential to strategically deal 
with nationalist ideology and symbols, engage in self-reflection and articulate counter-
nationalist discourses. There have been many studies on the creation of social memory 
and perpetuation of nationalist ideology and ethnic dichotomies in Cyprus; such studies 
have focused on education (Bryant 1998a, 1998b; Spyrou 2000, 2002), political rituals 
and commemorative events (Papadakis 2003) and ethnic stereotypes (Brown and 
Theodossopoulos 2004; Papadakis 2004) in the construction of ‘otherness’ and creation 
of an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983). The important common feature of most 
of these studies is that they try to go beyond identifying and describing the assumed 
totalising effects of nationalism; they rather highlight the processes through which 
individuals manage symbols and meanings in their everyday life. 
 
By focusing on forgetting rather than memory in Cyprus, for instance, Papadakis 
(1993:139) attempts to reveal how the two are interlinked. Greek Cypriot historiography 
has underplayed or even been silent about some events of the past that jeopardise the 
internal unity of Greek Cypriots and endanger their national causes and agendas. These 
ambivalences in official historiography, however, create spaces for different views of 
history that individual agents seek to fill with their personal stories and experiences of 
what happened in Cyprus. Certain groups of Cypriots, for example, do not share the 
official narrative’s silence on interethnic conflict and, for their own purposes, violent 
events of the past hold a dominant position in their narratives of the Cypriot history 
(ibid.:147).  It becomes understood, therefore, that the spaces left vacant in official 
historiography are internally and internationally contested, as the different experiences 
of the agents may give rise to different memories (ibid.:139). 
 
The interplay between official historical narratives and individual memories and 
experiences is utilised in this thesis as an important analytical lens in order to 
understand the construction of political subjectivities and the articulation of counter-
discourses. In large parts, my research traces the ways, in which Cyprio-centric 
narratives of the past have been historically constructed and articulated as alternatives to 
the dominant traditions of Greek and Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. Cypriotists in the 
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island and the diaspora have experienced and presented their own identities as 
marginalised and under-represented in the mainstream discourses. According to 
Peristianis (2006a), anthropological work in Cyprus for a long time concentrated its 
attention on the study of ethnic politics and ethnic nationalism on the expense of 
Cypriotism that is characterised as a form of civic nationalism (Brubaker 1998; see also 
chapter 2). Loizos, for instance, in his historical account of Greek nationalism in Cyprus 
from 1878 to 1970, focused merely on this form of nationalism as he was convinced 
that the quest for enosis had rendered another type of nationalism, Cypriot nationalism, 
impossible (Peristianis 2006a: 101). Peristianis, however, argues that a form of civic 
nationalism has developed in Cyprus and its history, discursive formation and dynamics 
has been documented in more recent works on the topic by the author himself as well as 
other academics (Stamatakis 1991; Papadakis 1993, 1998, 2006, Mavratsas 1999). Most 
of this work has investigated how Cyprio-centric ideas are employed in particular 
contexts and times in order to challenge the long-term dominance of ethnic nationalism. 
I build on these research findings and take them as an analytical basis in the thesis in 
order to move beyond this binary and focus on Cypriotism in itself, aiming to examine 
how it is (re)constructed, understood and practised in everyday life and how new 
identities but also contradictions and shifting power relations emerge through these 
processes.  
 
However, I do not document these narratives as missing blocks of truth in the 
historicisation of the Cypriot conflict. Foucault (1980) explains how every social 
discourse with particular claims to ‘truth’ encounters a counter-discourse that aims to 
challenge it. But as he suggests, ‘truth’ should be defined as the product of the struggle 
between competing discourses; in other words, there is no absolute historical truth to be 
achieved, as it is power that always produces particular ideas about what is true. To a 
large extent, I examine in the thesis how particular claims to truth develop through the 
antagonistic but also dialectical relationship between ethnic nationalism and Cyprio-
centric articulations of the nation and I argue that the political repertoire of Cypriots is 
discursively pre-determined by these two ideological traditions. Cypriotists, therefore, 
often reproduce the language of ethnic nationalism (although the opposite process is 
also observable) not only as a sign of what Herzfeld (1997) calls ‘cultural intimacy’, an 
essentialising process of reverting to the dominant language of the state in order to 
represent the national self to outsider others, who are considered of higher power; but 
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also in order to engage critically with Cypriotism itself, when it renders their own 
experiences and identities marginalised. Because, although a popularly assumed 
unifying idea, Cypriotism as a discourse stems from and creates particular loci of power, 
which produce internal spaces of exclusion and oppression. 
 
Butler (1997: 2), building on the Foucauldian theory of discourse, argues that we all 
speak within a language that already exists, when she asks: ‘Is our vulnerability to 
language a consequence of our being constituted within its terms?’, in order then to say 
that ‘[i]f we are formed in language, then that formative power precedes and conditions 
any decision we might make about it, insulting us from the start, as it were, by its prior 
power’. In other words, political subjectivities are produced through repeating and 
performing an established language and, therefore, reinforcing the power structures that 
maintain the discourse, within which they operate. However, ‘counter-speech’ (ibid.15) 
that resists the dominant discourse is possible, but, instead of locating resistance within 
the framework of ‘individual agency’, Butler suggests that it lies in this very notion of 
repetition. She (1993: 220) argues that every act of repetition is similar but not identical 
in various contexts and it is performativity that enables the ‘contingent and fragile 
possibility’ of transforming the discourse by exposing the power, which sustains it. This 
is an important idea in examining how Cypriotism is performed by multiple agents in 
ways that reinforce established understandings of ‘Cypriotness’ and create particular 
identities around this notion. But through performing Cypriotism, individual agents 
simultaneously reproduce and transform the power structures, within which the nation is 
imagined, and the thesis traces these processes as they unravel in a number of social 
spaces. 
 
Bryant (2004: 7) has observed that ‘Cypriotness’, articulated against ‘Greekness’ or 
‘Turkishness’, has been growing as a form of identification in the past few years. 
Cypriots have increasingly imagined themselves independently of associated 
motherlands. ‘The EU has presented new possibilities, new forms of sameness and 
otherness, and hence a new hierarchy of values in which it is possible not simply to live 
Cypriotness but even to value it’ (ibid.). Also, the opening of the Green Line in 2003 
and the prospects for a solution temporarily raised by the Annan plan brought Cyprio-
centric discourses to the foreground in public debates and language but also under 
academic investigation. From studying division and separation, researchers turned their 
 23
attention to new contexts of contact and communication created by such developments 
and to their potential impact on the future of Cyprus. A body of work on crossings was 
produced to investigate the new realities that were produced through interaction 
(Dikomitis 2005, 2009; Demetriou 2007; Hadjipavlou 2009; Bryant 2010).  
 
Such research unravelled how new opportunities for bi-communal relationships, 
friendships, sharing of space and memories and political co-operation emerged and were 
utilised; at the same time, however, contact and communication created new borders 
and divisions, some times in unexpected patterns. In her recent book ‘The Past in 
Pieces: Belonging in the New Cyprus’, Bryant (2010) demonstrates how the opening of 
the checkpoints significantly challenged long-standing ideas, imaginings and myths on 
both sides. Greek Cypriots crossed to the North to realise that it was not the backwards 
and wrapped in a time-capsule place that their media and official political rhetoric had 
propagated; this realisation led to another, perhaps more painful, understanding that the 
return of the Greek Cypriot refugees to their houses in the North, but more importantly 
the return to a social space and community in the way that they were before 1974, was 
now an unattainable dream. For Turkish Cypriots, the opening of the borders collapsed 
the idea of tanıma, recognition, as it had for years been pursued by Turkish Cypriot 
political leaders (ibid.: 170). Consequently, the opening of the checkpoints in some 
respects widened the distance between the two communities.  
 
The analysis of the political developments in ‘New Cyprus’ in terms of ‘new 
opportunities for contact’ and ‘new borders’ is employed in the thesis as a helpful way 
of exploring how political subjectivities and power dynamics form but also shift in 
particular times and contexts. However, the thesis moves beyond exploring these 
processes solely on an inter-ethnic level. It is argued here that, as Cyprio-centric 
discourses became popular and Cypriots debated the future of the ‘nation’, a renewed 
interest of members of the diaspora in Cypriot politics resulted in new venues of contact 
between the island and Cypriots abroad but also in new spaces of tension and conflict 
between these contexts as well as on other intra-diasporic, intra-ethnic and inter-
generational levels.  
 
Considering the large numbers of Cypriots who have emigrated and the connections 
between those who live in the UK with the island, one is left to wonder why the study of 
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the Cypriot diaspora has not been adequately incorporated into the academic discussions 
and research on nationalisms and politics in the island and why the work on Cypriots 
abroad has developed to a large extent as a theoretically and methodologically 
independent body. Most of the literature on Cypriots in the UK is of sociological 
character and has explored mainly the diaspora in their host country by focusing usually 
unilaterally on Turkish Cypriots (Ladbury 1977; Robins and Aksoy 2001; Canefe 
2002;)  or Greek Cypriots (Anthias 1982, 1992).  The main emphasis of such studies has 
been the reproduction of ethnic and cultural identity (Constantinides 1977; Bridgewood 
1986; Papapavlou and Pavlou 2001;), the geographies and politics of migration (Oakley 
1970, 1987, 1989; Solomos and Woodhams 1995;), gender and class (Anthias 1992). 
Increasingly, researchers also became interested in generational aspects of migration 
and identity formation. Canefe (2002) and Anthias (2002, 2006b, 2008) focused on 
second and third generation Turkish and Greek Cypriots respectively in order to 
critically examine issues of ‘belonging’, ‘multiple allegiances’ and ‘hybrid identities’. 
From a media studies perspective, Georgiou (2001) has focused on how media 
consumption in the Cypriot Community Centre contributes to community construction. 
In terms of political organisation, Adamson and Demetriou (2007) argue that Greek 
Cypriot diasporic politics challenge the neat fit between ‘state’ and ‘national identity’ 
and Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) examines Turkish Cypriots’ participation in the host-
country’s political establishment and argues that a limited access to power structures 
impedes on the lobbying potential of the community for issues concerning their country 
of origin. More specifically about peace politics in London, Bertrand (2004) studies 
official political organisations and their actions in London and argues that, although 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots have lived in the diaspora side by side, there is only a small 
number of bi-communal organisations. As he suggests, the political debates between 
nationalist and Cypriotist sides are articulated mainly within each community. The most 
recent ethnographic study of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in London by Göker (2007) 
presents the relationships between the two communities at a very particular historical 
point, just before and after the Annan plan. Göker, who conducted research with 
members of both communities, argues that political developments in Cyprus awakened 
old stereotypes, revived particular memories and consequently put a strain on everyday 
local relationships between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, who were forced to reflect on 
and re-negotiate their own past and identities.  
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Such literature has comprehensibly described the development and articulation of ethnic 
identity among Greek and Turkish Cypriots in London, but it has been less concerned 
with how such identities form and shift in intra-ethnic spaces –both discursive and 
actual- that connect and disconnect the diaspora and Cyprus. On the other hand, studies 
of nationalism in Cyprus have extensively traced the ways in which the nation is 
debated internally in the two main communities, however, they have overlooked to a 
large extent the diasporic perspective in this process. The study of Cypriotism, 
therefore, in a transnational context, provides a lens that brings these two theoretical, 
empirical and methodological trends together, through logics and methods explained in 
the following section. 
 
 
1.3 Studying Cypriotism in a transnational context: methods, sites and challenges. 
Logics and Anxieties of Multi-sited ethnography 
In order to study how connections between the Cypriot diaspora and Cyprus are 
constructed, imagined and articulated through ‘peace politics’ and discourses of 
Cypriotism, this research is concerned with the institutional organisation of Cypriots in 
London. However, in its core, it is not an ethnography of the politics of these 
organisations.  It looks at how ‘community associations’ produce particular loci of 
authority and power and how they articulate ‘peace’ in the process of appropriating it 
and often monopolising it, but if it was to limit itself there the thesis would not be able 
to answer how, when and why Cypriotism finds appeal among Cypriots in the UK 
beyond party ideologies, organisational membership and political views. Researching 
Islamist and secularist politics in Turkey, Navaro-Yashin (2002: 15) chose to not take a 
conventional methodological approach by only recording ‘articulated, conscious and 
formalized narratives’, which would have confined the political within what we 
typically understand as public sphere, but to also look for it beyond such accounts. In 
doing so, the author managed to avoid reproducing essentialised political categories and 
identities in representing Islamists and secularists as ‘communities’. As this project 
endeavours to move beyond sharp distinctions between peace-supporters and 
nationalists, it follows similar paths by tracing discourses of Cypriotism and peace 
within but also beyond and outside official political accounts and locating them in 
multiple other contexts, where they are reproduced and simultaneously, to return to 
Butler (1997), are shifted. After all, the main purpose here is to unravel the internal 
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divisions and contestations of Cypriotism, which is often imagined as homogenising 
and unifying. 
 
Otherwise, the thesis would have missed important connections between formal 
political ideologies and other narratives that frame individual experiences. As the 
following chapters demonstrate, it would be, for instance, inadequate to study the 
popularity of Cypriotism among some first-generation Cypriots in London without 
locating it within their particular experiences of migration, which are often presented as 
a result of their economic and political marginalisation in Cyprus before departure to the 
UK (see chapters 2 and 3). Similarly, it would not be possible to fully understand ‘peace 
politics’ by second-generation British born Cypriots without contextualising it within 
broader inter-generational tensions over cultural identity and authority in the diaspora 
(see chapter 4) or within struggles for ‘cultural authenticity’, when their legitimacy ‘to 
speak as real Cypriots’ is challenged by those living in Cyprus, as chapter 5 discusses in 
relation to their online interactions and exchanges.   
 
Identifying, therefore, ‘peace politics’ with organisational structures and official 
accounts as main centres of power would privilege an one-dimensional understanding of 
political discourse and would overlook contexts where the discourse of Cypriotism is 
reinforced but also contested through the enactment of more complex power 
relationships, multiple individual and collective identities and shifting experiences of 
both inequality and empowerment. Moreover, this approach would risk treating 
diasporic politics as static and unequivocal and reproducing essentialised concepts such 
as ‘community politics’, at the same time missing the spontaneity, in which new sites 
emerge as discursive contexts of Cypriotism, and the dynamism, with which they 
transform and shift. 
 
To capture these processes, the research endorses to a large extent the methodological 
aspirations of ‘multi-sited ethnography’, which has been formed and articulated through 
a large body of anthropological literature in the past few decades. Whereas 
anthropology for a long time had focused on the study of cultures tied to particular 
geographical areas and ethnography was traditionally defined as the product of such 
study, more recent reflections on the ‘field’ have expanded the ways in which it is 
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conceived and approached12. Such critical move was prompted by an increasing 
realisation that processes of globalisation, movements of people, things and 
information, make it increasingly inconceivable to describe the world as a mosaic of 
neatly defined cultures anchored to specific physical locations (Gupta and Ferguson 
1992; Appadurai 1990). Marcus (1995:96), therefore, suggests that ethnography should 
be adjusted in order to ‘examine the circulation of cultural meanings, objects and 
identities in diffuse time-space’ and proposed a variety of methods for ethnographers to 
construct fields, in the absence of physically bounded sites, by following people, things, 
metaphors, narratives, biographies and conflicts. 
 
In line with these suggestions, fieldwork research for this thesis transcended the idea of 
a geographically bound ‘field’ and followed people, narratives and biographies through 
multiple sites, from community associations in London to summer holiday trips to 
Cyprus and from online interactions of Cypriot groups on Facebook to crossings of the 
Cypriot Green Line. The question, however, that emerges here is what sort of ‘field’, if 
any, is constituted out of this movement between contexts. Although anthropological 
research has increasingly moved away from traditional ethnographic practices and has 
been involved in the study of multi-sited processes, multi-sited ethnography still creates 
some methodological anxieties for the anthropologist. It definitely moves away from the 
holistic ethnographic representations that have focused on localism in relation to the 
global. To resolve such anxiety, I return to Marcus (1995: 99), who advocates that 
multi-sited ethnography is not the portrayal of the world system as a whole anymore; 
rather, ‘[…] there is no global in the local-global contrast now so frequently evoked. 
The global is an emergent dimension of arguing about the connection among sites in a 
multi-sited ethnography’. Moreover, Gupta and Ferguson (1997: 5) argue that a real 
redefinition of the so central for anthropology ‘fieldwork’ has to be developed ‘not with 
a time-honored commitment to the local but with an attentiveness to social, cultural, and 
political location and a willingness to work self-consciously at shifting or realigning our 
own location while building epistemological and political links with other locations’ 
(emphasis in the original). 
 
                                                 
12
 Besides the foundational work of Gupta and Ferguson (1992, 1997), Marcus (1995) and Appadurai 
(1990, 1996), more recent edited volumes have revisited and expanded the discussions on what 
constitutes the ‘field’, including Coleman and Collins (2006), De Neve and Unnithan-Kumar (2006), 
Falzon (2009), Coleman and von Hellermann (2009). 
 28
We are, therefore, directed to a flexible (Merry 2000) and opportunistic (Marcus 1995) 
ethnographic practice that is less concerned with circumscribing the field and more 
focused on translocality (Freitag and von Oppen 2010: 19), or, otherwise, on the inter-
links between different and multiple locations and sites. Flexibility and opportunism 
proved particularly crucial in my fieldwork, as they allowed me to adjust my movement 
and strategies in order to follow connections between sites that constantly emerged and 
expanded ‘the field’. In other words, starting with an initial site, fieldwork developed 
not according to a pre-existing plan fixed on where Cypriotism could be located, but 
responding to the ethnographic opportunities rising in the process. Consequently, the 
selection, study and presentation of these sites are not exhaustive of how Cypriotist 
discourses and identities could be examined in a transnational context. The 
ethnographic settings of the thesis are those that emerged as mostly inter-linked and as 
more conspicuously concurrent in the period of fieldwork. By acknowledging this and 
by highlighting again the spontaneity and dynamism, with which sites materialise and 
shift, the thesis does not aim to present a neat and linear account of their connectedness 
by articulating it as inevitable and predictable; it rather recognises the need to pay 
attention to connectivity, the continuous and often unpredictable production of 
connection between contexts, as an inherent feature of fieldwork and vital mode of 
study.   
 
Another concern about multi-sited research lies in its fragmentary nature. As traditional 
ethnography has secured its authenticity and power through long-term fieldwork in one 
place, multi-sited ethnography has often been considered weaker in terms of intensity 
and ‘depth’ (Falzon 2009: 7-8). It is true that in multi-sited ethnographies not all sites 
are treated in the same scope and scale of study (Hannerz 2006). Most of the fieldwork 
time for this thesis, for instance, was spent in London, intermitted by shorter periods of 
stay in Cyprus and, although the research process was long, taking 23 months to 
complete, still the movement between different contexts inevitably involved dividing 
the available time across them –often unevenly. This approach, evidently different from 
conventional anthropological ‘village ethnography’, does not necessarily have to result 
to a compromised quality of the research product. Siding again with Marcus (1995: 
100), ‘to bring these sites into the same frame of study and to posit their relationships on 
the basis of first-hand ethnographic research […] is the important contribution of this 
kind of ethnography, regardless of the variability of the quality and accessibility of that 
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research at different sites’. Moreover, in many cases, the disproportionate time length 
spent by the ethnographer in particular sites often reflects the ways such contexts are 
experienced by the research participants themselves. My movement, for instance, 
between Cyprus and London coincided to a large extent in terms of timing and duration 
with that of many Cypriots, who travelled back and forth. In this sense, instead of 
bringing limitations, ‘multi-sitedness’ can prove an important strategy for participant 
observation. Falzon (2009: 9) underlines this by writing ‘[…] in my case this involved 
moving around, as my people did, and experiencing a broader but possible ‘shallower’ 
world, as they did. Understanding the shallow may itself be a form of depth’.   
 
Such realisation also allows for an ethnographic account of what lies beyond the 
everydayness of experience, on which anthropology has typically concentrated its 
attention and focus as a characteristic feature of fieldwork distinguishing the discipline 
from other research traditions. Malkki (1997), reflecting on her work with Hutu 
refugees in Tanzania, highlights that the ethnographic preoccupation with the everyday 
and ordinary provided an inadequate lens for capturing what her informants were most 
concerned about; extra-ordinary and transitory phenomena that made them refugees and 
defined their experience as such. Similarly, while, on one hand, I was focused on 
researching political identities and discourses of Cypriotism through everyday life in 
London and routinised practices, on the other hand, historical contingencies and 
transformative events directed my study to investigating sites that brought individuals 
together in ways not previously expected. The anticipation for the 2008 elections in the 
Republic of Cyprus, for instance, contributed to the emergence and flourishing of online 
Facebook groups in which some Cypriots from Cyprus and the diaspora united around a 
common agenda of demanding change of the state leadership (see chapter 5). Also, the 
opening of Ledra street in Nicosia after the elections, prompted a revived interest in 
crossing the Green Line among many of my informants producing a new body of 
narratives by those who experienced the crossings –and as a matter of fact, also among 
those who chose not to cross (see chapter 6). Multi-sited ethnography, therefore, was 
crucial in investigating these ‘accidental communities of memory’, a term utilised by 
Malkki (ibid.: 92) to describe common experiences and relationships taking shape at a 
particular point that ‘neither correspond to any ethnologically recognizable community, 
nor form with any inevitability’. It is often the case that due to their ephemerality and 
fragility these contexts escape the ethnographic gaze as insignificant; however, 
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following Malkki, the thesis aims to illustrate how these temporary sites have a 
powerful impact on the identities, language, memory and imagination of those who 
experience them. 
 
Not all multi-sited ethnographic projects necessarily cross national borders (Falzon 
2009: 13), this research, however, does trace the development of political subjectivities 
and Cypriotist discourses within a transnational context. Whereas the study of the 
transnational has challenged the stiff associations of particular cultures and territories 
and of individual identities with bounded communities, the employment of multi-sited 
ethnographic methods to capture cultural and identity production in diverse and distant 
milieus does not disqualify the anthropological preoccupation with the construction and 
meaning of place within such processes; on the contrary, ‘[…] concerns over how we 
understand the role of place, space and locality have become even more evident’ 
(Coleman and Collins 2006: 2).  This clarification is important here as the thesis, by 
moving between different contexts, aims to investigate both the role of place(s) in their 
production as well as place-making practices within them. On one hand, it is argued that 
we cannot understand the ‘production of locality’ (Appadurai 1995) in London without 
examining how ‘Cyprus’, as a particular place (and temporal reference for that matter) 
is employed as an imaginative resource; or we cannot fully interpret the stylistic 
formation and character of Cypriot groups on Facebook without associating them with 
the symbolic dominance of the Green Line as a focal point in the ‘landscape of peace 
activism’. On the other hand, and diverting here from Appadurai in terms of focus, the 
thesis is also concerned to large extent with how individual experiences and inter-
personal relationships, which are located in particular places, shape and determine the 
condition of transnationalism. For instance, the discursive development of a particular 
type of Cypriotism in London that does not only highlight ‘past peaceful coexistence’ 
but also ‘present coexistence’ between Turkish and Greek Cypriots is very much 
defined by local relations and dilemmas between members of the two communities, that 
do not necessarily emerge in the same patterns in Cyprus. Or, as discussed in the next 
session and more extensively in chapter 5, while online spaces are popularly 
characterised by their placelessness, attention to the physical locations from which they 
are accessed reveals the importance of place in shaping the usage and effect of 
Information technologies as tools of political mobilisation. 
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Narrating the Fieldwork: Sites and Strategies. 
Fieldwork for the thesis took place between October 2006 and September 2008, with a 
longer period of research in London for 16 months and two shorter field trips to Cyprus 
in the summers of 2007 and 2008. Although it was originally designed to last for a year, 
historical changes in Cyprus, such as the elections of February 2008 and a revived 
climate of political hope just before them, made the extension of the research time 
almost compulsory in order to capture the impact of such shifts on the field settings. 
For, while I was researching for almost a year ideas on peace and reconciliation and 
Cypriot identity between 2006 and 2007, my fieldnotes were rich with narratives of 
marginalisation, disappointment and pessimism by those who appeared most concerned 
with these issues both in London and Cyprus. The anticipation of the elections, 
however, contributed to a revitalisation of Cyprio-centric discourses and I continued 
fieldwork to investigate such change as well as new sites of politics, or ‘communities of 
memories’, that it prompted.  
 
My interest in diasporic politics developed during an MSc course in Forced Migration at 
the University of Oxford that I took in 2004 and for which I prepared a thesis on the 
politicisation of Kurdish refugees in the UK. At the same time, I had worked as a 
‘Greek teacher’ at a Cypriot school in Brighton since 2003, a position that I held until 
2007 and which increasingly made me aware of Cypriot ‘communities’ in the UK. 
Combining the two, therefore, I embarked on the DPhil to examine political and ethnic 
identity in the context of Cypriot life in London, especially struck by the different ways 
in which various diasporas are represented in popular discourses and media accounts; 
the Kurdish diaspora, for instance, as more radicalised and conflict-supporting, whereas 
the Cypriot as quite ‘peaceful’ and peace-supporting.  
 
As North London has historically become the place where most Cypriot organisations 
are concentrated and a large number of Cypriots reside, I chose it as my initial field site. 
The connections and long-term relationships that I had established with Cypriots in 
Brighton were of valuable help in entering the field, as some of them introduced me to 
their contacts, friends and relatives in London. My primary objective being to study 
‘peace politics’ and discourses of bi-communalism and Cypriotism, I was very quickly 
directed to the Cypriot Community Centre (CCC) in Haringey, as one of the main 
organisations claiming to represent all Cypriots. Its main building, not very far from 
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Wood Green tube station, is open to Cypriots, who want to socialise in the coffee shop, 
to hire its function rooms for gatherings and events or to use its multiple services 
including a unit that caters for the elderly and disabled. I was granted a permission by 
the manager of the centre to conduct research there and I started by interviewing 
managerial and administrative staff members. I also sat in during organisational 
meetings, conversations among members of staff and counselling sessions offered 
particularly to elderly Cypriots, who sought advice about bureaucratic and legal issues, 
usually regarding housing. Unlike a large body of work on what has been categorised as 
‘anthropology of organisations’ (cf. Wright 1994; Corsin Jimenez 2007), my intention 
was not to make the Centre my core ethnographic field and produce a comprehensive 
account of it as an organisation; I rather treated it as one of many sites, where Cypriotist 
discourses are produced, and although I studied how the ‘official line’ of the centre is 
constructed, articulated and practised through its operational activities, in order to move 
beyond official accounts of politics, I also diverted my efforts onto documenting the 
narratives and everyday interactions of Cypriots, who gathered at the centre’s coffee 
shop. Including a core of 20 regulars, at its busiest times the coffee shop hosted up to 50 
people, in their majority middle-aged men.  
 
In the first four months of fieldwork, I visited the Centre daily and engaged in 
participant observation, which often involved taking part in discussions, watching TV 
news and reading newspapers with the regulars. Simultaneously, I conducted un-
structured and semi-structured individual interviews and collected life stories. Like in 
the whole duration of fieldwork, I used a voice recorder to record the interviews when I 
had the consent of the participants, which I later transcribed, and I also took notes of 
observations and discussions. At the end of every day I typed the notes and expanded 
them into a more detailed ‘field diary’. The accounts which I collected were focused to 
a large extent on the everyday practices and experiences in the Centre, which some 
times emerged as reinforcing its official ideological line and others as counter-narratives 
and ‘everyday forms of resistance’ (Scott 1985) to its ‘politics of representation’. 
However, I realised that such accounts were also connected to experiences and contexts 
outside and beyond the physical and discursive walls of the Cypriot Centre. I started, 
therefore, to study more broadly ‘Cypriot life’ in London, and through snowballing I 
made contacts and conducted interviews by meeting Cypriots in a variety of places, 
including houses, coffee shops and businesses. Surprisingly quickly, I found myself 
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getting invited not only to political gatherings and organisational events, but also to 
house meals, family functions, and important occasions, such as engagements and 
weddings. Although these contexts are not necessary politicised, politics often emerged 
in them in unexpected ways and this offered an important insight into the multiple 
processes in which political subjectivities are enacted and articulated. Following also 
the accounts of non-Cypriotists, or even anti-Cypriotists, and their interactions with 
supporters of Cypriotism provided an opportunity to move beyond the study of Cyprio-
centric accounts and experiences only internally and to locate them within broader 
fields of social relationships, in which they are employed and (re)constructed13.  
 
Having said this, I continued to return to the Cypriot Centre almost weekly throughout 
the rest of my fieldwork, as it was always a place to collect news, attend events and 
arrange meetings. For similar reasons, I also spent time and conducted interviews in 
other associations and institutions with a Cyprio-centric agenda, including the Turkish 
Cypriot Community Association (TCCA), the leftist Greek Cypriot newspaper 
‘Parikiaki’ and the leftist Turkish Cypriot newspaper ‘Toplum Postası’. Through them I 
made contacts and interviewed ‘community representatives’ and others who held 
official ‘community positions’. In the last two also, I had the opportunity to research 
their archives, collecting useful background information on media representation of 
‘Cypriotness’ in London. Since ‘Parikiaki’ is tightly associated with the CCC, and 
‘Toplum Postası’ with the TCCA and all four organisations claim to promote similar 
political ideas, I was interested in tracing the connections and disconnections between 
them.  
 
In ‘Toplum Postası’ I met Serhat, who was involved in setting up a group representing 
British born Cypriots and I was introduced to the ‘peace politics’ of second generation 
diasporic Cypriots. A number of them had already been involved in organising informal 
bi-communal meetings in various spots in London, which I attended as a participant and 
to conduct interviews. Most meetings had been arranged through online social 
                                                 
13
 I borrow this idea from Gledhill (1994), who makes a similar suggestion about the study of social 
movements. According to him, work on ‘social movements’ has often identified them with ‘the people’ 
by abstracting from the relationships between participants and non-participants and from the larger areas 
and fields of social relationships within which social movements operate. Anthropologists have 
emphasised the need to shift focus from movements to the social arenas where they exist, and to the study 
of individual identities through an ethnographic understanding of social relationships (Burdick, 1992).  
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networking sites. Especially Facebook seemed to have emerged as an important site of 
interaction for young peace supporters in the diaspora and Cyprus, and it, therefore, 
became another context of field research. I followed three particular Facebook groups 
for almost a year from October 2007 to September 2008 that aimed to bring together 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots from all around the world. By making a public post, I 
introduced myself and my research to the participants of the groups and I followed their 
activities and discussions in order to develop a textual and visual analysis of how 
individuals and groups present themselves through their written text as well as 
photographic material, which they use and exchange. 
 
Discussions on the Internet often raise particular concerns about the effects of electronic 
communication. Questions such as ‘What is the Internet doing to communication?’, 
‘How has the Internet changed our lives?’, ‘Is the Internet evil or good?’ have been 
dominant within the contexts of public discourses, the academia, formal politics and the 
Internet itself. Such concerns have been based on the idea that the new information 
technologies are able to create a new type of communication, and consequently a type 
of life, different and apart from the rest of social life. However, such approaches have 
been criticised in anthropological studies of the Internet (Hine 2000; Miller and Slater 
2000; Guimaraes Jr. 2005) for their insistence on treating cyberspace ‘as an experience 
of extreme ‘disembedding’ from an offline reality’ (Miller and Slater 2000: 4). Miller 
and Slater, in their own research on the Internet in Trinidad, point to the need to treat 
the Internet as embedded in other social spaces instead of assuming a cyberian apartness 
from real life. As the writers suggest (ibid.: 5), even in cases where people treat online 
communication as a world apart, ‘this is something that needs to be socially explained 
as a practical accomplishment rather than the assumed point of departure for 
investigation’. 
 
Although I eventually met face-to-face and interviewed many of the creators and central 
participants of the Facebook groups in offline environments, the purpose was not to 
achieve some sort of authenticity by matching identities and information between online 
and offline settings. Verifying online information by pursuing offline research has only 
resonance, if identity is accepted as a singular category (Correll 1995). On the contrary, 
following Miller and Slater (2000: 10), I wanted to examine how ‘people engage with 
material culture through versions of themselves that are both articulated and 
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transformed through that encounter’; how Cypriots use and understand the Internet and 
how they construct and debate authenticity themselves; whether and how they build 
boundaries between the offline and online; and to what extent this distinction relates to 
broader cultural settings and social relationships. 
 
With such method it is possible to move away form the focus on the Internet as a 
cultural domain and treat it as a cultural artefact. Technology is produced by people in 
specific contexts and is formed by the different ways it is promoted, imagined and used. 
‘To speak of the internet as a cultural artefact is to suggest that it could have been 
otherwise, and that what it is and what it does are the product of culturally produced 
understandings that can vary’ (Hine 2000: 9). Although we often talk about ‘the 
Internet’ as one object, the Internet and technology in general have ‘interpretive 
flexibility’ (Escobar 1994); they have different meanings in different contexts and to 
different people. In his recent book, ‘Tales from Facebook’, Miller (2011) reinforces 
this idea by explaining why we should not speak of one but many Facebooks. In his 
case, Facebook is particularly Trinidadian, whereas what I aim to demonstrate in the 
thesis is some of the ways in which Facebook is Cypriot. 
 
Whereas many of the main users of the Facebook groups were based in London, others 
were located in Cyprus and I had the opportunity to interview them and attend their 
meetings during my research there. My first field trip to Cyprus was planned to follow 
some of my informants from London during their holidays in the island and trace their 
cultural and social activities and interactions. At the time, a main destination for many 
of them was Larnaca and places around it, so I rented a room in the centre of town and I 
made it my basis for four months between June and September 2007, although I 
travelled to most parts of the island to attend meetings and conduct interviews. Those I 
knew from London introduced me to their family members and invited me to their 
houses and I often accompanied them in their visits to relatives or to go out. With some 
of them, who came from refugee families, we also crossed to the North part of the island 
to visit villages, from where they or their parents originated. They also put me in contact 
with ‘returnees’, Cypriots who used to live in London and had ‘returned’ to Cyprus and 
I conducted interviews with a number of them. Investigating the official connections 
between the diaspora and the island in the context of Cypriotism, I also arranged 
interviews with politicians, particularly of the leftist AKEL in the South and CTP in the 
 36
North, and discussions with local peace activists.  I attended the ‘conference for 
Overseas Cypriots’ in Nicosia and visited diasporic associations in various cities and 
villages in Cyprus, which organised re-unions and communal events for the ex-pats.  
 
While the first part of fieldwork in Cyprus traced more broadly how cultural and 
political identities are enacted and performed by diasporic Cypriots when visiting the 
island, the second field trip in June 2008 was more focused on tracing how the election 
of the communist party leader Christofias had contributed to a re-centralisation of 
Cyprio-centric discourses and its impact on political contexts, in which Cypriots from 
London participated. This time I rented a room in one of the university hostels in 
Nicosia, which was located just next to the Green Line and traced the activities of 
‘peace supporting’ groups that had formed by Cypriots from both sides on the Line and 
London. I attended meetings, gatherings and followed the preparation of a conference, 
which was organised for the first time through Facebook. The opening of the checkpoint 
at Ledra Street, the main pedestrian road that connects North and South Nicosia made 
‘the other side’ more accessible by foot and I engaged in more regular and informal 
crossings with young Cypriotists, who stepped over the Green Line not to visit family 
houses and old villages but to see friends, socialise and organise political events. In 
order to examine what was particular about these new informal spaces of peace politics 
and their (dis)connections to organised politics, I also discussed the new political 
developments with officials and politicians again on both sides of the island and 
attended meetings of the youth party clubs of CTP and AKEL.  
 
After almost two years, the fieldwork that started in London had to be concluded in 
Nicosia, in September 2008 before returning to the UK. As with any other fieldwork of 
course, everyday life and socio-political events did carry on in their normal and 
abnormal rhythms beyond the end of research, and I left Cyprus amidst exciting debates 
on the much anticipated start of ‘peace talks’ between the leaders of the two Cypriot 
sides.   
 
Whose Voice? Fragments, Boundaries and Silences 
 
The term ‘Cypriot’ is not employed in this research as a fixed and static identity to be 
located within bounded geographical areas and, particularly in the case of the diaspora, 
to be identified with notions of community. Individuals live complex and fragmented 
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lives in large cities like London and in their everydayness enact different identities, 
which are often re-prioritised in different contexts. Whereas traditional urban 
anthropology focused on so-called ‘urban villages’, urban areas that encompassed the 
social, economic, religious and work lives of people joined by close ethnic ties and 
institutional relationships (cf. Whyte 1955; Gans 1962; Hannerz 1969), urban 
anthropologists now not only find it increasingly challenging to pin people down into 
concrete communities, but have also questioned whether urban villages had ever been as 
cohesive or as bounded as previous ethnographies claimed (Merry 2000: 128). 
 
But even if urban villages do not exist, this does not mean that ethnic identity is not 
imagined as anchored to particular spaces and places. As discussed in the thesis, those 
who lived in North London perceived themselves as ‘closer to the community’ than 
those, who did not and, therefore, as more Cypriot. Since I was living in central London 
during fieldwork, I would often receive comments such as: ‘See? You make the effort to 
take the tube and come here and you are Greek. There are others who do not even 
bother and they call themselves Cypriots’. As much as the intention was to compliment 
my commitment to researching ‘the community’, these statements also reflected broader 
discourses on cultural authenticity and boundaries. Taking North London as a main field 
site, the thesis does not aim, therefore, to privilege it as an authentic locale of Cypriot 
voices; quite the contrary, it aims to highlight how particular places and spaces come to 
be imagined as such and what effect this has on reinforcing some voices while silencing 
others. 
 
To some extent, the thesis also appears to focus more on Greek Cypriot rather than 
Turkish Cypriot voices. This is, however, due to the fact that the research has been 
designed to examine discourses and practices of Cypriotism. As it is explained in 
chapter 2, Cypriotism, in all its rhetoric of bi-communalism and common identity, has 
not historically gained large appeal among Turkish Cypriots. The lack of large 
representation of Turkish Cypriots in Cyprio-centric politics is, therefore, more an 
endemic characteristic of Cypriotism itself -which still remains a point of concern and 
debate both for Cypriotists and their critics- than just a methodological limitation. As 
Hatay and Bryant (2008a) have illustrated, Kıbrıslılık or Cypriotism for Turkish 
Cypriots has increasingly diverged in meaning from that among Greek Cypriots. 
Although I did conduct interviews with Turkish Cypriots and research in North Cyprus, 
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this was done in the context of Cypriotism and to the extent that this focus permitted; 
indeed an ethnographic study of the development and articulation of Kıbrıslılık in the 
diaspora and Cyprus would be of great comparative and analytical value here, however 
due to time constraints it fell beyond the means and scope of this research. The term 
Cypriot is used in the thesis with all the acknowledgement of its alienating and 
exclusive connotations that it has for many Turkish Cypriots. However, it is used 
persistently here, as this is how most Cypriotists, Greek and Turkish Cypriot, describe 
and identify themselves, even while continuously debating its content. 
 
Along similar lines, if the voices of women ‘sound’ weaker than those of men 
throughout the thesis, this has to be attributed to a large extent to the fact that organised 
Cypriot political spaces in the diaspora, including ones that appear more progressive, 
are mostly inhabited by men. In Cyprus, there have been women’s groups advocating 
for re-unification, and Cynthia Cockburn (2004) describes the organisation and 
activities of ‘Hands Across the Divide’, the most conspicuous of them, in her book ‘The 
line: women, partition and the gender order in Cyprus’14. However, such efforts 
promoting peace on the basis of a shared womanhood across the Green Line have often 
remained separate or parallel to other contexts of ‘peace politics’. Quite 
characteristically, in September 2008, after a meeting I had in Nicosia with a Greek 
Cypriot community activist, Mr. Stavros, and his wife, Mrs. Koula, both living in 
London, he invited me to go with them to a bi-communal gathering of NGO 
representatives and activists, who were organising a peace protest on the Green Line. 
Their meeting took place in the private room of a coffee shop in North Nicosia very 
close to the Ledra Palace check point. As I had not been officially invited by the group, 
Mr. Stavros asked me to stay with his wife and observe but not speak. When we entered 
the room, eleven men, Greek and Turkish Cypriot, were sitting around a big table; Mrs. 
Koula and I were given two chairs to sit separately behind them. After a long 
conversation on organisational issues, one of the men said turning to the rest: ‘It’s a 
shame we don’t have here any representatives from other Cypriot communities, 
Maronites or Armenians. And as a matter of fact it’s a shame that we don’t have any 
                                                 
14
 At the same time the gendered image of ‘the mother crying for her missing son’ has been placed in a 
central position in state politics on the missing persons (Sant Cassia 1999, 2005; Bryant 2002: 515; 
Uludağ 2006). 
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women’. Whereas understanding women’s political representation and participation in 
Cyprus is beyond the aims of this research, gender has been a central point in the 
agenda of second generation diasporic Cypriots, when contesting ‘traditional’ peace 
politics in London and the thesis examines how the trope of gender is employed by 
these young Cypriots to revisit and revise Cypriotism in chapter 4.  
 
In terms of locating the ‘voice’ or character of the ethnography, fieldwork for the thesis 
transcended bounded understandings of ‘going out there’ or ‘doing anthropology close 
to home’. Taking the tube to reach the ‘field’ as well as taking the plane to go away 
were both parts of the process and, as Hannerz (2006: 24) highlights, such experiences 
form and inform anthropological work more and more, while challenging the 
epistemological and ideological (and often moral) bases on which such categories have 
been constructed. The thesis is also based on ethnographic methods that go beyond 
practices of ‘studying up’ or ‘studying down’, which often imply a vertical 
understanding of power not only inherent in the ethnographic context but also between 
the ethnographer and the people she studies. In terms of gender, age, education and 
class, I found myself working in constantly shifting contexts and relationships of power 
with my informants. Therefore, as the field here is constructed by ‘[…]tracing webs of 
relations between actors, institutions and discourses’ (ibid.), the notion of ‘studying 
through’, which Hannerz proposes, fits more comfortably with the nature of my 
research.  
 
Because of my Greek nationality and language, I found myself some times in 
conferences and other academic and non-academic contexts being described as a 
‘native’ or at least a ‘not so outsider’ anthropologist. Whereas obviously these terms are 
based on an assumed understanding of a shared culture between Greeks and Greek 
Cypriots, a cultural affinity constructed along these lines was never taken for granted by 
my informants. Most of them supporting Cypriotism, they were keener on highlighting 
our cultural differences than emphasising any sort of ethnic or national kinship. On the 
contrary, there were other aspects of my identity in their perspective that defined my 
being an insider or an outsider; was I leftist? What did I vote for in the last elections? 
Did I support peace? Was I an activist? It is such contextualised understandings of 
belonging that question traditional distinctions between ‘real’ and ‘native’ 
anthropologists and commit the ethnographer to an ‘involvement that is unabashedly 
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subjective as it interacts with and invites other subjectivities to take a place in 
anthropological productions’ (Narayan 1993: 682). 
 
To ensure anonymity, I have changed all the names and some biographical information, 
where needed, of the participants in the research. I have tried to give common Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot names and I have avoided any resemblance between real 
names and pseudonyms. As an exception, I have maintained some of the original names 
of organisations and institutions and those of some officials and politicians, with whom 
I conducted formal recorded interviews, wherever this was necessary for clarity. 
 
1.4 Thesis Overview 
In order to trace the connections between the diaspora and Cyprus through discourses of 
Cypriotism and the practice of ‘peace politics’, the thesis is divided into five main 
chapters that examine inter-related contexts, in which these connections emerge and 
become (re)articulated. Chapter 2, therefore, starts from London and sets the 
background for the rest of the thesis by introducing and debating its main concepts: 
diaspora, peace politics and Cypriotism. The social geographies of movement between 
Cyprus and London are presented in the chapter in order to illustrate how the two places 
become cultural imaginative resources and are reconstructed in the ways Cypriots 
debate identity in London. Whereas Cyprus is seen as the source of an original 
Cypriotness, London is treated as the place, where an authentic Cypriotness, for which 
co-existence and bi-communalism are considered a fundamental criterion, has been 
preserved. Cypriotists in London, therefore, claim for themselves an undisrupted and 
historically consistent Cypriotness, which, according to this narrative, has been lost in 
Cyprus.  
 
As such an authentic Cypriotness is often articulated by first-generation Cypriot 
migrants through appeals to a communist identity, chapter 3 focuses on the politics of 
the past as established through debates over ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ histories in 
Cyprus. The Leftist historical account, particularly that of AKEL, has been 
characterised in popular and academic discourses as a counter-narrative to dominant 
nationalist history and as representing the voices and experiences of its supporters that 
have been marginalised in and excluded from official narrations of the past. In this 
chapter, however, close attention to the narratives and experiences of Leftists in the 
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diaspora reveals that these are often underrepresented in the Cyprio-centric historical 
narrative of AKEL, which appears then itself as containing its own silences and 
‘unofficial’ histories and becomes open to internal contestation by individual members 
in London. 
 
Chapter 4 carries on with the politics of history, but it also turns its attention to the 
history of politics, in order to examine how Cypriotism offers a platform on which inter-
generational struggles over cultural and political authority in the diaspora are 
crystallised. Whereas British born Cypriots are often rendered to a position of cultural 
inauthenticity and are presented in popular discourses as ‘in-between’ two cultures, 
Cyprio-centric peace politics in London provide some British born Cypriots a discursive 
and political tool to reinstate understandings of Cypriotness and Britishness that reflect 
their own experiences and divert from hybridised notions of identity. In entering the 
debate of ‘who is a Cypriot’, British born Cypriots challenge dominant ‘landscapes of 
politics’ in London, from which they have felt historically excluded and alienated. 
 
British born Cypriots also found and founded alternative political spaces on the Internet, 
away from established traditional structures, and chapter 5 follows their activities on 
Facebook, which emerged as a popular online context for the organisation of bi-
communal Cypriot groups. The chapter examines how connections between the 
diaspora and Cyprus are created and what kinds of political activism develop in these 
settings. Far from separate from ‘real life’, Facebook politics, it is argued here, have to 
be studied as embedded within offline socio-cultural contexts and power dynamics in 
order to understand to what extent these are challenged but also reproduced online. In 
this sense, whereas the Internet created new opportunities for interaction among 
Cypriotists in the diaspora and Cyprus, it also highlighted and consolidated existing 
boundaries among them by revealing that the definition of ‘Cypriotness’ at the core of 
Cypriotism is not uniformly shared by everyone. 
 
Chapter 6 encapsulates most of the divisions and power struggles among Cypriotists 
described in all previous chapters as expressed through discourses and practices of 
crossing the Green Line in Cyprus. Whereas border-crossing has been perceived as an 
ideological and moral commitment for Cypriotists and peace-supporters, the opening of 
the border has provoked various and contrasting responses by those most expected to 
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cross it highlighting the implications of other existing boundaries on intra-ethnic, inter-
generational and ideological levels. It is not only ethnic nationalism that consolidates 
the border, it is argued here, but the border is created and reinstated within a discourse 
that –at least on the surface- promotes its elimination.    
 
Finally, chapter 7 outlines the main conclusions by bringing together the core 
ethnographic and analytical points of the thesis in order to argue that although 
Cypriotism is popularly understood as a unifying discourse, its study from the 
perspective of the diaspora unravels it also as divisive and internally contested. As such 
contestations are often articulated through claims over cultural authenticity and identity, 
the thesis aims to illustrate how archetypal distinctions between civic and ethnocultural 
nationalisms are misleading, since both types of nationalism demonstrate –on different 
levels- a preoccupation with defining and establishing a shared culture.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
‘Who is a Cypriot?’ Diaspora, Peace Politics and Cypriotism 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Two months after his election as president of the Republic of Cyprus, in May 2008, 
Dimitris Christofias visited London in order to meet with diasporic Cypriots. In his 
speech at the Alexandra Palace hotel in North London, he acknowledged the support of 
the community and thanked them for contributing to his electoral victory. He promised 
to enhance co-operation   between Cyprus and its diaspora and to pay closer attention to 
their problems. As he characteristically said, ‘we need to show love and warmth to all 
Cypriots abroad, who live in their second countries [meaning Cyprus as their first 
country]’ (quote from field-notes, 18/05/2008). Christofias declared his commitment to 
work hard for peace and re-unification and, setting the ideological framework for his 
speech, he highlighted that ‘there is only one people (laos) in Cyprus, the Cypriot 
people’, an implicit criticism to Greek and Turkish nationalisms, from which the newly 
elected president wanted clearly to take distance. Continuing along the same line, he 
remarked that ‘Turkish Cypriots have been an equal partner since 1960, since the 
London-Zurich agreement. This is something some Greek Cypriots have to hear 
clearly’. 
 
Christofias’s speech was attended by a large number of London-based Cypriots. ‘This is 
the most charismatic speaker I’ve heard. He really managed to move me and make me 
cry. This is the type of leader we need for Cyprus; decisive, straight-forward and 
simple. He is one of us’, was the comment of Mr. Yiannis, an elderly AKEL supporter, 
who has lived in London for the past fifty years and for the first time saw the secretary 
of his party getting elected as the president of Cyprus. Although the affinity that he 
expressed towards the speaker was explained by Mr. Yiannis as a comment on 
Christofias’s ‘simple manners and humbleness’, his statement, ‘he is one of us’, has to 
be understood also through his ideological identification with the new president as 
communists. Such reactions were not unexpected, since the majority of the crowd who 
gathered to welcome Christofias were leftists, supporters of his party, or ‘peace 
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supporters’, who saw his election as a new ray of hope for re-conciliation and the re-
unification of the island. As the president made the trip from London to Cyprus to 
assure them about his commitment to peace, they also made the trip to Alexandra Palace 
to reaffirm their trust in his plans and the willingness of the diaspora to play a positive 
role in them. This is after all, according to popular discourses, a peace-supporting 
diaspora that has paradigmatically practised coexistence in their lives away from 
Cyprus. 
 
Figure 1. Queuing to congratulate the President –Christofias’s speech at the Alexandra Palace Hotel conference room, 18/05/2008 
 
This chapter sets the background for the rest of the thesis by examining how ‘peace 
politics’ and Cypriotism have been discursively articulated and historically developed in 
the diaspora. The first section (2.2) offers an overview of the social geographies of 
Cypriot movement between Cyprus and London and also highlights how these two 
contexts are interlinked through the ways they are imagined by individuals and groups 
in the diaspora in the process of being utilised as symbolic blocks for the construction of 
transnational identities. The next section (2.3) interrogates the notion of the diaspora by 
building on diaspora theories and current critiques and suggests that an expansive 
definition of the concept needs to be applied for the purposes of the thesis. Also, we 
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look at the ways ‘motherland’ politics institutionally operate in London, with a 
particular focus on organisations that support peace and re-unification. However, far 
from the popular understanding of the term as unifying, the meaning and purpose of 
peace divide the diaspora in multiple ways. Section 2.4 outlines the history and the 
discursive formation of Cypriotism both in Cyprus and in the diaspora. In the narratives 
of diasporic Cypriots, Cypriotism, articulated through the language of coexistence and 
common identity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, is presented in terms of 
continuities between a pre-migration past and a diasporic present. Any ruptures to such 
continuities are seen as tensions transported to the diasporic context from Cyprus and 
external to the experience of coexistence in London. The particular experiences and 
ideological articulations of coexistence in the diaspora offer individuals a platform to 
negotiate these tensions on a local and interpersonal level. Finally, the last part of the 
chapter explains how Cypriotism is experienced and understood as a form of counter-
nationalism or a ‘good nationalism’ and asks to what extent a sharp dichotomy between 
ethnic nationalism and Cypriotism is empirically observable and analytically useful.   
 
 
2.2 From Cyprus to London and back and forth…: the social geographies of 
Cypriot migration and movement. 
 
Appadurai (1996) has famously argued that in a modern globalised world characterised 
by migration and constant flows of people, ideas, capital and mediated images, ‘the 
production of locality’ takes place through the imaginings of multiple other socio-
cultural landscapes that transcend the borders of the nation and provide individuals with 
symbolic resources for articulating and negotiating identities. Following Appadurai and 
in order to trace the movement of Cypriots between London and Cyprus, the next 
section presents these two geographical contexts not merely as physical and bounded 
nodes within a transnational field, but as places, whose meaning is constantly 
(re)constructed within a nexus of individual and collective experiences, historical 
contingencies and political ideologies. What is largely argued here is that ‘Cyprus’ is 
(re)produced in London through various processes and, on the other hand, 
understandings and experiences of London mediate the ways ‘Cyprus’ is (re)entered as 
an imaginative field.  
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At the same time, ‘Cyprus’ and ‘London’, as ‘symbolic resources of imagining’ are not 
equally accessed and utilised by everyone. After all, they are discursive constructions 
within complex power structures and we have to examine how and why particular 
‘knowledges, images, and discourses are … authorized’ (Bhabha 1994: 270). As it is 
argued here, individuals reproduce established power structures by participating in these 
discourses; however, on a micro-level they also appropriate particular images and 
symbols in order to make sense of their own position within local and broader relations 
of power. For Appadurai, imagining is tightly related to individual agency, as ‘the 
individual actor is the last locus of this perspectival set of landscapes, for these 
landscapes are eventually navigated by agents who both experience and constitute larger 
formations, in part from their own sense of what these landscapes offer’ (ibid.: 33).  
 
London 
London has been the field-site of a plethora of ethnographic studies, many of which 
focus on its migrant and diasporic groups to discuss the experience of migration and the 
development of their cultural and political identities (Adams 1987; Alexander 2000a, 
2000b; Back 1994; Baumann 1996; Dench, Gavron and Young 2006; Eade 1989; 
Gardner 2002), the tensions between racism and multiculturalism (Herbert et al. 2008; 
James 2005; Keith 2008; Hewitt 2005; Watson 2009; Román-Velázquez 1999) and the 
interplay between globalisation and localisation (Eade 1997, 2000; Vertovec 2007; 
Wemyss 2009). 
 
Tracing the history of the British capital from its imperial roots to its current global 
character, Eade (2000: 179) alerts us to the two-fold way that London is presented to the 
unsuspicious visitor; on one hand as the residue of a ‘pure’ national past and one the 
other hand as a modern cosmopolitan city. ‘Most tourists still visit the famous sites 
redolent of the nation’s past but the guide books urge them also to sample London’s 
multicultural diversity and alternative locales. Although Soho was already portrayed as 
an alternative locality within the imperial capital, Spitalfields and Docklands add new 
themes to the global city’ (ibid.).   Tourists are encouraged to visit not only central spots 
but ex-industrial and working class areas, such as Soho, Spitalfields and Docklands, to 
acquire a complete taste of ‘authenticity’. The contemporary representation of London 
as a ‘tolerant melting pot’, however, Eade argues, masks the imperial past of the city 
that has been marked by economic and political tensions and inequalities that still 
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determine and define the experience of particular groups and local communities. 
Multiculturalism is a by-product of colonialism and Cypriot migration to the UK, 
similarly to so many other migrant movements, took place within this colonial 
framework. Many Cypriots initially settled in impoverished and industrial areas of 
London, which contributed greatly to the stereotypical images of ‘the dangerous 
migrant’ that were generated in public discourses at the time about various ethnic 
groups including those who came from Cyprus15.  
 
A number of Cypriots16, mainly Greek Cypriots, had already settled in London before 
World War II (Oakley 1987:3). However, Cypriot migration to the UK largely 
developed and peaked in the 1950s and 1960s. According to the 1966 Census, 100,000 
migrants from Cyprus had arrived in the UK, of whom 75,000 were Greek Cypriots 
(Oakley 1971:2) and the rest predominantly Turkish Cypriots. Whereas the majority of 
pre-war settlers were single men (Solomos and Woodhams 1995:234), in the subsequent 
decades, Cypriot settlement in the UK took to a large extent the form of extended 
family units (Oakley 1971). As an effect of and after the 1962 Commonwealth Act, 
however, migration influx declined and only immediately after the 1974 war in Cyprus 
a new wave of Cypriot migration to the UK took place. According to Canefe (2002:65), 
the number of the post-1974 migrants was quite small compared to the overall diasporic 
Cypriot population. In the post-conflict period, about 12,000 Greek Cypriots, mainly 
displaced from the North part of Cyprus, and 15,000 Turkish Cypriots arrived to the UK 
(Bertrand 2004:99). Although many Greek Cypriots returned to Cyprus after 1974 to 
take advantage of the economic booming in the island, during the early years of 
settlement in the UK Greek Cypriots were four times more than Turkish Cypriots 
replicating the same proportions as in Cyprus (King et al. 2008: 8). As of more recently 
and including British-born children of Cypriot origin, the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office counts over 300,000 Greek and Turkish Cypriots, who live today in the country 
(Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2009). 
 
                                                 
15
 Solomos and Woodhams (1995: 234) argue that this was particularly the case for Cypriots in the pre-
war era until the end of 1930s. As Britain moved from a period of depression to economic prosperity in 
the 1950s, discourses about the social and political stance of Cypriots in British society shifted quite 
considerably. Dench (1975) also discusses similar negatively charged images of Maltese migrants, 
usually single men, who shared work and residential spaces with Cypriots in the 1930s and 1940s. 
16
 Their numbers are estimated to have been between six and eight thousand just before the war (Solomos 
and Woodhams 1995: 232). 
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London was and remained principally the place, where Cypriot migrants concentrated. 
The early migrants settled mainly in its central areas and around the West End, before 
other parts progressively started becoming ‘Cypriots hubs’, such as Camden and 
Islington that in the 1950s seemed to have the largest numbers of Cypriot residents. 
After the 1960s, however, a concentrated movement took place particularly northwards 
to areas such as Hackney and Haringey. Economic prosperity and access to better 
housing allowed some Cypriots to keep moving further up to the boroughs of Enfield 
and Barnet. Some also settled in the south of the river in places, such as Southwark and 
Lewisham, but North London has remained the centre of the ‘Cypriot landscape’. 
Haringey was for a long time the borough with the largest Cypriot population (Alkan 
and Constantinides 1979) and it is still along Green Lanes and in the streets of Wood 
Green and Turnpike Lane that one is likely to come across a conspicuous number of 
Cypriot grocery stores, restaurants, businesses, community organisations, schools and 
churches.  
 
In terms of areas of settlement, it is characteristic that there has been a significant 
overlap between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Although many more Turkish Cypriots 
have concentrated to the north-east and south of London than Greek Cypriots (Oakley 
1987:15), in the 1950s a large number settled in Camden and over the decades followed 
a northwards movement similar to that of Greek Cypriots (Robins and Aksoy 
2001:690). Writing shortly after 1974, Ladbury (1977) argues that members of both 
groups lived ‘side by side’ in London even after conflict and division made this 
impossible in Cyprus. Although at the informal, everyday level, interaction between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots was quite uncommon, in institutional and employment 
contexts, there was exchange, coexistence and often co-operation between members of 
the two groups. 
 
The spatial concentration of Cypriots in North London has been one of the main reasons 
but also a great result of the development of an ‘ethnic economy’, dominated by small 
shops and clothing factories, in which many Cypriots have been involved either as self-
made employers or employees (Anthias 1992:9). If we can speak of one ‘ethnic 
economy’ (‘Cypriot’) or two different ethnic economies (Greek Cypriot/ Turkish 
Cypriot) depends on the extent to which people emphasise an identity and utilise a 
network based on a common ‘Cypriotness’ or separate ‘Greekness’ and ‘Turkishness’. 
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Since the first years of settlement, however, many Greek and Turkish Cypriots shared 
work spaces and worked next to and with each other (Constantinides 1977:277). In 
many cases, Cypriot employers, who established small or larger businesses, relied on an 
‘ethnic’ labour force, consisting of their own compatriots. This created a kind of 
economic interdependency between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, although, as Ladbury 
(1977:314) highlights, not always an equal one. Turkish Cypriots, who were smaller in 
numbers, tended to depend for jobs more on Greek Cypriots than the opposite, as the 
latter were more likely to own their own business.  
 
Alongside businesses, a cluster of ethnic organisations, including the Cypriot 
Community Centre (CCC), the Turkish Cypriot Community Association (TCCA), the 
Turkish Cypriot Women’s (TCWP) project, a number of media organisations and many 
other cultural and service-providing centres have contributed to the creation and 
maintenance of a ‘North London landscape of Cypriotness’17 and particular 
‘geographies of Cypriot politics’. I will return to the extensive discussion of these 
concepts later in the thesis (see chapter 4) in order to examine how in a popularly 
proclaimed cosmopolitan and diverse city like London ethnic group representation and 
political power is articulated in terms of geographical divisions and localised 
understandings of cultural authenticity and how individuals experience, reproduce and 
negotiate these discursive and physical borderlines.   
 
Eade’s work (1989; 1997; 2000) is important again here as he has extensively analysed 
how in resistance to the homogenising politics of nationalism or the essentialising 
projects of multiculturalism that create sharp divisions between communities, 
                                                 
17
 In order to complete the picture of Cypriot settlement in the UK, it has to be highlighted that Cypriots 
are to be found in many other places of the country, especially in big cities, such as Birmingham, 
Manchester and Liverpool. Many Cypriots from London also moved out of the city progressively 
(Anthias 1992: 8) and established themselves in the hospitality and catering industry in seaside towns of 
Southern England. In most cities and towns, there are to be found some community organisations usually 
operating through Cypriot churches and schools. Most of these communities, however, maintain links 
with London in various ways. For instance, many Cypriots of Brighton often travel there to do business, 
buy ‘Cypriot’ products, participate in political or cultural events or use particular services. In other cases, 
especially when distances are longer, contact with the core of the ‘imagined’ Cypriot community in the 
UK does not involve physical travel, but takes place through the UK-wide dissemination of newspapers 
published in North London; through letters with guidance from the Archbishop that are read in the local 
churches; through material and guidelines sent to local schools by the High Commission of the Republic 
of Cyprus in London; or through various ‘ethnic’ products that arrive in local specialised shops from or 
via the capital city. 
 
 50
alternative hybrid identities18 emerge in postcolonial London. Some migrants and their 
descendants, for instance, develop multiple allegiances including their connection to 
their countries of origins. Their particular and localised experiences of the British 
capital plays a major role in how these transnational contexts are articulated and 
understood (ibid. 2000: 181). As the ethnographic data in this chapter and throughout 
the thesis suggests, particular Cypriot understandings and representations of London as 
‘multicultural’ and as a place of ‘coexistence’ mediate and affect the way Cyprus is 
imagined, experienced and envisaged19. 
 
Cyprus 
Although there were Cypriots in the UK since the 1920s, their contact with Cyprus 
before World War II was limited due to financial difficulties and restrictions in travel 
and communication technologies (Constantinides, 1990: 92–3). Those first migrants left 
Cyprus with very few hopes of reaching back its shores any time soon and many of 
them managed to visit their island only decades after their first departure. After the war, 
progress in technology and travel made communication between the migrants and their 
‘home’ place increasingly possible, which enabled the development of diasporic 
practices (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 506). 
  
Cyprus strongly figures in the discourses and practices of those who live in London, 
even though the ways that it is imagined and debated are far from homogenous and 
unitary; on the contrary, what becomes apparent in all chapters of this thesis is that such 
debates are embedded within broader relations of power and interact with individual 
experiences, identities and narratives. Although its meaning is highly variable and 
contested, however, Cyprus is still treated as a source of ‘authentic’ identity for those in 
London who call themselves Cypriots. One way, for instance, that authenticity is 
articulated and experienced in material terms is through food. Like in other migrant 
contexts (see for instance Gardner 2002; Law 2001, Mannur 2007), Cypriots who go 
                                                 
18
 However, Eade (2000: 181-182) does not accept theories of cultural hybridity uncritically. He still 
alerts us to the need to move beyond celebratory understandings of hybrid identities, as they often 
underplay structural and institutional inequalities, racism and exclusion that define the experience of 
many migrants and their decedents in the UK. I also expand on the critiques of the notion of hybridity in 
chapter 3, by highlighting that exclusion and marginality are also constructed and experienced within 
broader transnational socio-political and ideological frameworks. 
19
 The word ‘imagined’ mainly refers here to the discourses through which past and present are 
articulated and understood; the verb ‘envisage’ entails a future orientation and it is, therefore, employed 
to refer to hopes for and perspectives on the future.  
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back to London after their visits to Cyprus often bring with them traditional ‘homeland’ 
food, such as halloumi and sheftalia, as well as fresh vegetables and fruits. It was very 
often the case at the Greek Orthodox Church on Sunday20 that in the after-service tea, 
participants would make the effort to offer goods that they had brought with them from 
Cyprus. Their freshness and higher quality compared to what is available in the UK was 
always the subject of discussion. Moreover, the fact that the food had grown and been 
produced in Cypriot soil was often stressed highlighting a process by which ‘real’ 
Cyprus is being transported to and consumed in London21. Whereas there is an 
underlying Herderian logic that connects soil and blood here, I take the above example 
less as a straight-forward manifestation of ethnic reproduction and more as a context 
that highlights how claims to authenticity are implicated into particular power relations 
and structures. Because it was through these generous offers of ‘original’ food that one 
could make a statement about their ability to have travelled to Cyprus in front of those 
who did not. The talk about the food was most of the times accompanied by discussions 
about where one went, who they saw and what news they brought with them. In other 
words, ‘bearing gifts’ of a particular type often served as a tool of negotiating 
someone’s legitimacy ‘to talk about Cyprus’. This is important, therefore, in 
understanding contestation over particular types of ‘authenticity’ and ‘authority’ as 
intrinsic part of diasporic practices and politics22. 
 
However, not everyone participates in these processes on the same level. We can argue 
that many Cypriots in the UK express a diasporic consciousness and identity when they 
claim a connection and allegiance to Cyprus. There are, for instance, young individuals 
who have never or rarely visited the island, who present themselves as ignorant of or 
even indifferent to the socio-political affairs there, but who would still identify –and 
                                                 
20
 I attended the Sunday service of a number of Churches in North London and other areas outside the city 
in the course of fieldwork. There is usually an after-service tea provided voluntarily by women for a small 
donation towards the church’s charitable fund [filoptwxo tameio]. 
21
 Dikomitis (2004) provides a similar ethnographic account of Larnatsjiotes, Greek-Cypriot refugees, 
who returned from a visit to their ‘home’ village in North Cyprus bringing with them water, soil and food. 
Dikomitis compares the sacredness attached to these substances by the refugees to that normally 
experienced in cases of pilgrimage.  
22
 Yeh (2007) examines the tensions emerging around claims to ‘authenticity’ amongst three groups of 
Tibetans, who arrived in the USA around the same time but have different relationships to the 
‘motherland’. According to Yeh, an embodied knowledge of Tibet as a physical place and language 
command are valued highly in this intra-diasporic contest over symbolic resources.  Klimt (2000) looks at 
the relationship between the diaspora and ‘homeland’ and examines how discourses of authenticity 
amongst Portuguese migrants in Europe often divert from hegemonic ideas of ‘Portugueseness’ in 
Portugal creating competing ideas of what it means ‘to be Portuguese’.    
 52
sometimes adamantly declare- themselves as Cypriots or at least British-Cypriots. 
Whereas various patterns of migration and displacement often emerge in the life stories 
of these individuals, as Anthias (2006a: 182) notes, ‘[t]hese are not always more 
important than other types of dislocation native youngsters experience, but they form a 
particularly meaningful part of the construction of the familial narrative; they are stories 
that are perpetually recycled within the family and by the collectivity as a whole in its 
social reproduction and its cultural practices’. In other words, ethnic identification is 
relational and situational and should not be privileged analytically over other identities 
or modes of identification.  
 
At the same time, there are other individuals, who are more active in terms of their 
diasporic practices and they keep an open interest or involvement in life and politics in 
Cyprus and London. Some of them, in particular, travel often between the two countries 
and are well-known in social and political circles in both places. The two categories, 
however, of those who emerge as more active in a transnational context and those who 
do not are mainly of descriptive value because on a deeper analytical and empirical 
level they are neither fixed nor bounded. As I highlight in chapter 4, participation in the 
cultural and political life of the diasporic community may vary throughout one’s life 
cycle and demonstrate peaks and lows. Moreover, although diasporic practices are often 
articulated by those engaged in them as a matter of personal choice, transnational 
identities and activities are enabled and restricted by other social structures and 
identities, such as gender and class, and by broader political and ideological 
frameworks. Economic capital, for instance, plays an important role in the production of 
transnational lives. There is a considerable number of older Cypriots, whose low 
pension and lack of savings do not allow them to visit Cyprus. Similarly, some younger 
Cypriots also face financial obstacles in their desire to travel to the island. Such 
individuals, therefore, experience a limited access to particular types of ‘knowledge’ 
and claims to ‘authenticity’ that are associated with a first-hand visit to Cyprus and the 
engagement with life there.  
 
On the other hand, not everyone who is financially able to travel regularly between the 
UK and Cyprus is recognised as an active agent in the socio-political life of either 
context. Besides individual levels of interest, the lack of social networks, connections 
and know-how of politics emerge also as major restrictive blocks for the diasporic 
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practices of some Cypriots. One of the main concerns, therefore, throughout the thesis is 
to illustrate how diasporic involvement in ‘peace politics’ is conditioned by particular 
types and levels of social and cultural capital but also how it provides a context in 
which individuals can negotiate their structural position and identities both on a local 
and transnational level; in other words, one of the main study questions deals with how 
Cyprus is discursively constructed and contested as a source of authenticity in the 
diasporic context. 
 
2.3 (De)constructing the ‘Cypriot’ Diaspora: political organisation and divisions 
In the past few decades the term ‘diaspora’ has been extensively employed, analysed 
and critiqued in academic discourses across multiple disciplinary fields. This section 
offers a description and analysis of the ways such definitions and critiques can be 
applied to the study of Cypriots in the UK. Even before such an attempt, however, a 
primary question on the issue is whether one can speak of one or two Cypriot diasporas 
–a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot (Bertrand 2004: 93). It becomes instantly 
apparent that an absolute answer is not possible, as it depends on political and 
ideological identifications both on an individual and institutional level. Most of the 
Cypriot organisations in the UK identify themselves as either Greek or Turkish Cypriot 
and attend to the needs or causes of their respective ‘ethnic’ groups. Such organisations 
include community associations, refugee pressure groups, media, political parties and 
cultural centres. Although the majority of them strongly emphasise their distinct Cypriot 
identity vis-à-vis respective ‘motherlands’, there is a number of institutions that 
embrace official Greek or Turkish-oriented nationalist values and operate closely with 
other organisations that cater for the broader Greek or Turkish communities in the UK. 
However, because the term ‘Cypriot’ is used in public discourses in the UK almost as a 
metonym for ‘Greek Cypriot’ (rather than as inclusive of Turkish Cypriots too), many 
organisations that are self-proclaimed as Cypriot are in essence only representative of 
Greek Cypriots. The National Federation for Cypriots in the UK, for instance, is mostly 
comprised of Greek Cypriot groups and associations23. Reconciliation and 
rapprochement are less central for some of the Cypriot organisations that mainly deploy 
                                                 
23
 Although some of them have Turkish Cypriot members too. Also, groups from other minority 
communities of Cyprus operate under the umbrella of the Federation, such as the Cypriot Maronites 
Association. In a personal communication, however, the president of the Federation, Peter Droussiotis 
expressed his commitment to approach and work more closely with Turkish Cypriot organisations and 
representatives in the future. 
 54
a particular historical narrative and understanding of the Cyprus problem identical to the 
official nationalist language that developed amongst Greek Cypriots after the division. 
They instead focus on human rights, especially on the right of Greek Cypriot refugees to 
return, and protest against Turkey’s intervention in 1974 and the successive occupation 
of the north part of the island. Likewise, Turkish Cypriot groups, such as ‘Embargoed!’, 
campaign for the lift of the international embargo on TRNC and the recognition of its 
residents’ human rights. 
 
Lobbying local British politicians, organising events and protests and campaigning 
through various media are the main political strategies of these groups. According to 
Bertrand (ibid.: 101), the Greek Cypriot voice developed as particularly influential 
during the election campaign of New Labour in 1997. The Labour Party eventually 
triumphed electorally in North London, even in constituencies like Enfield that 
previously belonged to the conservatives. As a result, ‘[n]o North London Labour MP 
can miss a Greek Cypriot event, even when this event is quite nationalist and does little 
to help reconcile Greek and Turkish Cypriots’ (ibid.: 102). Compared to Greek 
Cypriots’ political influence in the UK, Østergaard-Nielsen (2003: 687) characterises 
Turkish Cypriots as ‘invisible’ within the British political scene, mainly because of their 
lower numbers of registered votes but also of the complexities involved in the attempts 
of some leaders to establish and maintain a distinct identity detached from the Greek 
Cypriot and wider Turkish community. However, Embargoed! has managed to battle 
with such ‘invisibility’ to a successful degree. It was first founded in 2004 and by 2007, 
when research for this thesis was taking place, it had managed to be considered a very 
active Turkish Cypriot pressure group to the extent that it was perceived by many other 
Cypriot lobbying parties as politically ‘dangerous’ for overshadowing them.  
 
However, not all Greek and Turkish Cypriot diasporic organisations run along 
antagonistic or mutually exclusive lines. A large number of London Cypriots support 
reunification and peace as a solution for Cyprus that will mirror their own experience of 
coexistence in the diaspora. They hold a Cyprio-centric perspective on the Cyprus issue 
that diverts from the dominant Greek and Turkish nationalisms, commonly blamed for 
the separation of the island. The ideological articulation as well as the everyday 
practices of this Cyprio-centrism will be discussed and analysed extensively in the next 
section. What needs to be highlighted here though is that following the post-Annan 
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period of disappointment and just before the presidential elections in Cyprus in 2008, 
Cyprio-centric discourses resurfaced stronger in the diaspora and a greater willingness 
for co-operation between Turkish and Greek Cypriot organisations was demonstrated in 
support of a solution for their common ‘homeland’. Many of these attempts were 
presented as political projects of one, united Cypriot diaspora, however, few 
organisations are ‘bi-communal’ or ‘inter-communal’ in the sense that the two main or 
all communities of Cyprus are represented in their membership. The Cypriot 
Community Centre (CCC) in Haringey is the most enduring and established amongst 
them. Founded in the early 1980s, it is supported by AKEL, which has been the only 
Greek Cypriot political party that boasts Turkish Cypriot support24. On the other hand, 
Cypriots United (CU) was founded as recently as 2007, by second-generation Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots to articulate a pro-unification diasporic voice in a period marked by 
excitement about the anticipated –at the time- elections in the Republic of Cyprus. 
‘Friends of Cyprus’ is also a group that endorses bi-communal values and liaises often 
both with the CCC and CU. It was established in 1974 in London and acts through 
meetings, seminars and publications. As most of its core members are, however, British 
MPs and other leading political figures lobbying for a solution to the Cyprus problem 
through parliamentary politics, it could not be characterised typically diasporic. 
Similarly, the Association for Cypriot, Greek and Turkish Affairs (ACGTA) chaired by 
Zenon Stavrinidis and established in 1992 in London promotes understanding and co-
operation on an academic level by encouraging dissemination of knowledge amongst 
scholars from Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. As the most significant, therefore, bi-
communal diasporic organisations in London, CCC and CU are ethnographically 
presented in chapters 3 and 4. Their narrational juxtaposition unravels not only inter-
ethnic but also inter-personal, generational and ideological intra-diasporic tensions. 
Although these organisations claim to represent the voice of the Cypriot diaspora, a 
closer ethnographic account of their internal dynamics challenges the unity and 
homogeneity that are assumed as essential prerequisites in any process of representing.  
 
Precisely because of such empirical data, the ‘politics of representation’ emerges as one 
of the fundamental concerns about the uses of the term diaspora within academic 
                                                 
24
 Until 1958, AKEL openly had Turkish Cypriot registered members. Under the pressure of TMT, most 
Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the party, although according to AKEL’s claims a considerable number 
continued as secret members. In the diaspora, the number of Turkish Cypriots supporting AKEL is even 
higher, allegedly reaching twenty per cent of the overall party membership (Bertrand 2004: 106). 
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discourses. Most of the foundational literature (Hall 1990; Gilroy 1993; Clifford 1994; 
Cohen 1997) celebrated the concept as a useful way of studying groups of people who 
have been dispersed from their original homeland, but at the same time maintain 
relationships with it. Diasporas are often described in terms of these transnational 
relationships that develop across national borders and challenge ideas of cultural 
homogenisation under the hegemony of the nation-state. By focusing on borders, 
Clifford (1994) claims that diasporas define themselves against the nation-state and 
indigenous claims by ‘tribal’ peoples. The nation-state, as common territory and time, is 
subverted by diasporic attachments, as national narrative cannot assimilate people who 
maintain strong ties to a homeland and ‘whose sense of identity is centrally defined by 
collective histories of displacement and violent loss cannot be “cured” by merging into 
a new national community’ (ibid.: 307).  
 
In all its success at articulating why the concept is useful in understanding transnational 
identities, Clifford’s definition also brings out some of its limitations. Many studies of 
diasporas tend to reify the idea of ‘homeland’ and analyse the relationship between the 
two in primordialist terms (Anthias 1998). As discussed in the first section of this 
chapter, not all Cypriots in London share the same understanding of Cyprus and the way 
Cyprus is imagined and experienced varies depending on individual identities, 
narratives and practices. Both Brah (1996) and Anthias (1998; 2001; 2002; 2006a) 
suggest that the emphasis on the transnational may turn attention away from the 
divisions of class, gender and race within diasporas. Issues of social exclusion and 
differentiated inclusion based upon these divisions need to be taken under 
consideration. 
 
Also, neither ‘Cyprus’ nor the Cypriot diaspora are static and homogenous.  As they are 
always in the making both as discursive and lived fields, the relationship between the 
two varies and shifts accordingly. Brah (1996) emphasises on the conflictual nature of 
diasporas and highlights the fact that any diaspora involves a multiplicity of journeys, 
narratives, and processes of re-memory. Therefore, ‘the identity of the diasporic 
imagined community is far from fixed or pregiven. It is constituted within the crucible 
of the materiality of everyday life; in the everyday stories we tell ourselves individually 
and collectively’ (ibid.: 183). This is what makes diasporas contested spaces and Brah 
insists that there is a need to examine how the collective ‘we’ is constructed. 
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Awareness of the flexibility and fluidity of diasporas also pushes for further questioning 
on their boundaries and issues of membership. In other words, who is included in the 
diaspora and can we use absolute categories of identifying diasporic identities and 
practices? The protagonists of this thesis come from a wide range of backgrounds that 
do not always fit with strict typological definitions regarding diasporas (cf. Safran 1991; 
Cohen 1997). Many of them arrived to the UK as early as the 1950s and 1960s, whereas 
others left Cyprus in the 1970s as refugees and to escape the aftermaths of the war. 
Although all of them would be labelled as ‘first-generation’25 migrants, their 
internalised experiences and memories often diverge to a great extent. Many of those 
who are characterised as ‘second-generation’ also have different life trajectories to 
demonstrate. Although the majority of them were born in the UK, others lived years of 
their childhood in Cyprus. Some individuals also have experienced many movements 
back and forth between the two contexts in their life-time. The thesis is also concerned 
with second-generation Cypriots, who have decided to ‘return’ and live in Cyprus at 
some point in their life cycle26. As Christou and King (2008) argue, although such 
‘counter-diasporic’ movements should provide a closure to the diaspora cycle through 
‘return’, they often produce new narratives and experiences that contribute to the 
reproduction of transnational identities. As we see in chapters 4 and 6, therefore, some 
of the ‘returnees’, not only maintain strong social and cultural relations with London, 
but they portray their upbringing in the diaspora and their transnational consciousness 
as defining elements in their involvement in peace politics in Cyprus. More importantly, 
such self-understandings very often evoke nostalgia for and romanticisation of life in 
‘multicultural Britain’. Finally, new and constant waves of movement from Cyprus to 
the UK, mainly of students and some migrant workers, stretch further the definitional 
                                                 
25
 I use the terms first- and second-generation Cypriots mainly in relation to the migration cycle, applying 
the former to individuals who left Cyprus as migrants and the latter to those who were born in the UK or 
arrived at a very young age as descendents of Cypriot migrants.  The terms are employed with all the 
limitations and concerns acknowledged in the text and even more. Beyond sociological attempts to define 
and conceptualise ‘generation’ along clearer lines (cf. Kertzer 1983), Loizos (2007) argues that the 
vagueness of the term still clouds academic writing with essentialising effects. Drawing on his own work 
with Greek Cypriot refugees, he argues that categories such as ‘refugee generation’ fail to account for the 
different impact that displacement may have on individuals who go through the same experience but at 
different stages of their life cycle. 
26
 Teerling (2011) traces motivations behind such decisions, experiences of migration ‘back’ to Cyprus 
and complex understandings of home amongst a number of Greek Cypriots concluding that ‘essentialised’ 
and static understandings of identity do not apply to these individuals, as they often develop cross-ethnic 
and cross-cultural connections with foreigners and migrants in Cyprus of various backgrounds in order to 
feel ‘at home’. 
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borders of diaspora. Many of these ‘newcomers’ –but by no means the majority- take 
political roles in already established institutions in London, find jobs in Cypriot 
businesses, have social and, in many cases, kinship relationships with British Cypriots 
and some times become ‘permanent’ residents in London. They often hold normative 
ideas about what a Cypriot diaspora should be like and embark on cultural or political 
‘enlightening’ projects. In these interactions, images and understandings of 
‘Cypriotness’ are constantly debated and reproduced.  
 
In order to account for such diverse experiences, relationships and identities, I, 
therefore, take an expansive approach in the employment of the term diaspora in this 
research. Instead of applying it a priori to particular groups of people and practices, the 
thesis traces the cultural processes, discourses and agents, through which the diaspora is 
debated and continuously (re)constructed, especially from the vantage point of those 
who promote a common Cypriot identity as a fundamental prerequisite for peace and re-
unification in Cyprus27. 
 
Such an approach allows us to move beyond essentialised images of ‘peaceful’ or 
conflict-supporting diasporas. A relatively recent volume published by the United 
Nations University Press brings together various academics, who are asked to evaluate 
diasporas connected to ‘homelands’ in conflict as either ‘peace-makers’ or ‘peace-
wreckers’. Through a comparative analysis of a wide range of case studies, however, 
this absolute dichotomy is considerably challenged. Bringing the data together, Smith 
(2007: 9-12) argues that diasporas can be peace-makers, peace-wreckers or neither at 
different times and such orientation depends on historical developments and political 
conditions both in the country of origin as well as the home country. As they are not 
homogenous units, they may involve elements, institutions and individuals expressing 
opposing views vis-à-vis the conflict. More importantly, the very concept of peace is 
interrogated, as its meaning needs to be closely examined and specified in particular 
contexts. Skrbiš (2007: 235), for instance, explains that unlike common understandings 
of the term, for the Croatian diaspora the idea of peace was not incompatible with 
                                                 
27
 Characteristically, it is among Cypriotists, especially those who are British born that the term diaspora 
is employed to describe their communal experience in London. It is often employed to avoid other terms, 
such as ‘koinotita’ [community] or ‘paroikia’ (roughly translated as ‘next to home’) used traditionally by 
Greek Cypriots in London. Younger Cypriotists perceive these terms as essentialist and exclusive, 
whereas they consider the term diaspora as representing more their transnational predicament. 
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providing illegal arms to Croatian fighting forces during the Balkan wars in the 1990s 
and this was mainly because peace in this case only meant independence for Croatians. 
 
Likewise, peace is an elusive term in the way it is used by Cypriots. For some Turkish 
Cypriots, for instance, peace was achieved in 1974, when Turkey interfered to rescue 
them from the violence exercised against them by Greek Cypriots. For the other side, 
since the official political line of the Republic of Cyprus after the conflict has been 
based on promoting peace and re-conciliation (Papadakis 1993), the majority of Greek 
Cypriots appear to support the re-unification of the island. However, their 
understandings and visions of such a solution vary and do not always coincide with 
formal processes of peace negotiations that have as their basis the future establishment 
of a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. Those who oppose it, often treat this solution 
as unfair for the Greek Cypriot community, a majority community that now see their 
rights curtailed and compromised by having to negotiate with a minority (Turkish 
Cypriots) on equal terms. This particular rhetoric, although in principle supporting 
peace, is often characterised as typically Greek Cypriot nationalist, juxtaposed to more 
Cyprio-centric perspectives on a solution. 
 
Even within these Cyprio-centric discourses, however, the idea of peace is constantly 
negotiated and it is tightly connected to broader social and political relations. Adding to 
Skrbiš’s argument, the following chapters of the thesis illustrate how the meaning of 
peace is not only dependent on historical and political developments in host and home 
countries but in the case of Cypriots in London, it has also to be understood in relation 
to claims to identity, inter-personal relations and shifting individual and collective 
memories and experiences.  
 
2.4 Cypriotism as discourse and practice in the Diaspora: Continuities and 
Ruptures 
 
Continuities 
On the very first day of fieldwork at the Cypriot Community Centre, Mr Georgiou, a 
man in his mid-seventies, who kindly introduced me to the place and its regulars, 
invited me to the centre’s coffee shop. ‘What would you like to have?’, asked politely 
Mr. Giorgos, who run the coffee shop. ‘Can I have a Turkish…sorry…Greek…I mean 
 60
Cypriot coffee?28’, I replied in a confused manner concluding within seconds that 
‘Cypriot’ was the right adjective for the beverage, as it was written on the drinks price 
list hanging on the wall behind Mr. George. The two men laughed at my confusion and 
attempt to use the appropriate term and the coffee shop waiter joked further: ‘Are you 
sure you want a Cypriot coffee? We can also make you a Greek or even a Turkish one, 
if you want. We are fully equipped’. Further laughs followed based on a common 
understanding of the complex political and ideological debates behind the different 
names of what is principally the same type of coffee. Papadakis (2006: 248), writing on 
cultural ownership as an inherent part of the nationalist logic, explains how the term 
‘Cypriot’ offers a solution to the ‘Turkish/Greek coffee issue’ and it is used almost to 
diffuse Greek or Turkish nationalist claims.  Moreover, as in the case of the Cypriot 
Centre, it is employed to make a political statement against these two dominant versions 
of nationalism. 
 
Greek Cypriot identity and social memory, according to Mavratsas (1997; 1999) has to 
be understood through the antagonistic relation between Cypriotism and Greek Cypriot 
nationalism. Whereas the latter is based on the centrality and prominence of ‘pure’ 
Hellenism in the historical development of Greek Cypriot identity, Cypriotism treats 
cultural tradition as a result of mixing, syncretism and diffusion (Papadakis 1993). 
Correspondingly, in the Cypriotist versions of the past, Cyprus’s culture is presented as 
a combined product of the various conquerors, who set foot in the island, unlike the 
Greek Cypriot narrative that traces the historical past through the Hellenic presence. 
‘Thus, whereas the nationalists focus on a distinguished legacy, the Cypriotists 
emphasize popular culture (λαικός πολιτισµός), rural customs and everyday practices 
which construct a more syncretic, and unquestionably less dignified, view of identity 
and tradition’ (Mavratsas 1997: 730).  
 
                                                 
28
 In response and opposition to official campaigns in Greece to call the coffee Greek rather than Turkish, 
some people, like my grandma, who came from a family of Greek refugees from Turkey, insisted on the 
‘Turkishness’ of the coffee (for the complex attitudes and discourses of Asia Minor refugees vis-à-vis the 
Greek state, see Hirschon 1989). I had taken on the term from her and also as a reaction to the official 
campaigns, I habitually call the coffee ‘Turkish’. In this episode and in order to respond to the context, I 
shift within a few seconds from this position, to the official Greek one (the second most established one in 
my cultural repertoire) and then to the one that I thought most appropriate for a centre that embraces 
Cypriotism. 
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Although Cypriotism did not take a clear ideological form before 1974, some of its 
traces and ideas were already to be found in the 1920s in the politics and declarations of 
the Cypriot Communist Party (KKK) that eventually transformed into AKEL. In typical 
Marxist language, the communist party had warned against the dangers of nationalism 
as an ideology that serves the imperialist interests of global capital and local 
bourgeoisies and emphasised on the importance of class solidarity and common struggle 
across ethnic lines (ibid.: 722). In the 1940s, AKEL’s shift to pro-enosis (unification 
with Greece) contradicted to some extent its Cyprio-centric stance, however, prominent 
members and many of its supporters criticised the official turn of the party and remained 
loyal to communist Cypriotism. 
 
Many of the migrants who left Cyprus in the 1940s and 1950s, coming from working 
class backgrounds, were already members of AKEL when they arrived to the UK. They 
often therefore explain their commitment to Cypriotism, as part of their politicisation as 
young AKEL members, and draw connections between their pre-migration and post-
migration experiences. In response to the incident with the coffee, Mr. Georgiou 
explained smiling: ‘What do you expect? We are leftists, of course we will call the 
coffee Cypriot’. In this frame of analysis, Cypriotism appears as an ideological heritage 
that is not only employed by migrants to analyse their everyday conduct in diaspora but 
also to prove retrospectively the higher morality of communism vis-à-vis Greek Cypriot 
nationalism. 
 
Post-1974, however, Cypriotism dominated in Cyprus for the first time as part of the 
official Greek-Cypriot rhetoric that based on a language of ‘past peaceful coexistence’ 
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Papadakis 1993) urged for peace and the 
reunification of the island. The idea of enosis as a political project was dropped and the 
pro-enosists, who were now associated with the right and especially with DISI 
(Democratic Rally), the party founded by Clerides, were accused as the main instigators 
of the 1974 catastrophe (Mavratsas 1997: 720).  In the new political shift towards 
rapprochement, Greek and Turkish Cypriots were presented as the blameless victims of 
broader political processes and interests that included British colonialism, American 
imperialism, extreme nationalism, which culminated with Turkey’s intervention and 
occupation of the northern part of the island. According to the same discourse, 
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therefore, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, if left alone, would reunify and live peacefully 
together like before.  
 
Most Cypriots in London, however, did not experience conflict and division in the same 
way. Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the British capital had been working together, 
living in the same neighbourhoods and sending their children to the same schools for a 
long time before the conflict and in many ways they carried on so after the conflict too 
(Constantinides 1977: 277). One day during fieldwork, this was the topic of the 
conversation in one of the coffee shops near Green Lanes that Cypriot men visit to 
socialise, play cards and pass their spare time. A group of 5 men were discussing 
politics as usual, when Mr. Stelios, who came to the UK in the late 1950s and is an 
AKEL supporter said: ‘They (Cypriots in Cyprus) have to try to live together again, as 
we have managed to do here. Why didn’t we have the same issues here?’ Another man, 
in his mid-70s picked on what Mr. Stelios had said and quickly replied: ‘It seems we 
can only live together under the English, Stelios, no? We lived happily in the past 
because of the English, we live together now in England’, evoking a quite common 
argument amongst some Greek Cypriots that implies a degree of nostalgia for a pre-
Independence colonial past in Cyprus29 as an indirect critique of the rhetoric of an 
organic past and current coexistence used by many Cypriotists in the diaspora. ‘What 
are you talking about?’, Mr. Stelios quickly reacted reverting to a typical AKEList 
interpretation of the conflict. ‘It was the English that created differences. But the 
problem was those nationalists. We didn’t have to have an armed struggle against the 
English. Eventually they would have left, like they left from Malta. I’m telling you, my 
friend, the problem was that we wanted enosis. But we see things differently in England 
than people in Cyprus because we came here a long time ago. We carried with us the 
good situations from Cyprus on our shoulders and we still have these good situations. 
Here we were just left alone to live in the way we know’.  Interfering in the interaction 
between the two men, a third person, Mr. Yiorgos raised his voice and said: ‘But it’s 
also how this society works, Stelios. Here black, whites, they all live together. We have 
                                                 
29
 I agree with Cunningham Bissell (2005), whose work in Zanzibar reveals that ‘colonial nostalgia’ has 
to be ethnographically contextualised in order to be properly understood through the specificities of these 
contexts. Whereas in urban Zanzibar, he analyses it as a set of responses to neoliberal policies of urban 
restructuring, colonial nostalgia here has to be examined as a framework of response to experiences of 
violence and displacement that caused the Cypriot conflict. 
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no other choice. If you send your kids to school, you cannot ask them to not talk to 
Turkish Cypriots, you cannot ask them to not be friends’. 
 
Besides representing different ideological stances, these utterances express a shared 
understanding of the continuities of Cypriotism, as everyday experience and practice, in 
the pre- and post-migration periods. Either as a condition of (post)colonialism or as an 
organic experience outside and besides colonialism or as a result of British 
multiculturalism, diasporic coexistence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is 
represented in these narratives, as a replication of inter-ethnic relations in pre-war 
Cyprus. 
 
In Cyprus, however, the dominance of Cypriotism as a political ideology and discourse 
was short-lived and within a few years after the conflict, towards the end of the 1980s, 
the Cypriot political scene was characterised by the emergence of what Peristianis 
(1995) calls ‘neonationalism’ and Mavratsas (1997) names ‘new Greek Cypriot 
nationalism’. A renewed Hellenocentrism developed as part of official rhetorics and 
public discourses, principally as a result of internal problems within the Greek Cypriot 
government and the continuation of the Cyprus problem that demanded a  revival of the 
political relationships with Greece (Peristianis 2006a: 104). Most Cypriot parties 
therefore, including DIKO (centre) and EDEK (socialist and left-of-centre), but 
excluding AKEL, developed close connections with the Greek state. (ibid.). In this 
period, therefore, Cypriotism starts to be more tightly associated with the communist 
Left. However, as Mavratsas highlights, ‘Cypriotist elements and orientations can be 
found in almost all political parties, and it should be clear that the reduction of the 
contest between nationalism and Cypriotism into a left-right opposition cannot be fully 
sustained and can only oversimplify the picture’ (1997: 723-724). Peristianis (2006a), 
presenting a social survey that was conducted amongst Greek Cypriots in 2000, 
concludes that although a large number of those who identify themselves primarily or 
solely as Cypriots tend to belong to the Left, a Cypriot identity is also prioritised 
amongst members of the sample who come from different ideological backgrounds. 
Also, ‘Greekness’ is not totally excluded from the answers of leftists and it emerges as 
an identifying category for many AKEL supporters, especially in discussions about 
Turkey and the Turkish intervention. 
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Besides such overlaps between Cypriotism and Greek-Cypriot nationalism, however, 
the latter dominated the official political scene and set the parameters for permissible 
public discourse in the period after the mid-1980s. Such dominance was culminated 
with the rejection of the Annan plan in 2004 by the Greek Cypriot side that was seen by 
the international diplomatic circles as well as many Cypriots themselves as the victory 
of ‘neonationalism’ once again over the political consciousness of the Greek Cypriot 
community. Although the reasons and politics behind the rejection of the plan are more 
complex and besides the fact that AKEL at the end proposed an official ‘no’ stance 
towards the referendum, the emotive televised speech of the President of the Cyprus 
Republic, Tassos Papadopoulos on the 7th April 2007, in which, while shedding a tear, 
he urged Greek Cypriots to not accept the plan became an iconic moment of such 
victory.  
 
This is why the election of Christofias was received by a large majority in the diaspora 
with great euphoria. His electoral success was the main topic of discussion for many 
weeks in coffee shops, public gatherings and house talks. Many of the AKEL supporters 
celebrated and some of them, especially older generation Cypriots, even had tears over 
what was for them a pivotal moment in the history of their party. Their hope, however, 
was not only oriented towards a future solution for Cyprus but also towards the revival 
of a relationship between the diaspora and Cyprus. For the years that Greek Cyprus was 
going through its ‘hellenocentric phase’, again in the language of continuity, which 
diasporic Cypriots employ in their narration, Cypriotism both as an ideological 
commitment and everyday practice carried on in the UK in its previous form. This 
continuity was considered to have caused a disturbance on the political relationships 
between Greek Cypriots in the UK and the Cypriot state. In an interview with a 
prominent member of the National Federation of Cypriots in the UK, he highlighted this 
shift by saying: ‘Here in the diaspora we are more committed to the Cyprus problem 
than even people in Cyprus. They are just carrying on with their lives there. And the 
Cypriot state has not always supported us, but things are changing now with the new 
government. Papadopoulos had not come to visit us more than two times in the course 
of five years. Christofias is here every two-three months’. His words stem to some 
extent from his ideological closeness to the new president, but they also reflect a general 
atmosphere at the time that the election of a Cyprio-centric government would raise new 
opportunities for the voice of its ‘Cypriotist’ diaspora to be heard. 
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Ruptures 
 
I have presented up to this point a historical narrative often reproduced by some 
members of the diaspora –but not exclusively-, in which Cypriotism, as identity, 
ideological commitment and practice is expressed through a trope of continuities 
between a pre-migration past and a diasporic present. These continuities are articulated 
both through a romanticised nostalgia for a pre-conflict Cyprus as well as in terms of an 
essentialising language, in which diaspora identity and politics appears as static and 
fixed, almost untouched by broader historical and political processes that take place in 
Cyprus. In interaction with individual narratives and experiences, however, the 
discourse of Cypriotism involves the possibilities of ‘counter-discourses’ and ruptures 
to come to the surface. There are multiple contexts and examples, in which these 
ruptures occur and find space to be articulated, however, I schematically present two 
main historical moments that often emerged in the narratives of many of the 
protagonists of the thesis as points of reference: the Turkish invasion of 1974 and the 
Annan plan referendum in 2004.  
 
1974 
Both Ladbury (1977) and Constantinides (1977), writing shortly after 1974 about 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots in London, argue that the conflict in Cyprus did not have 
devastating effects on the inter-ethnic relationships on an institutional level at least. At 
the time intermarriage and co-habitation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots existed 
but it was quite limited, a situation that replicated to some extent pre-1960s socio-
cultural patters of interaction in Cyprus. But Cypriots worked together in factories, 
shops and restaurants and they developed personal relationships in these contexts that 
according to the authors remained good even after the Turkish invasion that year. 
 
However, 1974 emerges in the narratives of some diasporic Cypriots, as a moment of 
particular tension that put a strain not only on relationships with the other community 
but on their individual commitment to Cypriotism and co-existence too. 
 
Mr Christos’s narrative presents a particularly severe case of rupture in this sense. He 
had been in London almost three decades by the time of the conflict, after leaving his 
village in Morphou in the North part of the island to become one of the main young 
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migrants to the British empire’s metropolis. He was first employed in the restaurant of 
one of his co-villagers from Cyprus and with hard work, he managed eventually to own 
his own restaurant, a business now run by his children. To interview him as one of the 
early migrants who had arrived in the UK I visited him in the restaurant, where in spite 
of his 85 years he still ‘offers a hand’. He does not describe himself as a leftist, but his 
account reproduces some of the patterns of the Cyprio-centric storyline.  
 
‘We didn’t have any problems with the Turkish Cypriots. Neither in 
Cyprus nor here. But I remember that day in July I heard about the 
invasion. Some relatives of mine, who were in London as well called 
me. I went crazy, I totally lost it, I think. At the time I had a Turkish 
Cypriot guy working in my restaurant, in the kitchen. I heard him 
cheering after hearing the news of the invasion. I couldn’t take it. I 
didn’t even want to look at him, but I gave him a small bag with thirty 
pounds in it as compensation and I asked him to never come back. Right 
or wrong, that’s how I felt at the time. But since then I have always 
avoided employing Turkish Cypriots in my businesses.’ 
 
Although it is almost certain that the narrator did not have the intention to draw any 
parallels, the incident with the thirty pounds, quite interestingly, bring to minds the 
biblical story of Judas’s betrayal of Jesus for thirty silver coins, which is often utilised 
metaphorically in popular talk as an example of ultimate disloyalty and treachery. Mr. 
Christos reflected on his feelings and behaviour at the time, in terms of deep 
disappointment for what he considered as a betrayal on behalf of Turkish Cypriots. 
 
However, not all accounts of 1974 recall such radical ruptures in the everyday 
relationships of Cypriots in London. Mr. Stelios had arrived in London in the late 
1950s, as a young boy to join his older brother who had already been living in the 
capital for a few years. All members of his family including himself were and still are 
devoted AKEL supporters. By 1974, Mr. Stelios had already got married to his wife 
Eleni, had had his first child and had established a hairdressing business in North 
London with another Greek Cypriot man. ‘I remember that day very clearly’, he 
narrates. ‘It was a Saturday and I was in the car with my business partner, Yiannis. We 
had just heard the news and we were both very upset. Yiannis was driving but he 
crossed twice over a red traffic light. I asked him to stop, so we could calm down. At 
that time we had a Turkish Cypriot barber working for us in the shop. Yiannis and I 
were thinking how we would face him. We were angry but it was not his fault. Why 
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would it be his fault? It was not our fault either. We had been living in London together 
and fine. I asked Yiannis to drive around for a while and to not go straight to the salon. 
After we relaxed and our anger was gone a little, we returned to the shop. We tried to 
behave to Hakan as usual’.  
 
Mr. Stelios’s relationships with Mr. Hakan survived not only beyond 1974 but have 
lasted until today and this connection allowed me to trace Mr. Hakan’s side of the story 
for that particular day in July 1974. He had migrated to the UK in the early 1960s 
leaving some of his family members back in Paphos, in the southern part of the island. 
He considers himself a leftist and he is quite sympathetic towards AKEL ‘despite the 
mistakes they have made’, as he argues. For a long time, he used to attend the events in 
the Cypriot Community Centre and he has maintained relationships with some of the 
regulars there, although these days he prefers to go to the Turkish Cypriot Community 
Association (TCCA). Mr. Stelios brought me into contact with his old friend and former 
employee urging me to ask him ‘if what I said it’s true. My behaviour towards him 
never changed. Hakan knows that well and he can tell you’.  
 
‘I remember very clearly that morning’, Mr. Hakan narrated. ‘My wife was celebrating 
and I was happy too because we felt that something was finally being done. We had 
been so worried about our families in Cyprus and at that time we thought Turkey was 
coming in to protect Turkish Cypriots. But I didn’t want to go to work that day. I didn’t 
want to see Stelios and Yiannis. I just couldn’t face them. What could I say to them? I 
was having my morning coffee and I was thinking what to do. But then I decided to go. 
It would have been a betrayal to not show my face at the shop that day. We didn’t speak 
about it much during the day. I guess I hid my happiness, they hid their sadness’. 
 
 
The Annan Plan 
 
Whereas 1974 is a historical movement that has marked not only the official history and 
politics of Cyprus but also the memories and lives of most Cypriots, the Annan plan and 
the referendum became another important time in the history of Cypriots to the extent 
that the period after 2004 is often characterised as the post-Annan period in public 
discourses highlighting its significance and impact for Cypriot affairs. 
Characteristically, during fieldwork, especially in 2006 and 2007, the UN designed and 
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backed plan emerged as a point of reference in everyday discussions and interactions 
even more often than the events of 1974. For those who had believed in it or supported 
it as a compromised solution, the temporary hopefulness raised due to an imminent 
solution in 2004 had now been replaced by disappointment and hopelessness. ‘We had a 
chance and we missed it, who knows when we will have another one’, was often 
repeated amongst many Cypriots in the streets of London and Nicosia.  
 
Moreover, the failure of the plan to lead to re-unification and re-conciliation shook the 
very notion of Cypriotism, as a long-term ideological narrative and practice, not least 
because the most Cyprio-centric political parties of all in Cyprus, AKEL, in a last-
minute manoeuvre, took an official ‘no’ stance to the referendum and encouraged its 
supporters to vote accordingly. Although most Cypriots in London, as permanent 
residents and British citizens, were not eligible to and did not participate in the voting 
process, they, however, had their own views on and understandings of the plan; they 
also felt its impact on their life in the diaspora. 
 
‘I was waiting until the last minute to see what AKEL would come up with. I did not 
believe that they would say ‘no’, I was hopeful until the last second’, Volkan, a Turkish 
Cypriot in his mid-50s recalled. He had arrived in London in the early 1980s, as a 
young communist studying at that time in Turkey, to escape persecution by Turkish 
military forces that were targeting –amongst others- leftist university students. He had 
been loyal to his communist convictions and had supported Cyprio-centric peace 
politics in London by participating in bi-communal events and activities mainly 
organised by AKEL. ‘But I was so disappointed with Christofias’, he carried on, ‘and 
with all those people who were saying that we could live together, that we are all 
Cypriots. After the plan, I stopped going to the Cypriot Centre. What was the point? If 
they care about their people, maybe I should start caring more about my people 
[meaning Turkish Cypriots]’. 
 
Volkan’s words reflect a broader disappointment amongst Turkish Cypriots, especially 
those who had identified with the language of Cypriotism; in some cases, and as the 
quote implies, such disappointment was converted in the post-Annan period to a shift 
towards ‘Turkish-Cypriotism’. Hatay and Bryant (2008a) explain how a movement 
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among Turkish Cypriots, characteristically called the ‘Jasmine Revolution30’, emerged 
at the beginning of 2000s to protest against Turkey’s presence and what is seen as 
colonialism of their island.  The movement evoked a language of nostalgia for a lost 
multi-cultural and cosmopolitan past. Although Kıbrıslılık or Cypriotism had not had 
many supporters amongst Turkish Cypriots before, at that point it became popular as a 
form of cultural resistance against Turkey. However, as the authors argue, the 
underlying nostalgia expressed through the language of Kıbrıslılık was less for a 
multicultural past and more for a time when Turkish Cypriots were in enclaves. 
Especially as the opening of the borders and the rejection of the Annan plan by Greek 
Cypriots brought to some extent Turkish Cypriots’ disillusionment with the possibilities 
of living together again with their old neighbours, ‘[…] Kıbrıslılık did not necessarily 
imply a common identity for the entire island. Rather, Kıbrıslılık implied the resurgence 
of Turkish-Cypriot demands for self-determination, this time posed in opposition to the 
domination of Turkey’ (ibid. :431). 
 
The tensions caused on inter-personal, local and inter-ethnic relationships were 
acknowledged by many Greek Cypriots in London. ‘I had some Turkish Cypriot 
friends, but I don’t see them much especially after the Annan’, was a phrase regularly 
repeated during fieldwork when I would ask individuals about bi-communalism and 
coexistence. On an institutional level, the relationships between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot organisations froze for some time, especially between AKEL and CTP. 
However, Cypriotists in London insisted that this was a period of hard work in order to 
regain the trust of Turkish Cypriots. Mr. Yiorgos, a member of AKEL London, 
conveyed his hopefulness about such prospect by stating: ‘Of course I understand that 
Turkish Cypriots feel unhappy after the Annan. But it’s our responsibility to approach 
them again and make them understand why the plan was rejected. I think relationships 
will be good again soon. Here in London it is actually easier, we’ve always had better 
relationships than in Cyprus’. Such statements, however, not only involve an underlying 
belief in the Greek Cypriot ‘no’ to the Annan as justified; they also fall short of 
recognising the growing appeal and transformations of Kıbrıslılık amongst Turkish 
Cypriots that diverts to a large extent from Cypriotist understandings of re-conciliation 
                                                 
30
 As the flower of jasmine came to symbolise the city of Nicosia as a reminiscent of a purer time, before 
the city was contaminated with the presence of workers from Turkey living especially in the old walled 
part of the city (ibid.: 423). 
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and re-unification. Moreover, they are employed as strategies of avoiding blame and 
managing tension in the local context of London; according to this logic, Cypriots in the 
diaspora are the blameless victims of political processes in Cyprus and if left alone they 
can continue to live as they know: together. 
 
In summary, a Cyprio-centric narrative of past and present in the diaspora emphasises 
continuities, mainly between pre-migration and post-migration peaceful co-existence of 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In some cases such continuity is expressed through a 
romanticised nostalgia for a colonial past in Cyprus, others as a commitment to the 
values of communism as articulated through the politics of AKEL and quite often as 
product of British mutliculturalism. However, although the history of coexistence in the 
diaspora is presented as unaffected by and almost isolated from life in Cyprus, everyday 
experiences of even the most committed Cypriotists reveal that relationships in the 
diaspora are highly connected to and shaped by the socio-political and historical context 
in Cyprus. On the other hand, the particular Cypriot experiences of coexistence in 
London and their historicised and ideological articulation offer individuals a different 
platform than in Cyprus to negotiate and cope with such ruptures on inter-personal, 
inter-ethnic and institutional levels.  
 
 
2.5 Cypriotism as ‘anti-nationalism’ 
 
 
 
    Ekamaman kai fugame ouloi apo ta horia mas 
kai hassame o,ti eihame akoma kai ta paidia mas. 
 
Ekamaman kai fugame ouloi apo ta horia mas 
ki irthame stin Agglia pou einai i mana tis klepsias kai olis tis 
atimias. 
 
Ekeinoi pou ta ekamasi simeron kuvernousi, 
erxontai tora na mas poun, hampari den exousi. 
 
Tora me hilia psemata pashoun na ta skepasoun 
kai vgalan tous kai irwes kai oute tha tous dikasoun. 
 
Keinoi pou ta ekamasi thelousi na glitosoun 
keina pou mas ekamasi allou na ta fortosoun.  
 
*** 
They made us all leave our villages 
and we lost everything we had including our children. 
 
They made us all leave our villages 
and we came to England that is the mother of thievery and 
dishonesty. 
 
Those who did all this today they are governing 
and they come today to tell us that they know nothing. 
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Now they try to cover their acts with a thousand lies 
and they are even called heroes and they will never be trialled. 
 
Those who did all this want now to escape 
they try to blame others for what they did to us.  
 
(Mr. Socrates, Greek Cypriot, aged 87, 04/06/2007) 
 
 
 
This poem was orally composed by one of my most elderly informants, Mr. Socrates, 
who migrated to London in the mid-1950s, already a man in his thirties at the time. He 
could be characterised as a Cypriot version of ‘the storyteller’, that skilful transmitter of 
oral history and culture, whom Benjamin (2007 [1936]), without avoiding 
romanticising, identifies with ‘traditional’ societies in his homonymous essay. Whereas 
Benjamin asserts that in modernity the value of experience, fundamental prerequisite for 
the flourishing of storytelling, is lost to more objectivist understandings of narrative, 
Mr. Socrates often attracts an audience around him at the Cypriot Centre coffee shop to 
listen to his personal experiences, his on-the-spot conceived poems and to old myths 
and tales. He is very proud of his skills and the clarity of his thinking at this age, which, 
as he often repeats, have also been recognised outside his circle of friends. As a proof, 
he recalls the time when a journalist working for ‘Kiprion Nostos’ (roughly translated as 
‘The longing of Cypriots’), a TV programme about the Cypriot diaspora produced by 
RIK (Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation), video-recorded Mr Socrates reciting his 
poems. 
 
Although Cypriot migration to the UK, as discussed before, is formally analysed as a 
type of economic migration, in the poem above that Mr. Socrates insisted should go into 
my thesis, he points out a different or parallel explanation of his reasons for migrating. 
As it is not very clear in the poem to what or whom he refers, I asked him to explain it 
to me and the other men who were sitting around him that day. ‘I’m talking about 
nationalism of course and those nationalists that destroyed the country’, he replied.  
 
Many of the older leftist Cypriot migrants evoke a similar argument in their narratives 
of migration. In such narratives they appear as forced to leave their island because under 
the progress and dominance of nationalism they had been persecuted for their political 
beliefs; unable to find jobs, they had to look for a future in the metropolis of their 
coloniser –an anathema for them, as the connection of England to thievery and 
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dishonesty illustrates in Mr. Socrates’s poem. Later in the thesis (see chapter 3), I trace 
more closely the consistencies and inconsistencies between AKEL’s ‘hidden’ account of 
the past and that of its supporters in London. However, what needs to be highlighted 
here is that in popular narratives, Cypriotism is articulated as an antithesis to 
nationalism – mainly Greek Cypriot nationalism.  
 
Although many Cypriots often represent their community abroad as traditionally ‘anti-
nationalist’, peaceful and peace-supporting in terms of imagined continuities described 
above, however, the interactions between Cypriotism and nationalism in the diaspora 
produces further contexts of tension and narratives of marginalisation. 
 
In the course of the fieldwork, I encountered these different political positions 
interacting and often clashing in a variety of spaces, including organisations, coffee 
shops, church meetings and even house meals, when members of the same family would 
find their own relatives polarised across opposing ideological stances. 
 
The following interaction took place between Mr. Marios and Mr. Yiannis, two old 
friends at a coffee shop. I was recording Mr. Marios’s life history and Mr. Yiannis was 
listening patiently when the first one said: ‘I’m not a Cypriot, I’m a Greek of the 
diaspora. We are all Greeks, you know, no matter what’.  
 
Mr. Yiannis: ‘How can you say this, Marios? Cyprus is a different country, it’s an 
independent country from Greece’. 
Mr. Marios: ‘I feel Greek and I have always supported enosis’. 
Mr. Yiannis: ‘But enosis cannot happen, Marios. It was an old idea, we are paying now 
for this idea’. 
Mr. Marios: ‘It happened already when Cyprus joined the European Union’. 
Mr. Yiannis: ‘No, as long as Turkey is there, it cannot happen’. 
 
Although Mr. Marios is fully aware that an annexation of Cyprus to Greece is far from 
pragmatic, what he suggests here is that unification has taken place between the two 
countries within the European Union, after the ‘Greek’ part of Cyprus and, therefore, 
they only legitimate part in his understanding, became a full member. For Mr. Marios a 
political and historical circle has been closed; the Greeks of Cyprus together with the 
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Greeks of Greece are part of the broader community, in which they belong; that is 
Europe. For Mr. Yiannis, however, the circle is still open, as another unification is more 
imperative, the unification of Cyprus as one island. Unlike Mr. Marios, who seems to 
not discriminate between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish forces on the island, Mr. 
Yiannis evokes a Cyprio-centric argument that focuses on Turkey rather than Turkish 
Cypriots as the obstacle to re-conciliation and re-unification. 
 
‘They are all Turks’, Mr. Marios commented in a louder tone this time. ‘I met once a 
Kurdish Professor, who looked Turkish to me but when I asked him, he told me “I’m 
not a bloody Turk”. He was Kurdish (tserkezos). Kurds are an Aryan race, like Greeks. 
They were just islamicised’. 
 
Mr. Yiannis did not reply and kept silent for a while before he tried to change the 
conversation to a different topic. Not only he found the words of Mr. Marios extreme 
but as he said after his interlocutor left, ‘this happens all the time, but we cannot argue. 
We have to be more tolerant than the nationalists. Discussion helps much better to 
convince people’. 
 
Such interactions and clashes of different ideological positions do not always remain 
confined to the walls of a coffee shop or a house. They also take place in broader 
contexts with larger impact on those involved. One of my main informants, Nikos, a 
second generation Greek Cypriot and well-known for his Cypriotist ideas and peace 
activism amongst those involved in politics in London was publicly accused by a 
diasporic newspaper columnist as an ‘anti-Greek neo-Cypriot’. The columnist 
commented on Nikos’s commitment to ‘Greekness’ and questioned his patriotism and 
his ‘ethnic integrity’ consequently. Understandably, Nikos was quite concerned about 
and disturbed by the newspaper article.  When I asked him about the reasons behind the 
allegations against him, he replied: ‘It’s because I didn't enjoy going to Greek school; 
because I was interviewed by Turkish Cypriot newspapers; and because I prefer to call 
myself a Cypriot. They just want to silence us but I think we have to keep fighting 
back’. 
 
The term ‘Neo-Cypriot’ relates, according to Mavratsas (1997: 731), to the renewed 
dominance of nationalism in Cyprus after the short term rising of Cypriotism in the 
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mid-1970s. It has negative connotations referring to those who deny Hellenism as the 
core cultural substance of Cypriot identity. Consequently ‘Neo-Cypriots’ are often 
accused for conspiring with foreign powers, especially the British, against Cypriot 
interests and for posing a threat to the cultural heritage and traditions of Hellenic 
Cyprus. The term, although not very common in London as much as in Cyprus, has, 
however, been imported and reproduced in the diaspora to single out individuals and 
organisations as ‘anti-Greek’. Although in Cyprio-centric narratives, especially amongst 
the first generation, migration is associated with an exile from nationalism, nationalist 
rhetoric still dominates some diasporic contexts to the extent that Cypriotism is treated 
as a counter-discourse that challenges the core narrative from the margins; either 
through tolerance and convincing, as articulated by Mr. Yiannis or through the language 
of ‘fighting back’, as expressed by Nikos.   
 
Within these contexts, therefore, supporters of Cypriotism see their political stance as 
anti-nationalist. ‘Whereas the adherents of Greek nationalism usually have no trouble 
with the label 'nationalist', the Cypriotists present their views as explicitly anti-
nationalist - assuming that the only type of nationalism that exists is ethnic nationalism 
which they view as inherently chauvinistic - and would certainly reject the label; 
Especially since in Cyprus the latter has been closely associated with Greek-Cypriot 
irredentism’ (ibid.: 723). 
 
Peristianis (2006a: 101), however, argues that alongside the development of Greek 
Cypriot nationalism as a form of ethnic nationalism, Cypriotism evolved as a case of 
civic/territorial nationalism. Although the former treats the nation as a cultural 
homogenous community bound together by primordial ethnic ties, the latter 
conceptualises the nation in terms of citizenship rights; all those who have the right to 
live in a particular territory regardless of their religion, ethnicity or class are considered 
members of the national community and they are equal before the law (ibid.). 
Cypriotism consequently does not imply the negation of the idea of the nation or of the 
state; however, it contests the particular ways, in which the two have been interlinked 
through the prevalence of ethnic nationalism.   
 
In a self-reflexive mode, Cypriotists often admit that their own anti-nationalist rhetoric 
is inevitably another form of nationalism. To overcome such an internal contradiction, 
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in many cases supporters of Cypriotism would justify it as a ‘good’ nationalism, a 
necessary step to overcome the ‘bad’ dominant Greek and Turkish nationalist narratives 
that have divided the island. The insistence on the ‘goodness’ of Cypriotism is often 
defended even in cases when new exclusions and divisions emerge in its name. An 
indicative example of this was put forward to me by a young man in Northern Cyprus, 
Ibrahim, who proclaimed himself a strong supporter of Cypriotism. Ibrahim was born in 
Cyprus by Turkish parents, who had migrated to the island from Turkey in the 1980s. 
Since he is not of Turkish Cypriot ancestry, he is not eligible for an identity card of the 
Republic of Cyprus and he is aware that individuals like him, although born and raised 
in Cyprus, are often not distinguished in public discourses from Turkish migrants or the 
ambiguous and broad category of settlers31. He was discussing with another Turkish 
Cypriot friend how Cypriotist politics and language often dismiss or even exclude cases 
like his own when they put a strong emphasis on a shared socio-cultural past between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots. ‘I am a Cypriot, I feel a Cypriot and I’m nothing else’, 
Ibrahim said, ‘but if there was a solution and I had to leave the island with the settlers, I 
would go; I’d do anything for the good of Cyprus’.  
 
Navaro-Yashin (2006) examines how despite popular representations and official 
discourses of common ‘Turkishness’ in TRNC, Turkish Cypriots through a language of 
‘autochthony’ separate themselves from the Turkish migrants in the island by claims to 
cultural difference. Public and media discourses often present the migrants as 
backwards and conservative compared to Turkish Cypriots and connect their presence 
with rising crime rates. Moreover, during my fieldwork in TRNC, Turkish Cypriots 
would express fears that their culture would soon be extinguished and that they are to be 
outnumbered soon by the Turkish settlers. The Cypriotists among them would 
                                                 
31
 Hatay (2009) traces the historical roots of contemporary discourses that (re)produce distinctions 
between Turkish Cypriots and ‘others’, namely the Turkish migrants who arrived to Cyprus after 1974. 
Such representations, he argues, are orientalising and have a great impact on the everyday lives and 
experiences of Turkish working class individuals who inhabit mainly the walled city of Nicosia. In a 
different paper, Hatay (2005) highlights the need to restrict the category of ‘settlers’ mainly to the 
‘agricultural labourers’ who migrated to the island after partition through a settlement policy agreement 
between Turkey and Turkish Cypriot authorities. This agricultural labour force should be distinguished 
from other Turkish migrants who arrived to the island through their own arrangements and became 
citizens through naturalisation. Other groups of individuals of Turkish origin, such as registered or non-
registered workers, students and army personnel also reside in the TRNC, however, they have no voting 
rights. As the ‘settler issue’ is a hotly debated topic in Cyprus and the number of those who should remain 
in the island after a solution appears as a major concern in the official peace negotiations, a clarification 
and better understanding of the different socio-historical backgrounds and citizenship status of those who 
arrived to Cyprus from Turkey is imperative in order to demystify public misconceptions about settlers’ 
numbers and their potential threat to outnumbering Turkish Cypriots. 
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emphasise their common culture and tradition with Greek Cypriots rather than ‘the 
Turks’, who came to their island from Turkey. This Cypriotist anti-settler discourse is 
epitomised in the words of Ibrahim in the most contradictory ways; on one hand he sees 
himself as Cypriot, as he was born in Cyprus and believes in a common Cypriot 
identity. On the other hand, he is prepared to leave with ‘the settlers’, if his lack of 
genealogical connections to Cyprus, in other words the fact that he is of no Cypriot 
ancestry, excludes him from a future unified nation-state based on a common Cypriot 
identity, as he envisages it.  
 
The language of ancestry, genealogy, culture and tradition evoked by Ibrahim is not 
used here as particular to his own case only, but reflects broader Cypriotist discourses 
that often debate identity along these terms. Consequently, although Cypriotism is cast 
as a type of nationalism concerned with citizenship rights, everyday interpretations and 
practices make the picture more blurry. Writing about post-communist Poland and the 
ways in which the nation is imagined, Zubrzycki (2001) argues that although this takes 
place along two trends, on one hand ethnic nationalism and on the other hand civic 
nationalism, these two categories are not actually as distinct and independent from each 
other. They are defined as ideal types in the Weberian sense, but ‘contrary to what is 
often affirmed in everyday life discourses as well as in some academic works, the two 
models of nationhood are not as fundamentally opposed and mutually exclusive in 
practice as they are in principle’ (ibid.: 629, italics in the original). 
 
Moreover, in his ‘Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism’, Brubaker 
(1998: 299) further deconstructs the division between ethnic and civic nationalism. 
Although the former is commonly perceived as ‘ethnocultural’, the latter’s 
conceptualisation of citizenship appears almost acultural. However, the author argues, 
even the most exemplary cases of civic nationalism, the United States and France, 
appear to have a strong underlying focus on culture i.e. a common American or French 
culture. In that sense, civic nationalism ceases to exist in its pure typological form, ‘and 
virtually all nationalisms would be coded as ethnic or cultural’ (ibid.). 
 
The question then that emerges is how this common culture is articulated and 
(re)imagined and how it relates to identity construction. This does not occur by any 
means in a consensual and horizontal way. I argue in this thesis that besides the 
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antagonisms between Cypriotism and ethnic nationalism, internal dynamics and 
tensions appear within each model. In the following chapters I trace contexts in which 
such tensions emerge and are negotiated in the process of imagining a Cypriot nation. 
The perspective of the diaspora functions as a catalyst in this process, because it brings 
an important dimension into the discussions of ‘who is a Cypriot’; when the diaspora 
enters the debate, long standing power dynamics, discourses and ideologies are 
mobilised by individuals and institutions in ways that unravel spaces of exclusion and 
differentiation. For although the nation can be imagined and envisaged in various and 
multiple ways, this process is always embedded within and bound by particular socio-
historical and political contexts. The success of any model of nationalism, including in 
this case Cypriotism, is therefore ‘historically constrained by specific narratives and 
"events" that frame the discursive field on the nation, as well as by specific historical 
and institutional arrangements’ (Zubrzycki 2001: 630). 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Many of the Cypriots, who attended Christofias’s first speech in London as the 
President of the Republic of Cyprus in May 2008, had arrived in the UK as young men 
and women decades before, to find work, to join family members or a spouse, and in 
general, to build a better life than they had in Cyprus. Although a number of them had 
imagined this as a temporary arrangement until they finally returned to their country, 
various reasons turned their migration to the UK into a permanent settlement and some 
had now gone to the event accompanied by their British born children and even 
grandchildren. ‘Nothing is more permanent than the temporary’, Mr. Socrates, the 
storyteller of the Cypriot Centre, once said about his migratory experience reproducing 
a common Greek proverb. 
 
This chapter has traced the history of Cypriot movement between Cyprus and the UK 
but moreover examined how these two contexts are imaginatively utilised by diasporic 
Cypriots as cultural resources. However, not everyone participates in the diaspora on the 
same level and in the same ways. It has been argued here that an expansive 
understanding of the concept of the diaspora is adopted in the thesis in order to address 
issues of membership and, more importantly, to present the diaspora as an ongoing 
process embedded within a complex nexus of power relations and shifting dynamics. 
Far from having a united and homogenous diaspora, it has been explained that even 
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amongst those who support peace and re-unification in Cyprus, there are divisions both 
on inter-personal and institutional levels in terms of the definition and understanding of 
these terms. It is also debatable to what extent we can speak of ‘one Cypriot diaspora’, 
as ‘homeland politics’ is organised mainly separately along ethnic lines and very few 
institutions are bi-communal and representative of all Cypriots. 
 
Cypriotist narratives in the diaspora, on the other hand, present coexistence between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots in London in terms of continuities between a pre-migration 
past and a diasporic presence and blame any disruptions to such continuities on the 
external effect of politics in Cyprus. As a result, the diaspora is presented as 
maintaining an ‘authentic Cypriotness’, for which coexistence and tolerance are a 
prerequisite and which has not been preserved in Cyprus due to division and separation. 
Claims over ‘who is a real Cypriot’ prompt constant debates in a transnational context 
between the UK and Cyprus but also in an intra-diasporic space and these are examined 
more closely in the rest of the chapters. What has been argued here, in the final section, 
however, is that Cypriotism is experienced and presented by its followers as a form of 
anti-nationalism or at least as a ‘good’ nationalism. It has also been analysed 
academically as a type of ‘civic nationalism’ but, in terms of its everyday practice and 
understanding, Cypriotism appears to evoke some of the language and terminology of 
‘ethnic nationalism’. 
 
I build on this argument in the next chapter that deals with how the history of the 
Cypriot Left that is often rendered to a position of ‘unofficial’ history, although it 
presents itself as anti-nationalist, in particular contexts replicates the structure of the 
dominant nationalist discourse and they develop together in a dialectical relation. 
Moreover, they co-exist in the rhetoric and political repertoire of Leftist individuals who 
often draw on both discourses in order to make sense of their memories and 
experiences. For, whereas the Left has developed its own Cyprio-centric account of the 
past, this is some times contested internally by Leftists themselves, when it fails to 
reflect their shifting experiences and, in chapter 3, it is argued that the narrative of 
AKEL often under-represents the narratives of its diasporic supporters. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
 
The ‘Left-overs’ of History: Reconsidering the ‘Unofficial’ 
History of the Left in the Cypriot Diaspora 
 
3.1 Introduction 
‘Whose history?’ is a question that often emerges in accounts of the past both in 
academic contexts and everyday discourses. In the past few decades, there has been a 
growing interrogation of ‘the writing of history’ in terms of its connections to 
hegemonic discourses and nationalist ideologies. It is now recognised that history, as a 
homogenous overarching narrative, is selectively constructed, strategically canonised 
and conducive to the legitimisation of the projects of the state and the ruling elites. Such 
history adheres to a scientific ideal of objectivism and presents itself as the single 
source of access to the truth about the past (Appleby, Hunt and Jacob 1994).  
 
Until WWII, in most nation-states, the monolithic approach to history had 
systematically excluded alternative accounts/histories that diverted from the dominant 
narrative. After the war, however, intellectual absolutisms were highly critiqued and 
histories of ‘others’, those of the socially excluded and marginalised, were brought into 
the foreground (Hobsbawm 1998: 269). This chapter focuses on the dichotomy between 
‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ history as articulated and represented in older and more recent 
discussions on history writing in Cyprus. The question of ‘whose history’ is considered 
here with particular reference to the history of the Cypriot Left, which has been defined 
as one of the ‘unofficial’ accounts in the debates over the past in Cyprus.  
 
The leftist narrative has been widely known amongst Cypriots through oral histories, 
publications and social activism; it has, however, been marginalised and excluded from 
public contexts dominated by the nationalist account of history (Papadakis 1998, 2003). 
According to Panayiotou (2006: 270), official historiography in Cyprus has operated a 
strategy of ‘negative integration’ towards the history of the lower classes, incorporating 
only parts of their history that did not contradict the hegemonic discourse. Silenced 
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within the official historical narrative, the Left has been rendered to function outside the 
borders of permissible public discourse and circles of power.  
 
After the electoral victory of AKEL in 2008, discussions on the revision of educational 
history books in the Republic of Cyprus intensified with suggestions that more Cyprio-
centric accounts of history, in line with changes already implemented in TRNC since 
200432, as well as excluded histories, such as that of the Left, should be incorporated in 
the history teaching curriculum33. However, it is argued here that, although these 
discussions legitimately recognise the need to revisit alternative histories, equal 
attention should be paid at how ‘unofficial histories’ are authored, reproduced and gain 
‘authenticity’. In other words, alternative histories should not be treated as objective 
‘hidden truths’, which can be unveiled under the totalising effects of official 
historiography. ‘Contrary to common-sense belief, they do not give us any simple, 
direct access to the ‘authentic’ voice and history of subaltern groups. They are in this 
respect no different from other ‘sources’ for the historian: they too need to be ‘read’. 
For they too are shot through with contradictory, naturalizing features: the constructions 
of the dominant and the privileged’ (Pandey, 2000: 284).  
 
According to Pandey, the aim of discovering the truth in ‘unofficial’ histories, which 
dominated early works in Subaltern Studies, has now been questioned in more recent 
writings in the field (ibid.: 285). This chapter aims to contribute to the discussions 
generated by this kind of literature by arguing that the ‘unofficial’ history of the Cypriot 
Left is not in an opposing relationship to the ‘official’ history of nationalism. Although 
the Left has traditionally defended its anti-nationalist stance on the ‘Cyprus problem’, 
its own version of history shares a relationship of interdependency with the nationalist 
narrative. Building on theoretical approaches to memory and history, I argue here that 
when the unofficial history of the Left is awarded the status of a ‘historical truth’, other 
voices, internal contestations and differing experiences within it, such as those of the 
diaspora, are veiled and suppressed. In such cases, the history of the Left fails to contest 
the dominant nationalist approach to history; on the contrary, the leftist ‘unofficial’ 
                                                 
32
 After its election in government in 2004, the leftist CTP introduced a new approach to history teaching 
in TRNC aiming ‘to develop a culture of peace while highlighting cultural interactions, internal divisions, 
and discontinuities’ (Papadakis 2008: 1). 
33
 Papadakis (2008) reviews some of these different suggestions and proposals in a report that he 
produced for PRIO (Peace Research Institute Oslo).  
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history may strengthen the official discourse by appearing as co-opted and confined 
within the same rhetoric.   
 
The chapter focuses mainly on the Cypriot Community Centre (CCC) in North London 
as a case-study and draws on exchanges with first generation migrants and AKEL 
supporters, who frequent the centre. Before that, in the first part (3.2), I argue that the 
idea of communism as habitus can offer an insight into how its political ideology is 
sustained by diasporic individuals and what meanings communism takes for these 
people who left Cyprus as migrants at a young age, already identifying themselves as 
communists. To examine how habitus operates then, the following section focuses on 
the relationship between memory and ‘unofficial’ history in the CCC (3.3). However, 
approaching memory as a process, I argue that ‘unofficial’ histories develop along 
individual and collective memories, which contests our perception of them as hidden 
blocks of absolute historical truth. Attention, therefore, should be diverted to specific 
contexts, in which narratives emerge and develop. The particular experiences of AKEL 
supporters in the diaspora, as presented in the third section (3.4), indicate that 
‘unofficial’ histories may contain and suppress their own ‘unofficial’ histories. The 
history of the Left is also constructed as a master narrative and, thus, shares structural 
similarities with the official nationalist account of history. Their constructiveness 
renders both accounts susceptible not only to external but also to internal contestation, 
is concluded in the last part (3.5).  
 
3.2 Cypriot communists –Habituating Ideology 
The Left in Cyprus, at least among Greek Cypriots, has been largely formulated and 
expressed through the history and politics of AKEL, which was established in 1941. 
Unlike other communist parties in Europe, AKEL has not only managed to combat 
drops in its membership numbers throughout the years (Dunphy and Bale 2007: 287), 
but after the election of Christofias in the presidential position of the Republic of 
Cyprus in 2008, it is the only communist party in power within the EU at the moment. 
The success and survival of the party has been attributed by theorists to a number of 
historical, organisational and structural parameters, such as leadership skill and 
flexibility, the particular condition of Cyprus as a small divided country (ibid.: 129), 
where there is a strong left-right political cleavage, and presidential patronage (March 
and Mudde 2005: 30). More importantly, its resilience has been explained by its ability 
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‘to combine orthodox-Marxist Leninist dogma, with workerist, liberal-democratic and 
national liberation demands’ (Peristianis 2006b: 258). It is precisely this adaptability 
and chameleonic tactics that critics of the party highlight, when questioning its 
ideological substance as authentically communist. But such criticisms take a de-
contextualised perspective on communism, since ‘proclaiming a party has definitively 
abandoned some kind of right to be called communist (or social democratic) relies on 
privileged and supposedly objective observers employing reified and static constructs 
rather than acknowledging that ideologies are always “contingent and changing 
entities”’ (Dunphy and Bale 2007: 299). 
 
Moreover, communism in Cyprus, as Panayiotou (2006: 273) argues, although imported 
as a set of ideas, has to be understood in terms of the structural and historical 
specificities of the Cypriot context. In this sense, the Cypriot Left developed less as a 
theoretically articulated movement; as the author characteristically writes (ibid.: 267), 
‘there is no Gramsci here’. It started mostly as ‘a movement of the people’, 
encompassing and operating as a common platform for a number of class-based and 
anti-colonial struggles. More importantly, after the end of the civil war in Greece, in the 
late 1940s, when AKEL dropped its pursuing of ideas of enosis and took a clear stance 
in support of self-government for the political future of Cyprus through a language of 
anti-nationalism, the divide between Left and Right emerged even sharper than before. 
‘Local coffee-shops/ silloyi and even the main soccer teams split along Left-Right lines 
-a split which endures to today. It was out of this clash that the subculture of the Left 
was born. This subculture, which includes local coffee-shops/silloyi, cooperatives, and a 
variety of mass organisations, has expressed since then the political and cultural 
autonomy of the Left’ (ibid.: 270). It was in these contexts, that Cypriots came into 
contact with communist ideas and through which they developed political identities and 
party loyalties. ‘In all these ways abstract ideologies or dogmas became embedded in 
collective discourse and action, thereby being rendered more concrete social realities’ 
(Peristianis 2006b: 262).  
 
 It was after the events of 1974, Papadakis (1993, 1998, 2003, 2005) has highlighted, 
that the rhetoric of ‘past peaceful coexistence’ emerged strong as an ideological force 
behind political quests for reunification, particularly on the Greek Cypriot side. In that 
period, therefore, AKEL’s Cyprio-centric discourses based on the party’s history of 
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anti-colonialism, anti-nationalism and inter-ethnic co-operation, found broader appeal 
among Greek Cypriots -even though temporarily-, as discussed in chapter 2. Internally, 
however, communism remained as a signifier of ideological autonomy and developed as 
‘a “faith”, which made the communists dedicated martyrs of working-class organising’ 
(Panayiotou 2006: 275). 
 
The idea of ‘faith’ could be linked to Žižek’s concept of belief in understanding the 
operations of political ideologies. In ‘The Sublime Object of Ideology’ (1989), he 
argues that political words that are central in formal ideologies are not always captured 
in their meaning by their followers. This is because words, such as the Nation, the 
People or God, are inherently vague and undefined or, as he puts it, a ‘signifier without 
signified’ (ibid. 103). Making then a distinction between knowledge and belief, he 
explains that such lack of understanding on the behalf of political subjects does not 
destabilise their loyalty to official ideologies. On the contrary, political subjects are 
always divided by what they know and what they believe about particular regimes; and 
their inability to fully know is elevated into a proof about precisely how great ideas of 
the Nation or the People are, that they transcend the everyday and the ordinary.    
  
If communism in Cyprus has developed as an autonomous sub-culture based to an 
extent not on a theoretical understanding but on its supporters belief in the ideological, 
and moral for that matter, supremacy of its core concepts and values, the question that 
needs to be examined is how such belief is articulated and sustained by political 
subjects themselves. For this, I argue here, one has to look at individual experiences and 
narratives. In the life stories of Cypriot communists in the diaspora, political words and 
ideas provide a platform to explain personal behaviours and identities conditioned by 
them. Among such stories is that of Mr. Stavros, who arrived in London in July 1958, at 
the age of 15, and has always considered himself a committed communist. Immediately 
after his arrival, he started working for the Cypriot leftist newspaper ‘To Vima’ and 
selling ‘Haravghi’, the communist newspaper brought from Cyprus.  He later 
volunteered in a Cypriot leftist organisation that had offices in Camden offering advice 
and information to other Cypriots. Eventually, he became one of the most renowned 
members of AKEL in London and held official positions within the party. When 
recalling, however, the reasons for becoming a communist, he went back in time: 
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‘I think I’ve been a leftist since I was a child in Cyprus. I clearly 
remember a moment; after the coronation of the Queen in 195234, 
someone brought us some chocolates with the picture of the Queen on 
the wrapping paper. My brother told me then: “don’t ever eat this 
chocolate”. I was a kid and we were poor, you know, we didn’t get much 
chocolate at that time. But still, I didn’t eat it. Since that time I 
remember myself always being progressive. The progressive party made 
me who I am and I gained so much in my life. I didn’t lose anything; 
I’ve only gained [from participating in leftist politics]’.  
 
For individuals, therefore, like Mr. Stavros, communist ideas and values, expressed here 
through an anti-colonialist understanding of progress, acquire meaning when integrated 
into personal experience, which is formed within specific temporalities, locales and 
relationships. His narration of his brother’s comment highlights ways in which 
individuals are socialised into ideological structures often through experiences in 
contexts that fall outside the realm of official politics; political ideology then becomes 
most important not through intellectual engagement with its terms but through situated 
acts, such as that of not eating a chocolate. The performance of these acts is framed by 
ideological values, while simultaneously it gives them substance and makes them 
tangible and concrete.   
 
In other cases, such contextualised performances of ideology emerge as ways through 
which individuals deal with marginalising and disempowering experiences that are 
produced within and because of this very ideology. This process is highlighted in the 
story of Ms. Mary, which she shared when I visited her in her house in North London. 
Ms. Mary moved to the UK in 1956, when she was 17 years old to join her father and 
brothers who had already migrated to London. Her mother and sister followed them the 
subsequent year. She got married to a Greek Cypriot man in her early twenties and they 
had a daughter. Ms. Mary worked for many years as a seamstress both from home and 
in various factories, a hard job that she blames for the back and neck pains that make 
her now suffer in her old age. Most of her family members were active leftist supporters 
and her own commitment to the Left is illustrated by the various AKEL flags that 
decorate her living room. At the same time, they sit next to many Christian icons, 
crosses and other religious symbols. ‘In Cyprus communists are Christians too. Most of 
my brothers and cousins were communists but every Sunday they would sing in the 
                                                 
34
 He refers to the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II, who became the British monarch as well as the head 
of the Commonwealth in 1952. 
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church as chanters (psaltes). Communism has nothing to do with being religious or not’, 
said Ms Mary justifying her living room’s decoration. 
 
Whereas the Communist Party in Cyprus has historically criticised the Church’s 
political and economic dominance, it has never openly denounced religion. ‘Even more 
so AKEL, instead of promoting atheism, upheld an alternative version of Christianity, 
emphasising the communist practice of the early Christian church and Christ as a social 
revolutionary, who combined a message of brotherly love with an interest in the lot of 
the poor and of the suffering’ (Peristianis 2006b: 259). Although some communists, 
therefore, in Cyprus and in the diaspora are self-proclaimed atheists, many others, like 
Ms. Mary find no contradiction between Christian practice and commitment to 
communism. ‘But what then makes someone a communist?’, I asked Ms. Mary to 
which she firmly replied:  
‘Suffering. Communists always suffer. I will tell you a story. Some 
years ago, my husband brought to the house a friend of his who was 
visiting from Cyprus. He came to our house and I prepared dinner, I 
made desert, I showed proper Cypriot hospitality. But do you know who 
that man was? The killer of one of my favourite cousins. He was a 
communist and he was murdered by this man. I was so upset, so angry 
but I was still trying to be a good hostess. But for a few moments, when 
I was preparing his coffee, I swear I thought of dropping some poison in 
it. I thought of poisoning the man. But we are not like them, the 
nationalists. To be a communist is to suffer and keep silent but also to be 
able to deal with your suffering’. 
 
The episode can be compared to similar processes through which violence descends into 
the ordinary and social suffering becomes integrated into the everyday, which Veena 
Das (2007) has described in her work among survivors of the 1947 Partition of India 
and the 1984 massacres of Sikhs in New Delhi. As Das argues, the experience of 
suffering is covered by ‘a zone of silence’ (ibid.: 54), especially among women who 
engage in self-censorship in order to protect themselves and be able to assimilate their 
experience into everyday life; moreover, in order to maintain social relationships and to 
not disrupt the structural balance of local everydayness. Das’s (ibid.) women in this 
case, said characteristically that they preferred ‘drinking the poison themselves’, 
keeping the secrets of suffering inside them, which to some extent, metaphorically, is 
what Ms. Mary decided to do.  
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In Cyprus, although leftists have experienced intimidation and witnessed violence, they 
have rarely openly or publicly revealed the identities of perpetrators, even though they 
were often known to their victims; on the contrary, silence was preserved precisely 
because of the fact that such individuals often happened to be members of the local 
community, the village or the neighbourhood as a means of not disrupting inter-personal 
local relationships. ‘How can you reveal names when people live across the road or 
your children are friends with their children? And after all these years, how do you 
destroy someone’s life who has already become a grandfather by naming them?’, 
communists often say when interrogated about their unwillingness in pursuing justice 
after their own persecution. However, as the account of Ms. Mary illustrates, silence 
and suffering does not only define the experience of being a communist, but it also 
becomes endemic of a communist identity as a mechanism of protecting one’s self and 
coping with the violence that caused it in the first place by providing a justification of 
such action –‘we are not like them’.  
 
Going back then to the question of how belief in the language of a political ideology is 
sustained, both Mr. Stavros and Ms. Maria’s accounts, illustrate how communism in 
this case can be analysed as habitus, a set of ideas and modes of actions that form for 
individuals a repertoire for everyday practice and at the same time are acquired and 
reinforced through such practice. As Bourdieu (1977: 73) has defined it, ‘[t]he habitus is 
the source of these series of moves which are objectively organized as strategies without 
being the product of a genuine strategic intention –which would presuppose at least that 
they are perceived as one strategy among other possible strategies’. Communism, 
therefore, frames personal experience and action in ways that become so naturalised and 
routinised that it appears as the only frame through which individuals give meaning to 
their decisions and actions.  
 
The following sections investigate further how communism as habitus operates by 
focusing on the dialectical relationship between the history of AKEL and its supporters’ 
memories in the diaspora. However, although this relationship appears and is 
experienced as ‘natural’, it often requires some ‘memory adjustment’ on behalf of 
AKEL followers in order to be sustained. It is in these moments and spaces of ‘habit-
change’ then that the convergence between history and memory is challenged and 
contested.  
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3.3 Memory and ‘unofficial’ history at the London CCC. 
‘Of course we talk about history and politics here. This is what we, Cypriots, do, isn’t 
it?’ is an expression often repeated at the CCC in London. Although not all Cypriots in 
the diaspora engage with the politics at ‘home’, the regulars at the centre’s coffee shop 
are involved in discussions on Cypriot politics almost on a daily basis. The space of the 
centre’s coffee shop is predominantly used by male Cypriots, whereas women normally 
only visit the centre to require services or to attend particular events –but extremely 
rarely to casually socialise in its premises35. Most regulars came as migrants to the UK 
in the 1950s and 1960s and worked in a variety of jobs until retirement, which now 
allows them to spend large parts of their day at the centre. Their discussions are often 
fuelled by the wide availability of media in the centre, such as satellite TV and 
newspapers36, which play a considerable role in connecting the diasporic community to 
‘home’ (Georgiou 2001). 
Figure 2. The premises of the CCC coffee shop 
Although the discussants at the centre come from a wide range of political backgrounds, 
the majority, however, identify themselves as AKEL supporters or, more generally, as 
                                                 
35
 Papataxiarchis (1991) and Cowan (1991) have described coffee-shops in Greece as gendered spaces. 
The centre’s coffee shop operates as a space for male sociability, which often takes place through 
competing performances of masculinity. 
36
 Bryant (2004: 32-39) traces the history of the development of the cafe in Cyprus as public platform 
from the beginning of the 20th century. Public reading of newspapers and official material ‘was often a 
highly value practice, and in Cypriot villages cafes it provided an opportunity for public debate of issues 
and discussion of the reliability of printed reports’ (ibid.: 35). Such practice takes place along similar 
lines in the CCC’s coffee shop through the regulars’ engagement with newspapers and television news 
that are read and watched communally and then debated and discussed. 
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leftists. AKEL had already established its presence since 1941 in London through 
various institutions, events and services for its members. As most of the migrants to 
London came from poor, working-class backgrounds, AKEL found a large supporting 
base among Cypriots in the UK. Between 1948 and 1971, AKEL belonged to the British 
Communist Party (BCP). Newton (1969: 78) characteristically writes that although the 
BCP did not draw large membership from ethnic and migrant communities, Cypriots 
featured in the party in large numbers37. After 1971, however, AKEL resumed its 
independence and operated autonomously in the British capital38. 
 
The CCC, established in the early 1980s with funds by the Haringey Council, is 
affiliated to AKEL in multiple ways; the manager of the centre is the Secretary General 
of AKEL in the UK; many of AKEL’s events take place in the premises; and, more 
broadly, the centre seems to promote AKEL’s political ideals of co-existence and co-
operation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots for a re-united Cyprus.  
 
An emphasis on pan-Cypriotness becomes evident upon entering the centre. 
Announcements and signs on the walls are written in English, Greek and Turkish and 
there is an absence of any symbols, pictures or maps with potential Greek or Turkish 
nationalist connotations. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots are members of staff and, 
while the majority of the regulars at the coffee shop are Greek Cypriots, there is a 
number of Turkish Cypriots who also visit the centre. 
 
AKEL’s political line and history rhetoric emerges in and often dominates the everyday 
discussions in the centre. In addition to privileging Cypriotism, such rhetoric presents 
the organised Left as the major link that has kept the two main communities in the 
island connected (Panayiotou 2006). Leftists from both sides have been persecuted 
                                                 
37
 ‘It is known that in 1961 the London District of the B.C.P. had 6,682 members and that 752 of these 
were Cypriots.’ (ibid.) Newton also argues that these were merely Greek Cypriots because the party 
regarded the Turkish claim to Cyprus as imperialist sponsored.  According to the author, their high 
numbers are explained to some extent by the fact that some Cypriots had ‘brought their politics with 
them’ and also because of their concentration in particular areas it was easy to recruit them into the party.  
38
 In one of our interviews, the secretary of AKEL in London justified this move as necessary to address 
the language barrier that did not allow many of the Cypriot communists, whose English was not always 
fluent, to take part in meetings and conferences of the BCP. He denied any ideological drifts between 
AKEL and the BCP or any other cultural and political reasons for AKEL’s independence; however, other 
AKEL supporters explained in their narratives that AKEL catered better for their political interests in 
Cyprus. To some extent, this illustrates the supporters’ inclination towards a specific ‘Cypriot 
communism’, which, from their perspective, was not represented enough within the BCP. 
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equally by nationalists of their own ethnic community and, in this sense, their class 
position and political ideology unites them across ethnic divisions. For AKEL, Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots have not only always lived together but have also been united by 
their common interests and struggles as workers.  
 
Mr. Costas, who came to London in 1956 and frequents the CCC coffee shop almost on 
a daily basis, recalls his personal experience as a testimony for AKEL’s role in catering 
for both communities. When asked whether he has worked with Turkish Cypriots, he 
first refers to his working years in the UK and then to his pre-migration time in Cyprus: 
‘Not really, because the factory I worked in was a family business; we 
were just 10 people and there weren’t any Turkish Cypriots…not 
because they didn’t want Turkish Cypriots…it just happened. But in 
Cyprus I worked many times with Turkish Cypriots. They all spoke 
Greek. I worked at the port in ships; most of the workers there were 
Turkish Cypriots. When we finished work in the afternoon, on our way 
home, we all looked the same; you couldn’t see any difference. Let me 
tell you something else. My father used to have a bus but not like the 
ones today; it was a semi-lorry. Our parents used to wake us up around 
12 to take us with them. Before we left, a Turkish Cypriot man came 
to our house. There was such a big trust [between my family and the 
man]. He used to come to watch our house and our property. This is a 
proof that we could live together. Others did these things to us [Alloi 
mas ta ekaman]’. 
 
To explain who was to blame, Mr. Costas shifted from a personal narrative to talking 
about broader historical processes:   
‘Chauvinism; Nationalism, first; from both sides. That’s the main 
reason. But those who planted the seeds for chauvinism are not any 
others but English Imperialism. Wherever the English set foot and then 
left, there are problems. AKEL always supported the co-existence 
[simviossi] between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots; and we 
didn’t make any distinctions. There were thousands…thousands of 
Turkish Cypriots who were members of PEO [Pagkypria Ergatiki 
Omospondia (Pancyprian Federation of Labour)]. Through PEO, you 
could go to the doctor, you could get medicine…it was a great help; So 
PEO helped organise [politically] the Turkish Cypriots…or the 
Turkish Cypriots organised themselves within PEO. And that’s how I 
continued and I still continue [being politically active and supportive 
of the Left]’. 
 
The switch between personal and party history here illustrates the tight relationship 
between complex mnemonic processes. As social memory is composed of the 
individual memories of those who belong in the social group (Halbwachs 1992 [1952]; 
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Connerton 1989), AKEL’s narrative is patterned on the experiences of the supporters. 
Accounts such as Mr Costas’s, therefore, inform the leftist narrative of co-existence 
based on common struggles and class experiences.  
 
On the other hand, individuals also shape their memories to fit broader accounts of the 
past. As Lowenthal points out, ‘we treasure these connections with the wider past. 
Gratified that our memories are our own, we also seek to link our personal past with 
collective memory and public history. […] But these recollections are often as 
erroneous as they are vivid. Indeed, the gross inaccuracies emphasize the point: people 
are so eager to be part of ‘history’ that they falsely ‘remember’ their responses to, or 
even having been present at, some momentous event’ (1985: 197). Although Lowenthal 
treats individual memory here almost as a subconscious process, in which individuals 
are deceived by their own desire to fit their past into a broader social memory, I argue 
that many AKEL supporters in the centre are actively engaged in a process of 
negotiation between their personal memories and the party’s historical narrative.   They 
are involved in what Daniel calls ‘deliberation’ (1997), a process of active thinking on 
one’s history, a moment of habit-change on what has been considered ‘natural’. Such 
‘agentive moments’, as Daniel characterises them, emerge when the regulars at the 
centre reflect on their party’s history and strive to position themselves within it 
according to their current circumstances and their changing experiences. 
  
An example of this ‘deliberation’ on the past is the emphasis on the close relationship 
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus before 1974 that Mr. Costas highlights 
in the narration of his personal story to contribute to AKEL’s discourse of pan-
Cypriotism. Memory, thus, is selectively reconstructed to respond to the requests of the 
present.  For the same reasons, many of the regulars at the centre stress in their 
narratives the historical presence of Turkish Cypriots at the CCC. In the past few years 
and especially after the Annan plan that produced tensions in the relationships between 
the two Lefts in Cyprus39 (Panayiotou 2006: 278), the numbers of Turkish Cypriots at 
the centre have been diminishing; it has, therefore, become more important than ever to 
                                                 
39
 According to Panayiotou (2006: 278), there has historically been an underlying drift between AKEL 
and CTP in their rhetoric of Cypriotism, as the former focused on independence (through anti-colonial 
and anti-imperial language), whereas the latter was concerned more with the support of bi-communality 
and ethnic pluralism. These different approaches emerged as significant points of tension between the two 
parties after AKEL took a ‘NO’ stance on the Annan plan. 
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stress that their presence there was once considerable. ‘Deliberation’ on the past through 
‘memory adjustment’ becomes necessary for Greek Cypriots in order to deal with the 
discontinuities and disruptions between the party narrative and their current 
experiences; this relationship will be further discussed in the next section. 
 
What is important to emphasize here is that memory –individual and collective- is about 
the present as much as it is about the past (Hodgin and Radstone 2003). It is not only 
history that is constructed, reinvented and selectively narrated, but memory is also 
reconstituted in narrative and is significantly unpredictable (Misztal 2003, 73)40. 
‘Unofficial’ histories, therefore, cannot be perceived as ‘authentic’ and ‘true’ because 
they draw on individual and collective memories as their direct sources of access to the 
past. The ‘unofficial’ history of AKEL is structured and reproduced through interactions 
and negotiations amongst individual, collective and party narratives. 
 
Moreover, an approach to memory as processual does not only help us understand how 
memory is produced and reconstituted in the present; it also allows us to focus on 
individuals as active agents within the fields of production and re-production of 
‘unofficial’ history - and history in general. It, therefore, sheds some light to the 
questions of how particular histories develop and become accepted or contested; the 
following two sections are dealing with these questions. 
 
3.4 ‘Unofficial’ histories of the ‘unofficial’ history: the case of AKEL supporters in 
the diaspora. 
To accept that historical narratives are in a dialectical relationship with individual and 
collective memories and experiences means that we need to shift focus to the particular 
contexts in which this relationship is shaped. As Pandey has suggested, ‘unofficial’ 
histories should be examined in a situational and contextual perspective because ‘[t]he 
‘text’ has no intrinsic or fixed meaning: rather, it is surrounded, infused and positioned 
(as in the case of acting) by the speaker’s experience, gestures, mode, as also by the 
audience’s placement and participation. We do not conform action simply to text or 
                                                 
40
 A wide range of literature discusses the relationship between history and memory and debates on the 
intellectual, political and historical processes of separation of the two categories, especially within the 
context of nationalism. To refer to just a few of the numerous informative publications on the topic, see 
Olick (2003), Hodgkin, K. and S. Radstone (2003), Misztal (2003), Todorova (2004).   
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merely confirm the text by action: texts, or ‘source materials’, are inevitably shaped by 
the experience of the reader/actor’ (2000: 285). 
 
We have, therefore, to relate the development of the leftist historical narrative among 
Cypriots in London to their particular memories and experiences shaped by migration 
and their diasporic condition.   It is suggested below then that the historical narratives of 
AKEL supporters in London emerge as underrepresented or as ‘unofficial’ histories 
within the ‘unofficial’ history of the party. The specificities of the diasporic leftist 
‘unofficial’ history are articulated here in two ways: on one hand, the AKEL historical 
narrative has offered a familiar framework, through which migrants could make sense 
of their new experiences and current circumstances and migration has facilitated the 
expression and communication of the ‘unofficial’ history of the party. On the other 
hand, due to the disruption of their individual memory after departure from Cyprus and 
the gap between their current circumstances and party narrative, some of the AKEL 
supporters in London experience marginalisation both as leftists vis-à-vis the nationalist 
historical narrative and as migrants vis-à-vis the ‘unofficial’ history of AKEL. 
 
However, the purpose here is not to essentialise and homogenize the alternative 
‘unofficial’ history of the Left in the diaspora. Quite the opposite, such history or 
histories are employed to argue that approaching the ‘unofficial’ history of the Left as 
authentic reproduces an objectivist understanding of history, in which other voices or 
voices of others’ are destined to be excluded and oppressed. 
 
Although it is suggested that ‘unofficial’ histories should be approached as equally 
constructed and authored as ‘official’ histories, they, however, derive their power and 
authority through claims to ‘truth’. An emphasis on such ‘truth’ is prominent in the 
discussions of many of the AKEL supporters at the CCC. Similarly to Papadakis’s 
informants (2005), men at the centre were often insistent on giving me information that 
I would not be able to find in ‘official’ books. Their discussions revolve around the 
‘real’ aspects of the ‘Cyprus problem’: the roots of the problem –‘the EOKA struggle 
for enosis’, intra-communal violence –‘EOKA killed more communists than British’- 
and the recognition of the suffering of others –‘we did many bad things to Turkish 
Cypriots too’. 
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Even though analogous narratives are very popular and dominant in the centre, they are 
mostly labelled by the men as ‘unknown’ and ‘hidden’. This may seem contradictory, 
considering that AKEL has always been a strong political party maintaining almost a 
third of the votes throughout its political history and it has control over its own media 
and public spaces. Moreover, as already highlighted, its presence is especially strong in 
the UK community, which has often been proudly described by my informants as a 
leftist community in its origins. ‘This is understandable’, explained the Secretary of 
AKEL in London, ‘as most of the migrants in the 1950s and 1960s came from a very 
poor, working class background; and these were usually the people of AKEL’.  
 
However, the sense of marginalisation and exclusion attached to these narratives is 
partly explained by the fact that, even though they have been told and heard many times 
in both private and public spaces, they have been conspicuously omitted in particular 
contexts, such as in education41 and in governmental accounts of the ‘Cyprus problem’. 
Most of my informants would describe such contexts as the ones where nationalist 
history has dominated, it has been reproduced and it has, therefore, become ‘official’.  
Education would very often be raised as a serious concern and presented as one of the 
main reasons for the maintenance and domination of nationalism in Cyprus. This was 
pointed out very often by Mr. Loizou, one of the regulars at the centre. Mr. Loizou used 
to be a member of the Greek Parents’ Association42 that operates a number of Greek 
Cypriot community schools in London and, unsurprisingly, he has always been 
interested in educational issues: 
 
‘One of the main problems of nationalism is the school. Look what 
they teach them in Cyprus, how to hate each other. When my son was 
younger, I took him to a school that was part of the church to learn the 
language [Greek]. But he started saying things like ‘look what the 
Turks did to us’ and the boy started being full of hatred. They 
fanaticised him. I had never ever told him this kind of things. I hadn’t 
                                                 
41
 About the relationship between nationalism and education in Cyprus see Bryant (1998a, 1998b) and 
Spyrou (2000, 2002). 
42
 The Greek Parents’ Association was established in Haringey in 1950 to provide educational support for 
children of Greek and Greek-Cypriot origin (Charalambous 2005). Like the school, in which I was 
employed, most ‘Greek’ schools in the UK are run by the Greek Orthodox Church, which is headed by 
the Archbishop of Thyateira and Great Britain. At the same time the Greek and Cyprus High 
Commissions provide schools with books and other educational material and with teachers, who are 
transferred from Greece and Cyprus respectively. According to the secretary of AKEL in London, in one 
of our interviews, when the Greek dictatorial government sent teachers to London schools in 1971, the 
Cypriot community rejected the offer, proving for him that ‘the Cypriot community in London has always 
been progressive’.  
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actually told him anything. But then, I took him out of that school and 
I took him to a school where I knew they were not fanatics. And that 
was only once a week43. Imagine if this happens here, what happens in 
Cyprus. And then I told him many things myself, I told him about 
truths he would not get in books.’ 
 
Similar references are often made in relation to other institutions, such as the army and 
the church. For the migrants in the centre, leaving Cyprus provided them with the 
possibility of escaping to a large extent the power and control of these institutions. 
Although some of these institutions have been reproduced in the diaspora, many of the 
AKEL supporters in the centre often implied that in the diaspora one has a greater 
option of how close to or away wants to stay from the homogenising narratives of the 
institutions. With reference to the Iranian diaspora, Sullivan (2001) similarly recognises 
that diasporic contexts provide individuals with more choices compared to those in the 
home country. Diaspora, therefore, has offered an opportunity for the ‘unofficial’ 
histories of the Left to be expressed and fertilised more overtly. As Mr. Loizou stated, ‘I 
never felt comfortable as a communist in Cyprus. But when I came here, everyone was 
almost like me. It was much easier to be here than in Cyprus’.   
 
In this case, being away from Cyprus can be interpreted as an empowering condition for 
individuals like Mr. Loizou, who claim to have a greater control over their own history 
and memories. At the same time, however, migration and diaspora reinforce 
marginalisation, which some of the AKEL supporters claim to have experienced as 
young leftists in Cyprus.  
 
One of the main points of reference in the ‘unofficial’ history of AKEL is the exclusion 
of the Left from the EOKA struggle. EOKA developed and has been perceived in the 
‘official’ historical account as a patriotic anti-colonial organisation that fought for 
unification (enosis) with Greece. Originally, the Left maintained some distance from the 
EOKA struggle and leftists were successively labelled as ‘traitors’ and ‘unpatriotic’ by 
supporters of EOKA. As explained before, this ideology often led to tensions and the 
persecution of members of the Left by EOKA members (Anthias and Ayres 1983; 
Papadakis 1998). The Left has, therefore, identified the EOKA struggle as the beginning 
                                                 
43
 Many children of Greek-Cypriot descent in the UK attend ‘Greek’ school once or twice a week, usually 
on Saturday. There is a similar pattern amongst Turkish Cypriots, who send their children to ‘Turkish’ 
school. As part of the curriculum, children are taught the history of Cyprus and the language and history 
of their respective ‘motherlands’, Greece and Turkey. 
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of the dominance of nationalism in the island; a nationalism that was set to suppress and 
silence the leftist presence and rhetoric, as suggested in the words of Mr. Costas: 
‘We love and honour and respect anyone who lost their life for 
Cyprus. But if we have to speak the truth, the countdown for Cyprus, 
for all this that’s happened, started with the armed struggle of 1955 for 
enosis. And you know who that Grivas was…when he was in Greece 
he was in a group called Hittes44. You know that Hittes had orders not 
to kill leftists but to cause them problems and to torture them to the 
extent that they end up in a wheelchair. Death is fast, but to be in a 
wheelchair is torture for life’. 
 
The notion of suffering and exclusion emerged very often in the narration of the men’s 
pre-migration years in Cyprus as young leftists. As highlighted through the example of 
Mr. Socrates in chapter 2, the men often designate their political conviction as one of 
the important reasons that forced them to leave the island and migrate to the UK. This 
idea of being marginalised and forgotten was often allegorically presented in the centre 
through joking. In the first few months of fieldwork, there were long discussions about 
a letter, which the centre received by the Archbishop of Cyprus stating that he is 
offering financial help to all regulars in the coffee shop. A list should be produced with 
the names of all eligible for help. Whereas the men in the centre clearly knew that this 
was a joke made up by Mr. Loizou, they still put their names on the list. As an observer, 
I could not understand initially why a seemingly simple joke could spark uncountable 
discussions and laughs. Eventually, it became clear that the comical value of the joke 
was to be derived from the impossibility of the scenario it presented. Many of the men 
at the centre, having spent most of their lives working hard, rely on modest pensions 
and any kind of financial help would be very welcome. But the men never expected the 
Church, identified by them as one of the forces of nationalism, to want to reward a 
group of old leftists, who left their country decades ago45. 
 
Sharing these stories in the centre confirms for many of the discussants that their 
experience is not individual but, also, collective. As Mr. Costas explained, ‘I find that 
                                                 
44
 From the Greek letter X (hi), which was the name of a para-state group, in which Grivas is considered 
to have been a leader. Group X was allegedly active in the 1940s in Greece and it has been perceived by 
leftists as a group with a strong anti-communist agenda (Droussiotis 1998).  
45
 Herzfeld (1988: xvii) discusses the use of joke among male Cretans in the village of ‘Glendi’ in Greece, 
highlighting the ways it is used collectively by men to draw on their ‘oxymoronic sensibilities’ in order to 
deal with social events that provoke fear or sadness. I understand humour here as being used by the men 
in the centre as part of a similar repertoire of ‘oxymoronic sensibilities’ to deal with marginalisation and 
exclusion that are articulated as collective experiences. 
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these people understand me. Whereas on the other side, you can tell someone this is 
water and they can say, no it’s not. The best thing you have to do is leave them…they 
will not understand’. 
 
Whereas ‘the other side’ is commonly used by Greek or Turkish Cypriots to refer to 
North or South Cyprus respectively, in this case it became clear that Mr. Costas referred 
to someone different: 
‘The people of the right. There are many here too…who don’t want 
the Turkish Cypriots around. They talk against them. Look, you’ll say 
it’s just football but sports should unite people. There is a TV here and 
it shows football matches every Saturday and Sunday from Cyprus. 
There was a game of Anorthosi –although I’ve been with Salamina 
since I was a child- playing against a Turkish team from Turkey and 
some Turkish Cypriots came here with their wives or their families. 
And there were people here who started saying swear words 
[ksemarishes] and as a result those people left. This happened two 
years ago. And instead of those people reacting, they just left. And we 
were ready to intervene, in case something went wrong and they 
started arguing, you know.’ 
 
As the quote illustrates, the notion of ‘being silenced’ coexists with ‘being able to speak 
up when it is needed’. Many of the men in the centre explained that they prefer to stay 
silent in some contexts, especially when they come into contact with non-supporters of 
the Left. This was justified as a result of years of persecution and fear but also of the 
need to avoid tensions and misunderstandings (see Papadakis 2005). On the other hand, 
as holders of truth, they believe that their voices should be heard as a challenge to the 
mainstream discourse and to the status quo. Their positioning in the margins of their 
own ethnic community allows them to reach the margins of the ‘other’, the Turkish 
Cypriot Left. Thus, as suggested in the previous section, the familiar leftist rhetoric of 
exclusion and marginalisation on one hand and bi-communalism and co-existence on 
the other hand provide the men in the centre with a framework, through which they 
negotiate interpersonal relationships and deal with ongoing experiences. 
 
The notion of marginalisation is also repeatedly used in order to deal with issues of 
blame and guilt. As mentioned before, people of the Left blame the Cyprus problem on 
the expansion of nationalism and chauvinism in the island, in which they did not take 
part. For the first-generation migrants in the centre, however, there was extra blame to 
be attached to nationalism. As young, leftist, poor, persecuted and unable to find work 
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in Cyprus, many men blamed the EOKA struggle as one of the factors that pushed them 
to migrate. They identified themselves as doubly-marginalised, first as leftists, and 
second as migrants, who had to leave their country and through hardships to make a 
living on foreign soil. 
 
While there are many factors to be named and/or blamed for becoming a migrant, for 
the men in the centre there was an additional level of guilt attached to their leaving their 
country. This feeling of guilt has to do with being an ‘escapee of history’, of not being 
in Cyprus when particular historical events took place. During my fieldwork I followed 
some of the men from the centre to their holidays in Cyprus. In a few cases, when 
heated political discussions developed, they were confronted with the marginal 
identities of leftists and ‘escapees of history’. One of these discussions took place in a 
taverna in Larnaca, where I went to see Mr. Costas. He was sitting in a group of old 
friends, who had been discussing for hours, when a man from the group said: ‘But what 
have the leftists done for this country?’  When Mr. Costas tried to explain and defend 
the Left, he was confronted by the man: ‘How do you know, Costas? You were gone by 
then…you, guys, were lucky, you didn’t have to go through what we went through’. On 
our way back, Mr. Costas stated almost apologetically: ‘See? They think we had it easy. 
But we didn’t want to leave, we had to leave. They didn’t want us in Cyprus and now 
they are asking why we didn’t stay’. 
 
What is evident here is that the notion of being an ‘escapee of history’ derives from a 
territorial understanding of history, which, as Malkki (1992) suggests, is part of the 
rationale of nationalism. It is also associated with issues of authority, of who has the 
right to speak about the past, and in this particular case it contributes to a double 
silencing of the AKEL supporters in London vis-à-vis the official nationalist historical 
narrative. For some men in the centre then, like Mr. Costas, the rhetoric of 
marginalisation is articulated in order to deal with the blame and guilt that are attached 
to being an ‘escapee of history’.  
 
The specificities of the diasporic experiences of AKEL supporters in London force us to 
reconsider ‘unofficial’ histories not as homogenous and static but as continuously 
negotiated and developing. For some of the first-generation leftist migrants, diaspora 
has been an empowering experience; however, it has also contributed to their 
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marginalisation both as leftists and migrants. The Leftist historical rhetoric has provided 
a structure, through which the experiences in the diaspora can be articulated. On the 
other hand, the ‘unofficial’ history of the Left has been invested with new meaning and 
value as it is reworked to fit the migrants’ particular experiences and memories (or lack 
of them). 
 
If we are to accept the ‘unofficial’ history of the Left as a missing block of historical 
truth, we are at risk of dismissing the fact that such history encompasses other 
‘unofficial’ histories, which may also be suppressed and silenced. The example of the 
diaspora is used here to argue against the homogenisation of the history of the Left. 
Moreover, as argued in the next section, ‘unofficial’ histories are often internally 
contested and resisted and demonstrate a close dialectical rather than opposing 
relationship to the ‘official’ historical narrative. 
 
3.5 Beyond ‘Official’ and ‘Unofficial’ Narratives of History 
Supporters of AKEL often voice their opposition against Greek and Turkish nationalism 
in Cyprus and they stress their Cypriot identity. This focus on Cypriotness has been 
identified by social scientists as a form of civic nationalism against ethnic nationalism 
(Peristianis 2006a). AKEL, however, has avoided nationalist terms in its claims for a re-
unified Cyprus. As a communist party, it has spoken about ‘the people’ instead of the 
nation and it presents itself as traditionally and historically against the particular 
nationalisms that has prevailed and led to conflict and division of the island.  
 
Although the leftist claims to historical truth have developed in opposition to the 
‘official’ nationalist discourse, it is argued here that the two historical narratives share a 
relationship of mutual interdependency. I follow Appadurai’s suggestion that it is not 
useful to consider the past as an unlimited and infinite symbolic resource. There are 
norms that define the ways the past is debated and ‘[…] although there might be infinite 
substantive variation concerning such norms about the past, there is a minimal set of 
formal constraints on all such sets of norms’ (1981: 203; emphasis in the original). In 
other words, any debate about the past takes place within a culturally definable 
framework that must provide the structures that make the debate possible and 
meaningful. According to Appadurai, an important pre-condition for any deliberation 
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over the past is the ‘interdependence’ of a version of the past with other versions; this is 
to secure a common ground for debating and ‘to ensure minimal credibility’ (ibid.). 
 
I, therefore, highlight here some of the formal similarities between the leftist account of 
history and the nationalist ‘official’ discourse to establish their dialectical relationship. 
Furthermore, the interdependence of the two historical accounts is expressed in the 
ways that they both are employed in individual narratives. In order to deal with 
experiences and memories that cannot fit within the framework of the ‘unofficial’ 
history, individuals selectively use elements of the dominant ‘official’ narrative to 
critically engage with the ‘unofficial’ discourse. As discussed already, ‘unofficial’ 
histories develop dynamically and are invested with multiple meanings in relation to 
different contexts and individual memories and experiences; in that sense, they are 
susceptible to internal contestation as much as the ‘official’ history is. 
 
One of the structural similarities between the two accounts is the way continuity is 
established between the present and the past through narration. The ‘official’ historical 
narrative has selectively focused on particular historical periods, in its attempt to present 
a linear and coherent narrative, where events follow from each other in a progressive 
and teleological order. This order is then presented as natural, ‘the natural order of 
things’, whereas alternative histories and narratives are silenced and excluded. 
However, the history of the Left also demonstrates gaps and silences. For instance, 
AKEL’s ambivalent stance on enosis during the 1960s and on the Annan plan in 2004 
that created tensions in the relationships of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Left 
have often been avoided in the political discourses within the party. 
 
In a discussion about these tensions with a prominent member of the party in London, 
he assured me that the Cypriot Centre in Haringey is for all Cypriots and that AKEL has 
successfully managed to keep the Turkish and Greek Cypriots united within the 
premises of the centre. However, when the topic shifted to talking about the dropping 
numbers of Turkish Cypriot regulars at the centre, he reluctantly added: 
 ‘Before 2004, there were more Turkish Cypriots coming to the centre. 
But after the referendum, the relationships froze. The Turkish 
Cypriots, without thinking properly and without being adequately 
enlightened thought that we should say yes. But if 76% of the 
population says ‘no’, you have to respect their opinions. Because if the 
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76% of the Turkish Cypriots, not the settlers, the Turkish Cypriots, 
said ‘no’, could we just say ‘accept it’? No, you can’t do these things. 
But Turkish Cypriots lost their trust on me personally. They would say 
‘are you now saying no to the plan?’ But I couldn’t do otherwise; they 
couldn’t understand that the plan was not serving our country, my 
Turkish Cypriot compatriots!’ 
 
As the quote illustrates, there are internal contradictions, confrontations and 
disappointments within the history of the Left, which, however, are rarely discussed 
publicly, as they pose potential disruptions to the linearity and continuity of the party’s 
historical narrative. These teleological connections with the past through narrativization 
are particularly established through public events. Whereas public commemorations 
have been seen as a tool, by which the nationalist narrative is injected into public 
memory (Connerton 1989), the Left has also established its own commemorative 
events.  
 
One of the most important commemorations AKEL organises every year is in honour of 
Mishaouli and Kavazoglou (Papadakis 1993). Mishaouli, a Greek Cypriot and member 
of AKEL, and Kavazoglou, a Turkish Cypriot and member of the central committee of 
AKEL, were murdered together on the 11th of April 1965 by members of TMT. They 
became the symbol of Greek and Turkish Cypriot friendship and, for AKEL, they came 
to symbolise the eternal common struggles of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot working 
classes. 
 
In London a special event is organised every year in the CCC to honour the two heroes 
of the party. During my fieldwork, I attended the commemorative event twice. In the 
second year, however, the day acquired even greater importance within the new 
political developments in Cyprus and the election of AKEL as government and its 
secretary Christofias as president of the Republic of Cyprus in February 2008. The 
London-based AKEL newspaper, ‘Parikiaki’, clearly made a connection between the 
two events and tied them historically across an imagined chronological spectrum. On its 
front page of 10 April 2008 an announcement for the commemorative event is 
published along with some comments about the two murdered heroes: 
‘The fascists of TMT wanted to silence an irritating voice, which 
was standing as an obstacle to their divisive plans. They wanted to 
terrorise every patriotic Cypriot, who was fighting for a united 
country. They wanted to terrorise AKEL. But they achieved the 
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opposite through such an atrocious crime. The Kavazoglou-
Mishaouli sacrifice became the symbol of a shared struggle of Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots for the salvation of our shared 
country. The anniversary of the Kavazoglou-Mishaouli sacrifice 
coincides with developments in the ‘Cyprus problem’. The 
beginning of these developments was demarcated with the election 
of Dimitris Christofias as president of the Republic of Cyprus, who 
has changed the status quo with his stance, policies and flexibility. 
The meeting between Christofias and Talat, its results and the 
opening of Ledra Street are optimistic signs. They enhance the belief 
that we can fight the occupation and division. Of course, we have a 
difficult road ahead of us. A necessary precondition for the way to a 
solution is for Turkey to change its political stance [on the Cyprus 
issue]. Our main duty is to stand next to our president Christofias in 
his fight for Cyprus and our people’ (Parikiaki, 10/04/2008). 
 
Most of the speeches at the event drew similar connections between the political 
developments in Cyprus and the historical past of the Left and incorporated the 
electoral victory of AKEL into the party’s narrative of long-term struggles and 
achievements. Connerton describes commemorative ceremonies as ‘collective variants’ 
of personal memory told in a master narrative. However, he recognises that in order for 
these ceremonies to be persuasive to their participants, ‘then those participants must be 
not simply cognitively competent to execute the performance; they must be habituated 
to those performances’ (1989: 71). 
 
Although it is useful to understand those who participate in the leftist events of the 
Cypriot diaspora as habituated performers, such events also provide opportunities for 
habit-change. To return to Daniel’s concept of ‘deliberation’ (1997), individuals have 
the potential to critically reflect on their past and shift their stance on it. 
Commemorative events are collective expressions of individual memories; however, as 
memories are not static but change through different experiences, events also open the 
space for contestation of the master narrative that they construct.  
 
At the Mishaouli-Kavazoglou event in 2008, among other participants, I spoke to Mr. 
Farouk, a Turkish Cypriot, who had come to the UK in the early 60s and worked most 
of his life as a tailor. He had been an old member of AKEL but, as he stated, he 
eventually became less politically active. ‘I came to find some old friends today. I don’t 
normally go to these things anymore. I felt quite disappointed all these years with 
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AKEL. First, there was their support for enosis, then the Annan Plan. And look at these 
events. There were few Turkish Cypriots speaking, it was mostly in Greek. This 
happens all the time. It’s again like in the 1960s. Greek Cypriots want a federation but 
they don’t believe in it’. 
 
Although the event was organised as bi-communal, the main speeches had been 
delivered in Greek, whereas the fewer Turkish Cypriot speakers used English. Most 
speakers celebrated the election of the AKEL government and expressed their hopes for 
a solution to the ‘Cyprus problem’ and the establishment of a bi-communal federal state 
in Cyprus; Mr. Farouk, however, suggested that the format and organisation of the 
event was reminiscent and nostalgic of another period of Cypriot history, in which 
Turkish Cypriots were once again suppressed and not equal sharers of power. 
 
Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots often comment in similar ways on the bi-communal 
events organised by AKEL in London. Many of these individuals are of a leftist 
background themselves, like Mr. Loizos. He is one of the regulars in the centre, and he 
has been a member of AKEL for many years; nevertheless, a ‘critical supporter’, as he 
says. When I asked him about the events, he told me ‘yes, these things have been 
happening in the same way for many years. AKEL talks about old friendships and 
stories of co-operation but they have to talk to people about today. We have to take 
some responsibility too. We have to speak about things that are happening today. And 
our past shows that we have made mistakes too’. 
 
For Mr. Farouk and Mr. Loizos, their participation in bi-communal events in London 
and their broader experiences in the diaspora contest to a large extent the historical 
narrative of AKEL and force them to revise their memories and stance on the party’s 
version of the past. 
 
The interdependency between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ history makes this contestation 
possible. Although different accounts of the past vary in terms of content, they 
demonstrate particular formal structures that allow them to converse (Appadurai 1981). 
As discussed, one of the most conspicuous structural similarities between the leftist and 
nationalist accounts of history is the narration of the historical past as a series of events 
that took place in a linear and teleological order.  The ‘unofficial’ history, therefore, 
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develops as a master narrative with its own gaps and silences. It is in commemorative 
events, such as the one for Mishaouli and Kavazoglou, where this master narrative is 
told and gains authority. At the same time, these events, as spaces where individual 
memory and party narrative come into contact, offer the opportunity for debate and 
‘deliberation’. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The ideological commitment of some diasporic Cypriots to communism can be better 
interpreted, if communism is analysed as a form of habitus, a set of ideas, discourses 
and rhetorics that frame individual experiences and practices and, simultaneously, are 
reproduced through them. In this sense, AKEL’s history as marginalised and suppressed 
by ‘official’ history has reflected the experiences of marginalisation of its individual 
members. Members of parties, however, have multiple and complex experiences that 
affect their allegiance to the party line in various ways. The men at the Cypriot centre 
have experienced marginalisation not only as young leftists in Cyprus but also as 
migrants. For them, the rhetoric of ‘marginalisation’ that has dominated in AKEL is a 
way of dealing with blame but also with guilt for leaving one’s one country and 
becoming an ‘escapee of history’. This suggests that the ‘unofficial’ history of AKEL 
encompasses a variety of diverse narratives that also need to be studied and understood 
in their own terms.   
 
Moreover, the ‘unofficial’ history of the Left is tightly dependent on the opposite 
‘official’ discourse, not only in terms of form, but also in the way that both narratives 
often coexist in political and individual narratives. Similarly to how the ‘unofficial’ 
history has the potential to contest ‘official’ accounts, the ‘official’ history can also be 
used by individuals to contest the ‘unofficial’ rhetoric in order to match their changing 
experiences and memories. In short, the ‘official’ narrative of nationalism and the anti-
nationalist historical account of the Left are not parallel lines that cannot meet; the 
boundaries between these two accounts are negotiable and porous. 
 
Recent discussions about the improvement of the history schoolbooks in the Republic 
of Cyprus have drawn attention to the absence of the history of the Left in the official 
historical accounts. Although marginalised histories deserve to be heard and 
acknowledged the ‘unofficial’ history of the Left should not be unreservedly included 
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as ‘true’ and ‘authentic’ to fill the gaps of the dominant historical narrative. To move 
away from totalising narratives and to open up the space for continuous dialogue 
amongst different voices, we need to recognise history as perspective (Foucault [1984] 
1991) and divert our attention to wider processes of history production; to how, when 
and where any historical knowledge emerges, develops and dominates. 
 
As this chapter has focused on how the Cyprio-centric language of the Left is internally 
negotiated and contested by paying attention to the experiences and narratives of first-
generation Cypriots in the UK, the next chapter examines how the discourse of 
Cypriotism and ‘peace politics’ offer a platform on which underlying inter-generational 
tensions between these first generation Cypriotists and British born Cypriots are 
crystallised and articulated through struggles around authority, political representation 
and cultural authenticity. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
The Conflicts of Peace: inter-generetional perspectives 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
During one of my first visits to the Cypriot Community Centre (CCC), a member of 
staff approached me and asked me to follow him to his office. He was a man in his early 
forties, who immediately addressed me in his London accent: ‘You can’t do this’, were 
his first words. ‘We don’t talk about history, religion or politics here. This is all 
finished, it’s left back in Cyprus; this is Britain. These people have suffered too much 
and now you are asking them about their past. This is a place for all Cypriots and we 
don’t want to jeopardise this by talking about the past or politics. No one will talk to 
you’. The ‘non-Cypriot’ decorations on his office walls, except for a map of Cyprus, 
seemed to convey almost a similar message: ‘we come from Cyprus, but we don’t want 
to be stuck with its history or politics’. Even after I explained to him the aims of my 
research and that I was not planning to ask any direct political or sensitive questions, he 
concluded that my project was incompatible with the character of the centre. 
 
I would have considered leaving the Centre and finding a more ‘compatible’ field site, 
however, I had already secured a research permission by its manager to conduct 
research there. When I asked him for his advice next day, his response was short, but 
quite revealing about an inter-generational aspect of the politics of history in the Centre: 
‘I am the manager of the Centre and you have already got my permission to do research. 
You can ask whatever you want and be here as long as you want’, he said. ‘This is 
typical attitude of second- generation Cypriots. This is the only thing I’ll say and I hope 
you understand. And of course we talk about history and politics here. This is what we, 
Cypriots, do, isn’t it?’ For the manager of the centre, the attitude of the British born 
Cypriot, Petros, who asked me to leave the centre, highlighted a common pattern 
amongst younger Cypriots in the diaspora of cultural apathy and political fatigue vis-à-
vis Cyprus. Petros, however, being cautious and sceptical about the nature of my 
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research, feared that it would not be compatible with his own vision of how the Centre 
should operate as a pan-Cypriot space. 
 
This episode brings to the foreground the main concerns of this chapter, which deals 
with inter-generational relations amongst Cypriots in London within the framework of 
‘peace politics’ and discourses of Cypriotism. The first section (4.2) presents the ways 
in which an assumed distance of British born Cypriots from ‘community’ affairs and 
politics is discursively attributed to ‘cultural apathy’ and ‘political fatigue’, as 
articulated in the comments of the manager of the CCC. It is argued, however, that such 
terms should be contextualised in order to understand how they relate to particular 
power relations and structures and they should, therefore, be studied themselves as parts 
of political processes. As Petros’s words imply, disassociation from the past does not 
necessarily mean erasure of memory and a lack of political consciousness but a 
rejection of the ways the politics of the past have been articulated within an 
organisation, like the CCC.  Moreover, the ‘double consciousness’ of second-generation 
British-Cypriots, is presented in popular discourses as a sign of ‘cultural inauthenticity’, 
which blocks their participation in Cypriot political and cultural spaces. However, as 
section 4.3 argues, contrary to theories of hybridity, ethnographic accounts and 
theorisations of identity as situational highlight that British born Cypriots draw on both 
their Cypriotness and Britishness in creative ways to resist discourses of ‘in-
betweeness’ within British, diasporic and  transnational contexts. 
 
These identity shifts are reflected in the tactics of ‘Cypriots United’ (CU), a group 
established by British born Cypriots, which is used as a case study in section 4.4. By 
adopting a language of Cypriotism, they redefine Cypriotness in Britain in order to 
expand its meaning beyond its associations with Greekness. On the other hand, they 
appropriate the discourse through a ‘British perspective’ articulated in the rhetoric of 
multiculturalism that provides them with space and voice in debates of ‘who is a 
Cypriot’. The chapter ultimately argues that in order to trace and understand the 
operations of Cypriotism in this case, it is imperative to contextualise it within inter-
related power struggles that are grounded here within a nexus of localised inter-
personal, inter-generational and inter-organisational relations. Contrary to Western-
centric assumptions, in which ‘homeland’ politics are treated as a sign of the 
unwillingness of migrant and diasporic communities to integrate in their ‘host’ country 
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(Østergaard-Nielsen 2003:6), ‘peace politics’ oriented towards Cyprus appear less as 
attempts for intervention in the politics at ‘home’; rather, they primarily provide British 
born Cypriots with a platform to contest London-based structures and ‘landscapes’ of 
traditional authority.   
 
4.2 The politics of cultural apathy and political fatigue 
It has been established in the literature on the Cypriot diaspora, as discussed in chapter 
2, that not everyone who by definition belongs to the ‘community’ participates in its 
socio-cultural and political life46. Some individuals do not identify with what is called 
‘community life’, whereas others take leading roles and often appear as representative 
figures of the larger group. Even for those who participate actively, some manage more 
diverse lives moving in and out of the ‘community boundaries’, while others’ everyday 
lives are consumed to a larger extent by the demands and obligations of their roles in 
the ethnic group. More importantly here, one’s engagement with the community life 
may vary throughout their life circle. A common theme that emerged out of many 
interviews with first-generation Cypriots is that during earlier stages of their lives, work 
and financial obligations as well as family responsibilities had left little time for active 
involvement in the socio-political life of the community. Many of them had come to the 
UK as young migrants, who focused on stabilising themselves professionally and 
financially by working long hours in order to provide for spouses and young children. 
Similarly, older Cypriot women, whom I interviewed, also highlighted that domestic 
work and taking care of the family at a younger age consumed most of their time. 
Although most of them were tied to domestic responsibilities, they also often worked as 
seamstresses from home, or were employed outside the house either in family or other 
businesses47. As many of them admitted, at that time, community cultural life, church-
going or politics were quite low on their priority list. The connection for many of them 
to what they call ‘the life of the community’ [i zoi tis koinotitas] was (re)established at a 
later stage. 
 
                                                 
46
 Anthias (2006a) discusses numerous attitudes towards ‘community belonging’ among Greek Cypriots 
in London. Canefe (2002: 70-71) describes similar trends amongst Turkish Cypriots in London regarding 
history and belonging, arguing that whereas some individuals and groups follow party politics in Cyprus, 
others distance themselves from Cypriot politics in their life in the diaspora. 
47
 Usually in businesses that belonged to other Cypriots. 
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The prioritisation of everyday life and survival over broader political and social 
engagement implies a juxtaposition between a dynamism in personal life and a stasis in 
social involvement, which for many were characteristics of earlier periods of their lives 
or periods of ‘crisis’, such as those of migration. Such an idea is embedded within an 
understanding of personal life as challenging and shifting and of the socio-political 
aspects of the community as stable and undisrupted; meaning that someone who has 
withdrawn participation for a while can ‘return’ and continue in many ways from where 
they left. However, this language of ‘continuity’ by first-generation migrants often 
constituted a point of inter-generational tension, since for many British born Cypriots, it 
entailed an unwillingness for change, which for them was imperative to reflect their 
own experiences and identities, as it will be discussed later in the chapter. 
 
At the same time, a paradox emerges here, since the same individuals who admitted an 
earlier disconnection from their diasporic ‘obligations’ in their youth, constantly 
highlighted that the major problem of the Cypriot community in London was the 
cultural apathy of young people. In most of the organisational meetings and gatherings 
in the Cypriot Centre, a central point of discussion emerged in the agenda: how to 
approach and draw the youth back to the socio-cultural life of the Centre. This anxiety is 
founded on the understanding that the long established structures and operations of 
Cypriotness in the UK do not appeal anymore to second and further generations of 
Cypriots, who lead more independent and detached lives. 
 
This is not to say that other organisations did not battle with similar concerns. In 
discussions I had with teachers working in ‘Greek’ and ‘Turkish’ schools in the UK, the 
majority commented on the progressively decreasing numbers of students and the 
deterioration of students’ language skills. In the ‘Greek’ school, where I worked as a 
teacher, the constant concern of community members and parents was the increasing 
‘anglicisation’ of their children and youth and they often put pressure on them to keep 
engaged with the community. One of the mothers used to entice her teenage boys to 
attend ‘Greek’ lessons by promising dinner at McDonald’s -apparently a treat- for the 
night of the week that their class was running. In other occasions, such as church events, 
national holidays or community functions, parents or grandparents would often draw 
others’ attention to their offsprings’ presence to stress their commitment to the 
community life; in case of absence, they would often provide explanations and excuses 
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that would regularly end with the statement: ‘but you know how children are. You 
cannot force them to do things’. 
 
For the Cypriot Centre that promotes itself as a Cypriotist and bi-communal context, 
however, the task of recruiting new members and participants into its activities posed an 
additional load of challenges. Unlike other organisations that could be characterised as 
Helleno- or Turko-centric, with much clearer nationalist agendas, the Cypriotism that 
was identified with the character of the centre lacked strong and concrete directions, 
narratives and symbols; not least, as the cultural activities taking place at its premises 
almost subverted its overarching ideology; and vice versa. On one hand, there were 
classes on Greek language and traditional dancing running, which were predominantly 
based on the Greek Cypriot curriculum and folk tradition. On the other hand, the focus 
on Greekness was highly underplayed in the public profile of the organisation and those 
it represented. This ambivalence inherent in the articulations of Cypriotism in the centre 
created an ideological and organisational vacuum that inevitably obstructed any internal 
decision and attempt to involve new people. 
 
As a result, AKEL representatives and members in the centre feared that younger 
Cypriots would be attracted towards nationalistic ideologies and organisations. Or, in a 
less dramatic scenario, they would just remain culturally apathetic and politically 
inactive. This second interpretation was reflected in the words of the manager of the 
centre on the incident narrated in the beginning of the chapter. For this first-generation 
migrant, Peter’s attitude typified a wider dismissal and discount of Cypriot politics by 
second- and further generation Cypriots in the UK. Besides the demands of everyday 
life, one of the excuses, which many of the youth employed to justify such distance, was 
a particular fatigue of the ‘Cyprus problem’. Papadakis (1998) identified a similar 
pattern amongst post-1974 generations in Cyprus, who often appear overwhelmed by 
the hegemonic role, which the conflict has played in their everyday life and the ways it 
has overshadowed every other aspect of Cypriot politics. Younger Cypriots want to 
distance themselves from the ‘dark past’ of the conflict and to look forward to the 
future. This partly explains Peter’s adverseness to any discussions on history and the 
politics of the past. For him, looking back revives tension, pain and violence, conditions 
that do not fit with his own experiences in the UK and from which he feels detached. 
Peter was not alienated from the community; on the contrary, he was working for the 
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centre and participated in many of its activities.  He was, however, alienated by the way 
the politics of the conflict had historically defined Cypriotness.  
 
For Papadakis (ibid.), the political fatigue of younger Cypriots is partly seen as 
reinforcing distance, lack of communication and stereotyping of the ‘other’. However, 
this disillusionment of younger generations with the past, according to Anastasiou 
(2002), could also be seen in a positive light, as it opens the space for communication 
and dialogue between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, who did not participate in the 
conflict and do not wish to be associated with it. This is –at least on the surface- an 
optimistic way of interpreting and analysing the political fatigue of many young 
Cypriots and it is indeed a rhetoric that is often employed by some of those who support 
peace and reunification in the lines of ‘we don’t want to look back. We have not created 
the conflict, so we have nothing to divide’.  
 
Both perspectives, however, can de-politicise and de-historicise the ideology and 
initiatives of younger Cypriots, as long as they do not trace the specific contexts and the 
power relations within which this ‘political fatigue’ is produced, talked about and acted 
upon as well as how political fatigue relates to particular processes of remembering and 
forgetting. For, distancing oneself from the past does not necessarily involve the 
collapse or absence of memory. Papadakis (1998: 151) argues that whereas  the older 
generation, who have first-hand experience of the conflict and history, are more likely 
to take up the role of contesting official history through their personal narratives, the 
historical narratives of the younger generation, who are mainly aware of most events as 
‘learned history’, seem to converge to the official history. The younger generation’s 
narratives, therefore, appear to be much more distant to those of Turkish Cypriots, 
especially as the majority of younger people have never lived in mixed areas and have 
limited contact with the Turkish Cypriot side (ibid.:152). However, memories of 
trauma, exile and conflict but also of life and co-existence before conflict become part 
of the mnemonic repertoire of those who have not experienced them directly, through 
interactions with narratives produced in multiple spaces, such as the family, the media 
and the school, which often present various and even competing accounts of history48. 
                                                 
48
 In Cyprus, the connections between post-memory and identity have been explored particularly with 
reference to the experiences of refugees. Hadjiyanni’s (2002) study has built on a more linear approach to 
memory by describing how a ‘refugee identity’ is transmitted from parents to children. Ege (2007), 
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One young man, whom I interviewed in Cyprus, for instance, claimed that most of his 
memories of the Cypriot conflict were produced through visual material, such as films, 
photos and documentaries, rather than through history lessons at school or narratives by 
family members. Papadakis’s representation of younger generations in Cyprus has 
surely to be read as an account of the particular period in the late 1990s, to which the 
article refers, before the opening of the checkpoints and the widespread use of 
information technologies that have provided Greek and Turkish Cypriots with novel 
opportunities for contact. His account also appears less representative of diasporic 
Cypriots, who have not experienced physical separation and division or the 
homogenising effects of dominant nationalist politics promoted through formal 
education like those in Cyprus, as suggested in previous chapters.  
 
At the same time, the production of ‘post-memory’ (Hirsch 1993; Goertz 1998) in the 
diaspora, or otherwise the ways in which memories are transmitted to the descendents 
of first-generation migrants, has to be located in multiple and complex processes and 
spaces. Employing a processual understanding of memory, studies on second-
generations in the diaspora have described how it is (re)produced, for instance, through 
media consumption available due to transnational cultural flows (Kabir 2004), ‘return’ 
visits to the ‘homeland’ (Christou 2006a) or as a variable of current experiences and 
conditions (Mason 2007); these illustrations, therefore, break the linearity in which 
post-memory is often understood in popular accounts as unmediated blocks of memory 
passed on from parents to children. Similarly here, second generation Cypriots’ post-
memory is constructed, articulated and shifted beyond familial accounts of the past 
through a number of dynamic spaces such as new organisations that are described in 
this chapter, online encounters, which are examined in the following chapter and 
physical crossings of the Green line in Cyprus, as presented in chapter 6. One has, 
therefore, to keep alerted about how particular memories re-emerge and are redefined in 
the act of taking a distance from the past, rather than exploring new political initiatives 
of younger Cypriots as separate and discontinuous from that past. 
 
In other words, cultural apathy and political fatigue have to be historicised and 
contextualised within particular loci and temporalities of power relations. It becomes 
                                                                                                                                               
however, furthering Hadjiyanni’s work, has suggested that refugee identity is articulated and mobilised by 
children through more diverse processes and it is, therefore, more situational than often assumed.  
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apparent in this chapter that the fatigue of young diasporic Cypriots in London reflected 
less a holistic rejection of Cypriot culture and politics and stemmed to a large extent 
from a disillusionment with how politics have operated in the local community in 
London and a disappointment with their peripheral role both within these particular 
power structures and in a broader transnational space. Therefore, while the AKEL 
supporters of the Cypriot Centre agonised over appealing to new members through their 
own discourses of Cypriotism and peace, younger Cypriots in the diaspora created and 
participated in new political spaces49 to promote co-existence and re-unification that 
reflected their own experiences. Paradoxically, in their broadness and vagueness, 
Cypriotism and peace as discourses provided the terrain for power struggles between 
generations in the diaspora to crystallize and take new forms. 
 
4.3 Interrogating Hybridity –Dropping the hyphen 
The following scene took place in the premises of a Greek-Cypriot ‘community 
newspaper’ in North London, which is published in Greek, including also a section in 
English targeted towards second-generation Cypriots not fluent in their ‘mother-
tongue’. Stella, a British born Cypriot, who had just been appointed as the new editor of 
the English section, was struggling to write an article about Cyprus. She was working 
next to Maria, who had moved to London from Cyprus a few years before to study and 
was now employed as one of the editors of the Greek section. I was sitting behind them 
in a desk going through the archives of the newspaper, when I heard Stella in despair 
asking: ‘Maria, the Cyprus invasion was in 1974, right? Or 1975?’.  Maria took a few 
moments before answering, puzzled by a question that she obviously considered that 
any Cypriot should not even need to ask. ‘Of course, 1974’, she said, but Stella was 
already replying apologetically: ‘Thank you, I knew it but I don’t know why I got 
mixed up. I’m so bad with dates’. When I was interviewing Maria some weeks later, we 
were discussing about her experiences in ‘the Cypriot community’ through her role as 
the newspaper editor. It was then that she recalled the dialogue with Stella and said: ‘I 
realised that the community here has many problems but the main one is with the 
British born Cypriots. They have no idea about what is going on in Cyprus. They are 
not fully British and they are not fully Cypriots. In a way, I feel sorry for them’. 
 
                                                 
49
 Mügge (2010) similarly describes the rejection by Kurdish youth in Holland of established political 
structures through the creation of new Kurdish organisations. 
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Hyphenated ethnic terms, like ‘British-Cypriot’, are used in everyday discourse both as 
political and descriptive categories to designate dual or multiple cultural affiliation and 
belonging. On one hand, they emerge from and fit well with the language of 
multiculturalism and the political project behind it in the ‘new Europe’ (Modood 1997). 
On the other hand, they are employed by individuals to declare personal identifications 
and life experiences. This duality or multiplicity of cultural loyalties has been celebrated 
in the literature often as tautological to a hybrid condition that is created in and defines 
contexts of postcoloniality. Associated either with ‘new ethnicities’ (Hall 1992) or with 
new culturally liminal spaces (Bhabha 1994), hybridity has been conceptualised in 
terms of its potential to interrogate fixed identities and transcend national or ethnic 
borders. 
 
However, as the incident in the newspaper demonstrates, being ‘in-between’ can also be 
rendered to a condition of being nowhere fully. Even in such a mundane and ordinary 
interaction, Stella’s lack of historical and cultural knowledge, which as/in order to be a 
Cypriot she should possess and be able to instantly utilise, was highlighted and 
commented upon in a manner as subtle as a pause during dialogue. British Cypriots are 
constantly interrogated about their language competency, historical knowledge and 
cultural skills in a number of spaces; within family contexts, in media discourses, in 
public discussions in associations and community organisations, when they travel to 
Cyprus or when they attend ‘Greek’ school. Sharing once the same flight from London 
to Cyprus with a group of British born Cypriots, I observed them practising with some 
apprehension their Greek vocabulary and testing each other’s knowledge on the latest 
Greek popular music and songs preparing themselves for encounters with friends and 
relatives in the island. Celebratory accounts of hybridity, therefore, tend to dismiss to a 
large extent the fact that ideas of ‘cultural authenticity’ and belonging are not only 
externally imposed but that they are also internalised and reproduced by diasporic 
subjects themselves. The discourse of ‘cultural (in)authenticity’, into which diasporic 
Cypriots become socialised sustains their orientation towards Cyprus50, which is 
imagined as a territorialised source of ethnic identity.  
                                                 
50
 This argument does not aim to dismiss other experiences in Britain that affect identity formation among 
British born Cypriots, such as social discrimination and racism. One of my informants described how he 
first started inquiring about his Cypriot identity and becoming involved in ‘the community’, when he was 
called ‘a Paki’ at school, explaining the verbal attack due to his skin colour. However, such events and 
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This, however, does not mean that British born Cypriots are confined by an assumed 
primordial connection to a ‘homeland’. The following example, one among many 
similar incidents in the everyday encounters of diasporic Cypriots, illustrates the point. 
One evening at the ‘Greek’ school, a British born Cypriot woman in her mid-thirties 
was picking up her children after class. The teacher, who had been transferred to the 
school from Cyprus a few years before, was commenting about how difficult he found 
his everyday interactions with ‘British people’. In a stereotyping mode, he was arguing 
that ‘British people are unfriendly and inhospitable and they don’t like relating to 
foreigners’. ‘Yes’, the woman responded, ‘it is so difficult for us to live with them some 
times’. The teacher appeared almost shocked by her reaction: ‘But it’s not the same for 
you. You are British too, aren’t you?’, he asked the woman, to which she took no time 
to answer: ‘Of course, we are’.  
 
The intriguing part of this episode is that it was ended there. No further explanations or 
comments were added. No matter what the intentions of the teacher were, the British 
born woman masterfully shifted between the two categories of identification, 
simultaneously evoking and challenging them. While she initially showed empathy 
towards the teacher’s concerns, she immediately rehabilitated her ‘Britishness’, when 
her ‘Cypriotness’ was interrogated by him. His surprised reaction implied that he did 
not see the two of them belonging to the same collectivity –or at least being Cypriot in 
the same way. By admitting to this conclusion, the woman somehow managed to avoid 
potential tension in this particular context. 
 
There are a few important points to be made in relation to the incident. It does illustrate 
according to ‘hybridity theories’ that single and static identities are challenged by a 
diasporic ‘double consciousness’. In this state, individuals question and reflect upon 
their own cultural resources and affiliations and transcend established ways of thinking 
about belonging. However, what the example also points towards is the importance of 
context, in which all these processes take place. Hybridity theories have been quite 
hasty to applaud the transformative potential of this postcolonial and postmodern 
condition, without paying enough attention to variations of how hybridity is 
                                                                                                                                               
experiences were raised less often in the narratives of British born Cypriots than perhaps in other 
diasporas (e.g. McLoughlin, S. and Kalra, V. 1999). 
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experienced and acted upon in different milieus. Anthias (2006a: 178) argues that we 
cannot pre-emptively assume that hybridities take always particular shapes or that they 
even consistently emerge in diasporic contexts. ‘Such hybridities cannot be judged as 
either transgressive or progressive without paying attention to their deployment’. 
 
To take Anthias’s suggestion a step further, it seems important not only to trace when 
and where hybridities are deployed but also how they are (re)produced, (re)defined and 
subverted through everyday experiences and interactions. Because these contexts are 
not power-free, hybridities have to be examined as products of a wider nexus of 
interpersonal, socio-political and ideological power relations that constantly shift. In his 
critique of hybridity studies, Hutnyk (1998: 414) calls attention to the situations when 
the concept loses its political content and becomes not just a superficial postmodern 
parole but also ideologically dangerous for masking ongoing undercurrent struggles. As 
he characteristically writes, ‘[t]heorising hybridity becomes, in some cases, an excuse 
for ignoring sharp organisational questions, enabling a passive and comfortable -if 
linguistically sophisticated- intellectual quietism’. 
 
The incident between the British born Cypriot and the teacher pushes for theorisations 
of identity beyond the concept of hybridity. The woman strategically shifts between 
different identities in ways that resist a condition of hybridity that leads to 
disempowerment and silencing. Goffman ([1959] 1990), in ‘The Presentation of the Self 
in Everyday Life’, compares self-representation by social actors to theatrical 
performances, where the roles one takes up correspond to the expectation of the 
audience that watches. He argues that what is important for the maintenance of 
coherence and consistency is an agreement of the setting between actor and audiences. 
When the agreement shifts, as it does when the teacher challenges a common 
Cypriotness with the woman, the performance of the self alters in order to adjust to the 
new conditions. McLoughlin and Kalra (1999: 135) find similar dynamic and 
innovative performances of identity among British-Mirpuri youth, which call for 
attention to routes rather than roots (Gilroy 1993). As the authors articulate it, ‘[v]ery 
far from ‘“being caught between two cultures”, as some have suggested in the past, the 
young people we spoke to produced situational and improvised accounts of identity and 
belonging which straddled “here” and “there”, “home” and “away”’.  
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To paraphrase a famous expression, there are only three problems with the term 
‘British-Cypriot’51; the word ‘British’, the word ‘Cypriot’ and the hyphen. One of the 
main limitations and critiques of ‘hybridity’ is that through a notion of ‘mixing’, it 
reinforces the same categories that it seeks to de-essentialise (Caglar 1997: 170); in this 
case, the terms ‘British’ and ‘Cypriot’ appear as defined a priori and remain 
unproblematised. However, these terms carry ideological meanings that are 
(re)produced and negotiated at the shifting intersections between individual experience 
and overarching political structures and discourses. 
 
The term Cypriot, for instance, in the UK is popularly understood to connote Greekness. 
In his novel ‘The Cypriot’, Andreas Koumi (2006: 32-33), brings to the surface the 
problem of this exclusive interpretation of the term Cypriot, through an episode, in 
which his main character Tony is being introduced by his friend Dave to a British 
woman in the pub. Tony, a Greek-Cypriot, who went to London as a migrant in the 
1950s remains quite silent about his origins and his secret past in Cyprus that involved a 
life-changing, albeit short-lived, relationship with a Turkish-Cypriot young woman. He 
narrates: 
‘I found myself rubbing the bristles on my chin self-consciously. I 
wished I’d made the effort to shave before coming out. 
“Oh, dear. I should have warned you, Ruth,” interjected Dave, 
overhearing her as he returned from the bar with a round of drinks. “He 
doesn’t like to talk about that.” 
Ruth accepted her glass of gin and tonic and took a sip. “I’m not after 
Tony’s life story, Dave. I just wanted to place him. Spanish? Italian? 
How about Greek? There’s quite a few living round here now.” 
“Careful, Ruth’, warned Dave, wagging a finger at his cousin. “He’s 
touchy about people calling him Greek.” 
“Turkish then”, Ruth suggested. Dave winced. 
“OK, I wish I hadn’t asked”, she said with resignation. All three of us 
sipped our drink in an awkward silence. I knew I had to be the one to 
break it.  
“I’m Cypriot”, I said, and then felt obliged to add, “I was born in a 
village in Cyprus. I came to England when I was a young man. I’ve not 
been back”.  
“I see”, she ventured, in a way which suggested she didn’t rally see at 
all. How could she see? She looked at me expectantly. 
“I’m sorry, Ruth. There’s nothing more to say”. 
Ruth now looked at me with compassion. 
                                                 
51
 Borrowed from Latour (2005), who has used the expression in his discussion of the ‘Actor-Network-
Theory’. 
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“I’m the one who should apologise,” she corrected. “Where you’re 
heading is more important than where you’re from. It’s what I tell the 
kids52.” 
I gave Ruth an approving smile.  
“You should smile more, Tony. It lights up your face”, she suggested 
and I felt myself blush. The butterflies were returning. 
I wanted to know more about Ruth’s work and she seemed delighted to 
tell me. 
“They come from so many different backgrounds. English, Irish, 
Caribbean, Indian. One or two Greek kids too, I think”, she enthused 
proudly, “Or do I mean Cypriot?” 
 
Koumi, whose book can be analysed as a Cyprio-centric account of conflict, migration 
and diaspora from the perspective of a British born Cypriot, skilfully presents a context 
where the ignorance of the British woman is treated in a sympathetic manner but also 
where simultaneously the power of the dominant discourse emerges as unsettling.  
 
It is more so when such discourse excludes Turkish Cypriots from definitions of 
Cypriotness. Once I joined Sezan and Andreas in a pub near Wood Green tube station. 
Of Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot origin respectively, they are involved in bi-
communal initiatives in London and they are supporters of Cypriotism. While we were 
having a political discussion about Cyprus, a British man from an adjacent table 
approached us and in a didactic voice he said: ‘You Greeks, I’m so tired of you. You 
always blame Turkey and Turks. Get over it!’. Without knowing explicitly what caused 
the man’s reaction and, moreover, what his interpretation of our discussion was, Sezan 
and Andreas tried to explain that they are actually Cypriot. Unsatisfied from their 
response the man was leaving the place, when Sezan said loudly: ‘And as a matter of 
fact I’m Turkish’. She seemed very surprised by her own utterance and turning to us she 
explained: ‘I really don’t know why I said this. I always say I’m Cypriot, it was the first 
time I actually shouted that I’m Turkish’.  
 
What is illustrated broadly in this section is that whereas British Cypriots are defined as 
culturally hybrid, and they are therefore rendered to a position of ‘in-betweeness’, 
within British society and within intra-communal (first/second generation) and 
transnational contexts (diaspora/Cyprus), identity, however, emerges as dynamically 
produced through innovative ways of appealing to ‘Cypriotness’ and ‘Greekness’ 
                                                 
52
 Ruth works in a youth club. 
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depending on particular contexts and experiences. As it will be clear in the rest of the 
chapter, second generation Cypriots, organising themselves around ‘peace politics’, 
draw on a language of Cypriotism in order to perform a Cypriot identity that redefines 
its common meaning in British public discourses. On the other hand, when Cypriotness 
as articulated in established Cypriotist accounts proves limited in reflecting their 
particular experiences, they evoke and employ Britishness in order to expand it.  
 
4.4 ‘Cypriots United’ 
 
Cypriots United (CU) was conceived as an idea and was established by a small group of 
British born Cypriots in London towards the end of 2007. The pro-peace group 
promoted its cause through a quite strong Internet presence and activity, especially on 
Facebook, and it very quickly became known amongst peace supporters in the diaspora 
and Cyprus. This was a time before the 2008 elections in Cyprus that was marked by a 
peak of political activism and CU took the opportunity to promote their ideas by 
lobbying British and Cypriot politicians, publishing opinion pieces and organising 
events in various venues around London.   
 
The raison d’être of the group was to represent a particular demographic of diasporic 
Cypriots, whom the founders considered as marginalised and voiceless not only vis-à-
vis nationalist movements but also within peace politics both in Cyprus and in the UK. 
Serhat, one of the founders, exemplified the political and ideological gaps and tensions, 
within which CU emerged, when he traced its genesis:  
 
‘It was 2007, November, in the Foreign Office, at an event just for the 
Turkish Cypriot Community and we were what they call it the 
representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community. We were against the 
idea in the first place of Greek and Turkish Cypriots meeting separately. If 
we fight for unification, it is a bit odd to meet separately. I remember 
sitting there as a journalist, I was not allowed to ask any questions, just 
take notes and write the article [about the event], feeling that I was being 
used. OK, fine that’s my job to come there as a journalist and write the 
news. But I remember thinking ‘these people, who the hell are they?’. 
There was the main self-proclaimed representative, who is a nationalist, 
discussing whether Cyprus would join the Eurovision song contest. There 
was also a woman there, who is a member of ‘Embargoed!’53, asking 
                                                 
53
 ‘Embargoed!’ (www.embargoed.org) is a London-based group campaigning for the lift of what its 
supporters identify as an economic and political embargo against Turkish Cypriots in North Cyprus. It 
was established in 2005 and cushions their pledge on a language of human rights. Some high-profile 
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ridiculous questions completely irrelevant to what’s happening. I felt used 
and lots of people afterwards felt the same. So this event was organised by 
people from Embargoed! to put forward to the minister of Europe an idea 
that only some people from the Turkish Cypriot community subscribe to. 
Whether they are a large number or a small one, I don’t know. But they 
were presenting themselves as if they were the voice, the only voice of the 
Turkish Cypriots. And they wanted us to make big front news about it to 
help them. I was fed up and I told Ilke later in the pub ‘let’s set something 
up’. But Ilke said that they wanted to set something up within CTP. And I 
said that we will not succeed in the party, because not all Cypriots vote for 
CTP. They are not all left-wing. We should do this broader and do it bi-
communally too. I disagreed with them, I resigned from the CTP 
committee and with Petros and the help of Mary started this thing. And 
then other people got involved. […]We wanted to create a Cypriot group, 
to show that we exist. Because before that we didn’t exist. […]You have 
this sort of groups in Cyprus, like Hands Across the Divide who are doing 
a good job. But we felt that the diaspora was left behind, maybe because 
diasporas in general live in a time warp.’  
 
CU and ‘traditional’ peace politics  
In our first meeting, both Serhat and Petros, two of the founders of the group presented 
themselves as outsiders to political circles that dealt with peace politics in London. 
Petros came from a left-wing Greek Cypriot family, who, however, never spoke to the 
young Petros about politics. He later became involved in the AKEL-associated Cypriot 
Centre and its London newspaper ‘Parikiaki’, where he was contributing to its English 
section. He very quickly felt alienated by their ‘flag-waving communism’, as he 
characteristically said, and decided to leave the newspaper and to detach himself from 
the CCC. 
 
Serhat, on the other hand, grew up in South London, away from the Cypriot centres of 
North London. This geographical distance coincided with a socio-political remoteness 
from ‘everyday Cypriotness’, as Serhat’s family did not socialise very much with other 
Cypriots, Greek or Turkish. They were not politically active either, and as Serhat says, 
‘my dad was not an educated person, so he believed what he read in the newspapers’. In 
his early teens, Serhat was leaning towards Turkish nationalism and found himself 
writing passionate letters about Cyprus to local newspapers. It was only when he went 
                                                                                                                                               
Turkish Cypriots are amongst its members and it is a particularly active group in lobbying with British 
politicians. Their alleged dynamism and influence in the UK made ‘Embargoed!’ well-known amongst 
other political circles in London and Cyprus. For supporters of rapprochement and re-unification, 
however, the group represents a pro-partition and nationalist trend and it is, therefore, seen as antithetical 
and threatening to peace. 
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to university that he started questioning his political ideas and changed his views and 
stance on the Cyprus problem. A South Londoner, Serhat started engaging with the 
Cypriot circles in North London and after university, he landed a job in one of the 
Turkish Cypriot newspapers located in the south end of Green Lanes. 
 
Whereas both Andreas and Serhat spoke about their detachment from the centre of 
Cypriot politics, their marginalisation vis-à-vis such structures developed in almost 
opposite directions. Petros was originally an ‘insider’, who eventually became 
disenchanted with the politics of AKEL and the CCC. Serhat on the other hand, who is 
in his late twenties and more than ten years younger than Petros, initially came as an 
‘outsider’, who worked himself up and into community politics in North London. 
 
These identities were not only discussed and proclaimed by the individuals involved but 
were also debated by other members of the community within discourses of political 
authority and authenticity. It is quite characteristic that when internal issues emerged 
within CU, Serhat was accused for lacking a legitimate background in diasporic and 
peace politics. A few months after the creation of CU, tensions surfaced from within the 
group about its organisation and direction. Ilke, a young Turkish Cypriot man, who was 
one of the core members of the group decided to resign. He explained his reaction as a 
frustration against the inexperience of some of the other members in terms of 
community politics juxtaposing it to his own socio-political background. Explaining the 
events that resulted to his withdrawal from the group in one of our meetings, he 
concluded: ‘Serhat is not even from here [meaning North London]. He comes from 
nowhere. He lived all his life in South London. I have been raised here and my whole 
family have been involved in the community politics. I come from a leftist background 
and my uncle is a well-known activist both in London and Cyprus. My family have 
given their life for Cyprus’. 
 
This comment is significant for considering both the metaphorical and physical 
geographies of political processes and identities. Generalised terms, such as ‘diaspora 
politics’ and ‘peace politics’ tend to mask the way internal politics is played out in and 
defined by particular localities. As shown here, participation in Cypriot peace politics in 
London is often judged according to locally specific criteria that determine one’s social 
and cultural capital –or the lack of it- to do so, through rhetorics of a territorially 
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imagined symbolic ‘landscape54 of Cypriots politics’. As Howard Ross (2009: 6) 
argues,  
‘[a] society’s symbolic landscape communicates social and political 
meanings through specific public images, physical objects, and other 
expressive representations. […] Symbolic landscapes reflect how 
people understand their world and others in it, but they can also be 
significant shapers of these worlds when they establish and legitimate 
particular normative standards and power relations within and between 
groups […] Symbolic landscapes communicate inclusion and 
exclusion as well as hierarchy, and they portray dominant and 
subordinate groups in particular ways’.  
 
It was these locally particular ‘cultural and political centres’ that CU aimed to 
challenge. The group’s establishment did not only oppose nationalist politics in the 
diaspora but also the monopoly of ‘anti-nationalism’ or ‘Cypriotism’ by particular 
agents, organisations and structures. AKEL and, by association, the CCC appeared as 
the main representatives of this ‘old’ establishment. The Turkish Cypriot Left was also 
included in this category as traditional allies with AKEL, however, to a much lesser 
extent; this was mainly due to the relatively low popularity and limited influence of 
CTP in London. The opposition to ‘traditional’ peace politics in the diaspora was 
motivated and enacted on different levels and, although not all of these complex 
processes can be exhaustively analysed here, I will try to highlight some of the main 
points of divergence between ‘old’ and ‘new’ peace politics in London. 
 
First of all, as quotes by Petros and Serhat have shown before, CU was created partly to 
break away from the ideological dominance of the Left. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the Cypriot communist parties have had a more conspicuous role in peace 
politics both in Cyprus and in London, historically justified by their lack of involvement 
in the ethnic conflict. The main difference between the two contexts, however, is that in 
Cyprus, individuals and groups of more diverse backgrounds, ideological orientations 
and agendas have participated in peace activities and organisations, ranging from 
identity-based groups, such as women’s groups to right-wing political parties, such as 
DISI.  
 
                                                 
54
 As Christou (2006b: 34-35) argues in terms of Greek-Americans, ‘cultural cores alternatively provide 
the basis for a communal shared sense of ‘sacred space’, although, as she acknowledges, they are formed 
both through consensus and conflict.  
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In numerous discussions about the lack of diverse peace activism in London, two are the 
main interpretations that emerged in my informants’ accounts. The first relates to the 
experience of migration, as most Cypriots spent their lives working to establish 
themselves and their family, which left little time for politics in general. The second 
explanation revolved around the discourse of co-existence in the diaspora -‘Cypriots 
have lived peacefully and together in London’-, which implied that there was no 
immediate need for strong political action. Due to its strong support base, therefore, and 
due to the lack of other political actions and structures around peace, AKEL 
monopolised the organisation and development of peace politics in London. 
 
For Petros and Serhat, as well as for many other members of CU, this dominance posed 
issues of ideological rigidity and exclusion. In my first meeting with Serhat in the 
Turkish Cypriot Community Association (TCCA) in Haringey, he made this explicit at 
the beginning of our conversation: ‘I’m not a communist or leftist myself but I am 
interested in peace and reunification in Cyprus. I don’t think the two are mutually 
exclusive’. Serhat expressed a feeling of alienation and fatigue by the language and 
ideological line of Cypriot communism, which also underlined the politics and agenda 
of CU.  
 
While many members of the CU, including Serhat and Petros, openly expressed their 
support for the candidacy of Christofias before his election in February 2008 both in 
private and in public forums and events, the group tried to distinguish themselves from 
AKEL by embracing other ideological strands on peace and re-unification. It is 
characteristic that in one of the largest events that CU organised at the London School 
of Economics in association with the Hellenic Observatory in October 2008, one of the 
key speakers invited was Cyprus’s ex-president, George Vassiliou. Vassiliou, also a 
well-known businessman, has been consistently involved in peace activities and 
negotiations throughout his career and he took the opportunity at the particular event to 
emphasise the economic benefits that re-unification would bring to Cypriots. He 
suggested that, for instance, Turkish companies would be very keen to invest in Cyprus 
after a solution in order to access EU markets and this would, therefore, contribute 
enormously to the economic development of the island. This neo-liberal and 
instrumentalist approach to peace that promotes the ideas of the free market and 
economic prosperity has been at the core of his politics and activities. Unsurprisingly, in 
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this line of argument, the European Union features as an ideal framework within which 
re-unification can be negotiated and achieved. CU endorsed the argument and it has 
often been repeated by many of its members in private and public events as an 
alternative to the communist language of AKEL, which at least in London, still attacked 
international capital and called for a peace solution based on the solidarity of the 
Cypriot working-classes on both sides against foreign and economic imperialism. For 
some second-generation Cypriots, communist peace politics appeared as passé and 
unrealistic, reminiscent of older periods, from which they personally felt detached and 
alienated. As Serhat remarked, ‘not everyone is a leftist’ and CU attempted to open up 
to other rhetorics and solution ideas to address the disenchantment of some Cypriots 
with AKEL’s communism. 
 
However, CU’s reaction to ‘traditional’ peace politics in London cannot be reduced to 
ideological differences. After all, many members of AKEL, including Petros, still 
considered themselves leftist and were sympathetic to the history and activism of the 
political party. Even Serhat, in one of our interviews pointed out that ‘AKEL in Cyprus 
are doing a fantastic job but here it’s different. It’s personal. People in London are 
motivated for different reasons’. This statement points to the second conspicuous point 
of tension between first and second-generation Cypriots involved in peace politics, 
which could be summarised as an intergenerational and interpersonal struggle for power 
and authority. Whereas the AKEL committee members in their meetings repeatedly 
discussed the lack of participation of young people in their activities, some younger 
Cypriots saw the AKEL organisation as a type of gerontocracy, where the same 
hierarchy and structures have been reproduced for decades with the same people 
continuously holding positions and roles. This gap in mutual understanding and co-
operation was reflected in the words of the president of the CCC: ‘One of our main 
concerns is that young people need to be more active and involved. I have heard that 
they are doing things on the Internet and they talk to each other. But we need to get 
them involved in the activities of the centre’. What the president, who has also served as 
the Secretary General of AKEL for a long period, did not recognise, according to 
second-generation Cypriots, is that the recycling of power amongst the same individuals 
alienated anyone new who wanted to join them. This was the experience of Petros, who 
often explained how as a young British Cypriot within AKEL and its newspaper 
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‘Parikiaki’ his voice was marginal and almost never considered by the older people who 
held offices and positions. 
 
However, whereas the criticism by CU members was often articulated against particular 
individuals holding onto power, the third point of divergence that is tightly related to the 
second one was expressed through a dissatisfaction of younger peace supporters with 
the internal organisational structures and values of ‘traditional’ peace politics in 
London. When President Christofias visited London and gave a public speech in May 
2008 at the Alexandra Palace Hotel, members of CU were particularly agitated with the 
failure of the local AKEL organisers to provide live translation of the President’s speech 
into Turkish. This marked for them a consistent pattern within AKEL’s bi-
communalism, in which Turkish Cypriots are used as token figures and are not seen as 
equal sharers of the State (see also Chapter 3). Serhat spoke about this tokenism when I 
met him and some other CU members the day after the speech and inquired about his 
absence from the event. ‘Why should I go? I wouldn’t be able to understand. These 
people [AKEL London] are doing bi-communalism by including two members [Turkish 
Cypriots] in their committee’. 
 
On the other hand, CU tried to engage in ‘prefigurative politics’ (Breines 1989) and 
develop the organisation of their group according to a vision of the structures and values 
which a united Cyprus in the future should figure. First of all, the group moved beyond 
the term ‘bi-communal’ and adopted the self-characterisation of ‘inter-communal’ 
acknowledging therefore the other minorities of Cyprus, such as Maronites, Armenians 
and Latins. The bi-communalism of AKEL was critiqued as reproducing further 
exclusion of other Cypriots and both Petros and Serhat tried to incorporate into CU 
members of the other communities.  
 
The same applied for issues of gender that were not addressed in the politics of AKEL, 
in which very few women held organisational and leading roles. Aware of such male-
centrism, CU very quickly after their emergence tried to involve women and gave the 
role of ‘joint co-ordinator’ to Sophia, a British Cypriot, who took a very active role in 
the organising of the group’s activities. In general, CU aimed to deal with issues of 
strict hierarchy, power monopoly and lack of internal democracy that, according to 
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them, characterised AKEL by pursuing the ideals of diversity, multi-vocality and 
horizontality in their organisational structures. 
 
 
Who are the Cypriots United?: multiculturalism and bi-communalism 
 
CU was created to represent a particular group of second-generation Cypriots in London 
who felt alienated by the way peace politics had developed in the diaspora. In that 
sense, they also aimed to represent a ‘fresh’ diasporic outlook to the Cyprus issue. 
However, CU had consistently been careful to not intervene directly in the politics in 
Cyprus and stressed the fact that their space of operation was Britain and the Cypriot 
community abroad. As Serhat highlighted,  
 
‘We can’t possibly represent people from Cyprus. We represent 
students but they are still based here. We lobby the government here 
and most of us are born and bred here so we understand the language, 
how the system works. We are looking to apply what we take for 
granted here -multiculturalism, human rights, equality- to Cyprus. So 
we are looking at peace from a British perspective.’ 
 
This ‘British perspective’, which is articulated in a language of human rights and 
multiculturalism, emerged in the discussions of many second-generation Cypriots as the 
most positive contribution that the diaspora could make to Cyprus. At the same time, a 
lack of understanding of these values was often highlighted as one of the main negatives 
of life in Cyprus.  
 
Multiculturalism in this case is interpreted and talked about in two main ways that 
reflect broader discursive strands on the topic both in public and academic contexts. 
Firstly, the term is evoked to describe an organic way of life in the UK that is 
characterised by multiplicity of cultures, religions and mentalities and is often 
associated with values, such as tolerance and mutual respect (Modood 1997). In a night 
out in Larnaca with a group of British-born young women in the summer of 2007, most 
of them were commenting on the lack of a ‘multicultural atmosphere’ in Cyprus. Two 
of them were on holiday and the other two had left the UK to live in the island. Maria, 
who had moved permanently to Larnaca with her parents after spending the first 23 
years of her life in London said: ‘I’d never marry a Cypriot-Cypriot [meaning someone 
born and raised in Cyprus as opposed to the diaspora]. I think Cypriot men here are so 
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closed-minded. Cyprus is not multicultural at all. I feel much more foreign here than I 
have ever felt in London’. 
 
The quote is quite significant because, on one level, it expresses feelings of social and 
cultural exclusion, which some diasporic Cypriots seem to experience as a result of 
contact with Cyprus. As discussed before, the discrimination, that is often humorously 
implied in the term ‘Charlies55’ used for British Cypriots, is constructed around issues 
of language, authenticity and cultural repertoire. Members of the diaspora, who 
experience such types of marginalisation often associate them with the lack of an ‘open-
minded’ or multicultural mentality, which on the contrary is represented as central in 
their life in the UK. In their interpretation, multiculturalism, encouraging identity 
politics and minority recognition (Turner 1993: 429), allows them to be ‘more Cypriot’ 
in London than in Cyprus. On a second level, however, the quote makes a particular 
value judgment, according to which ‘multiculturalism’ appears as an important 
indication of a liberal and progressive society. Maria’s friends agreed with her by 
stating that Cypriot men as well as Cyprus are quite conservative and ‘backwards’ in 
that respect.  
 
In the agenda of CU, therefore, multiculturalism appears as an important requirement 
for a solution of the ‘Cyprus problem’ and for the operations of a future united Cyprus. 
CU members often criticise the fact that, although diverse groups of people, including 
large numbers of migrants56, live in Cyprus, multiculturalism both as an ideological 
framework and as practice has not characterised the Cypriot context. Besides it being 
employed to express an inherent aspect of the diasporic experience, in terms of the 
‘Cyprus problem, ‘multiculturalism’ is used by second-generation Cypriots to refer to 
how ‘Cypriotness’ should be articulated and envisaged. Characteristically, both sides of 
the term are simultaneously evoked in CU’s official declaration that states: 
 
 
                                                 
55
 A term used in everyday language to refer to British Cypriots.  
56
 Hatay and Bryant (2008b) and Demetriou (2008) have produced reports documenting the experiences 
and lives of migrants in North and South Nicosia respectively. Whereas there is increasing academic 
attention towards  migrant communities and experiences, the dominance of the ‘Cyprus problem’ and 
ideas of ‘bi-communalism’ on Cypriot public discourses leaves less space for discussions about migration 
and diversity that go beyond ‘anti-migrant’ rhetorics.  
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What becomes noticeable in the declaration, however, is that the discourse of ‘past 
peaceful co-existence’, which informs the politics of ‘bi-communalism’ and underscores 
the basic rhetoric of Cypriotism as developed in Cyprus and the diaspora, are not 
rejected. On the contrary, a historical connection is being made between a quite 
romanticised ‘past co-existence’ in Cyprus before the conflict and the contemporary 
multicultural condition that Britishness entails. Co-existence in the pre-war era 
Cyprus is not a problem between two nationalist extremes, each 
propagating the idea, whether consciously or otherwise, that the 
island's people comprises "Greeks" and "Turks" ahead of Cypriots; 
each promoting the perceived interests of the respective 
"motherlands"; each emphasising rights for one group at the 
expense of rights for the other. 
 
The real differences in Cyprus are between these increasingly 
marginalised factions and the vast majority of Cypriots. Cypriots 
whose parents and grandparents lived, worked and played together 
peacefully in a united homeland, albeit under British rule. Cypriots 
who today live, work and play together peacefully in London's 
cultural melting pot. Cypriots who are, first and foremost, for 
Cyprus. 
 
Our Declaration 
We, as Cypriots United, declare that we are a united people with a 
shared goal: to create a reunited common homeland where: 
 
• all Cypriots can live in peace, freedom and prosperity under 
European Union values; 
 
• no individual or community faces isolation, restriction of human 
rights, or alienation from ancestral lands or heritage; 
 
• diversity, multiculturalism and inclusiveness are fully embraced 
and there is no discrimination on the basis of linguistic, religious or 
ethnic background; 
 
• there is participative democracy at all levels of society; 
 
• there is respect for the sanctity of life, rule of law and freedom of 
expression; 
 
• there is no interference in the affairs of state by military or 
paramilitary forces, religious bodies or by other countries; 
 
• there is a Cypriot citizenship under a bi-communal, bi-zonal 
Federation leading to a united Cyprus. 
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represents an inherent quality of ‘authentic’ Cypriotness that was robbed by the 
operations of nationalism in the island; on the other hand, it is still to be found amongst 
Cypriots in London enabled by the British context.  In other words, by employing 
Cypriotist accounts of the past, CU aim to redefine the limited understanding of 
‘Cypriotness’ within British discourses that often reduce it to a synonym of Greekness. 
On the other hand, taking a ‘British stance’, framed through the language of 
multiculturalism and open-mindedness, they expand Cyprio-centric discourses of 
identity to include experiences and narratives of those, who otherwise appear as 
culturally inauthentic in ongoing debates of ‘who is a Cypriot’. 
 
This particular version of Cypriotism, however, although it provided a discursive space 
for British born Cypriots within local, national and transnational political spheres, was 
not directly endorsed by all its members. Whereas for some created conditions of 
political empowerment, for others the agenda of multiculturalism proved alienating, 
particularly for students from Cyprus, some of who were active participants in the board 
meetings of CU. A Turkish Cypriot woman, who came to the UK in 2004 to study and 
work, raised the issue of multiculturalism as romantic and untimely for the Cyprus 
context. ‘Let’s try to deal with the problems of the two communities first and then we 
can talk about multiculturalism and all these issues’, she commented, in one of the 
group’s meeting at the premises of ‘Toplum Postası’, the Turkish Cypriot leftist 
newspaper. ‘You have no idea what is happening in Cyprus. No one will listen to such 
arguments’, she continued saying, highlighting once again the discrepancy between life 
in Cyprus and life in London. Paradoxically, however, it was such comments and 
interactions, which reinforced the meaning of the Cypriotist language of CU. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The chapter has aimed to illustrate that a close ethnographic study of the involvement of 
British born Cypriots in Cyprio-centric politics at a particular period before the 2008 
presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus, unravels its embeddedness within 
particular spheres of political and social interaction in London. It is therefore argued 
here that in order to understand how and when political subjectivities are constructed 
and articulated in a transnational context, we need to examine them at the intersection of 
broader political and historical processes and localised experiences and narratives. 
Whereas British born Cypriots are often characterised in popular discourses as 
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culturally apathetic towards and politically disengaged from the life of the ‘community’, 
it has been argued here that such categorisations should be examined within existing 
power structures and relations. It then becomes apparent that far from being culturally 
and politically aloof, some British born Cypriots resisted the ways politics and cultural 
life in London has been monopolised by established agents and organisations and, by 
employing a Cypriotist language, formed their own political groups in order to engage 
in peace politics and, at the same time, to alter their traditional format and operations. 
Their attempt was timed at a historical period when political and discursive shifts in 
Cyprus enabled the proliferation of Cyprio-centric politics. Peace politics, therefore, 
crystallised some of the undercurrent inter-personal and inter-generational conflicts in 
the diaspora, revolving around issues of authority and the right ‘to represent’. At the 
same time, however, when they do take political initiatives, second generation Cypriots 
in the UK are interrogated in terms of their cultural knowledge and authenticity often by 
the same agents who encourage their participation in the politics of ‘home’. The 
discourse of ‘cultural inauthenticity’ is employed as disempowering and silencing, but 
British born Cypriots, rather than being trapped in a state of ‘in-betweeness’, they often 
strategically shift between different categories of identification in order to overcome 
‘voicelessness’ as experienced in various contexts and levels.  
 
All these processes are illustrated and encapsulated in the case study of CU, a group of 
British born Cypriots, who, through a language of Cypriotism, aimed at reinstating 
discursive articulations both of Cypriotness and Britishness that reflect their own 
experiences and identifications; albeit, reified through the rhetorical tropes of ‘bi-
communal co-existence’ and ‘multiculturalism’ respectively. Cypriotism is 
appropriated, therefore, here as a means of resisting cultural and political 
marginalisation in local, national and transnational contexts. 
 
As discussed in the chapter, the hegemonic constructions of Cypriotness in London 
were also articulated through particular claims to symbolic and physical landscapes. 
North London and organisational spaces like the CCC figure as actual and imagined 
centres of ‘community’ life. However, whereas CU emerged as a counter-hegemonic 
group to such cultural and political cores, the group did not radically disconnect from 
them; on the contrary peace politics provided some of the members the cultural and 
social capital to penetrate the landscape of Cypriotness in North London. They 
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maintained, therefore, a close relationship to the CCC, while simultaneously trying to 
develop a different political and ideological approach. One of their very first events, for 
instance, took place in the premises of the Cypriot Centre and the group often held some 
of its meetings there. In many ways, for the group to acquire legitimacy, it needed the 
recognition by the ‘official’ structures of peace politics in London, which have long-
established connections both with the Cypriot and British states.  
 
On the other hand, British born Cypriots found and founded alternative spaces for 
political engagement that secured a larger degree of autonomy from the control and co-
optation by ‘traditional’ institutions in London. In the next chapter, we turn our 
attention to the ways the Internet provided such spaces, by focusing on Cypriotist bi-
communal groups that developed activity on Facebook, in order to examine how the 
Cyprio-centric discourse was shaped in this context and what kinds of politics emerged 
online. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
The Faces of Cyprus on Facebook 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
There has been a wide acknowledgment in the recent mass protests in the Middle East, 
collectively labelled as ‘the Arab Spring’, that Information technologies, especially 
social networking sites, have been instrumental for the mobilisation and organisation of 
large numbers of people into revolutionary political action. Such technology uses have 
dispelled fears by theorists, who writing in the 1990s tended to see the Internet as the 
end of real politics (Holmes 1997). Less pessimistically, other researchers of the same 
period emphasised on the role of technology as determinant for the changing nature of 
grassroots politics; Castells (1997), for instance, described how significant the use of 
Internet has been in the development and popularity of the Zapatistas movement in 
Mexico (see also O’Lear 1999); for others, while the Internet enhances and expands 
offline political action by allowing for the development of counter-hegemonic 
discourses, it is not however an adequate means of politics in itself, but it only 
complements real-world struggles (Warf and Grimes 1997; Elin 2003).    
 
Taking different perspectives, all these discussions, however, tend to accept 
separateness between online and offline politics, usually privileging the latter as more 
‘real’ or efficient (cf. Ayers 2003). Drawing on anthropological literature on the Internet 
(Miller and Slater 2000; Hine 2000), this chapter argues that instead of accepting such a 
dichotomy a priori, it is important to understand how ideas of online and offline politics 
develop in particular contexts and how this distinction is constructed and negotiated by 
different agents. Such approach allows then to examine how online politics are 
embedded within broader offline historical and ideological processes, power structures 
and dynamics. In terms of Cyprio-centric peace politics online, it is argued here that the 
disenchantment of some individuals with Internet activism has to be understood in 
relation to how ‘peace activism’ in Cyprus has been historically developed around a 
‘particular landscape of peace’ that emphasises the importance of transcending physical 
boundaries, such as the Green Line, and meeting face-to-face as a sign of commitment 
 132
on behalf of peace supporters. Others, however, who lack access to such established 
‘landscapes of peace’, privilege online politics as a context that provides them with 
opportunities to gain social and cultural capital that are limited in offline settings.  
 
Moreover, for some British born Cypriots, as highlighted in the previous chapter, the 
Internet provided a space for the articulation of a Cypriot-centric discourse and identity 
that were marginalised in cultural and political centres in London. Acknowledging this 
potential of Information Technologies, a large body of literature has examined the 
development of ethnic identity and politicisation of diasporas on the Internet (see for 
instance, Graham and Khosravi 2002; Panagakos 2003; Parham 2004; Axel 2004; 
Bernal 2006). Following such processes, Eriksen (2006) has identified different 
categories of ‘long-distance nationalism’ representing different diasporas. For instance, 
he presents the Kurdish diaspora as an example of ‘pre-independence’ nationalism and 
Moroccan-Dutch nationalism as ‘multiculturalist’. 
 
Whereas this categorisation is useful in understanding and tracing different styles and 
forms of Internet nationalism, it raises, however, some issues especially when applied to 
the Cypriot example. First, there are different ‘nationalisms’ promoted within and by 
the same diaspora. On the Internet, there are Cypriots who promote ethnic, Greek or 
Turkish nationalist ideas. These are different to the Cypriotism mostly promoted and 
articulated by pro-peace and pro-re-unification voices. Second, by focusing and 
categorising diasporic nationalism online, we overlook other kinds of interactions and 
connections between the diaspora and ‘home’ and tend to re-territorialise diasporas not 
only in terms of the ‘country of origin’ but in terms of the ‘place of residence’. In the 
Cypriot online sites, members of the diaspora, communicate and co-exist with members 
who reside in Cyprus. Such interactions produce discursive contexts within which the 
nation is defined and imagined and this is a process that involves conflict as well as 
consensus. Instead of strictly labelling a Cyprio-centric nationalism online, it is, 
therefore, imperative to examine how Cypriotism is articulated but at the same time 
shifted and redefined online.  
 
In order to address these points, the chapter ethnographically presents Cyprio-centric 
and bi-communal groups that developed high activity between 2007 and 2008 on 
Facebook. These groups emerged to a large extent in anticipation of the 2008 
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presidential election in the Republic of Cyprus, as ‘temporary communities of memory’ 
(Malkki 1997), bringing individuals together from the diaspora and Cyprus, who 
originally organised around this particular historical event. The first section (5.2) traces 
the history of technology use within the peace movement in Cyprus to examine in 
which ways Facebook continues and diverts from previous ICTs utilised for peace 
building. Without aiming at establishing a causal connection, such an ‘archaeological’ 
investigation provides insight into how ‘real’ political activism has been debated and 
articulated in Cyprus. Section 5.3 looks at ‘dynamics of mediation’ (Miller and Slater 
2000), or, in other words, the ways Facebook is used for ‘peace politics’ and the reasons 
that it emerged as a suitable medium at that particular historical moment. I then look at 
the role of the diaspora in the pro-peace groups (5.4), in order to argue that whereas 
Facebook provided some diasporic agents with a voice that they claimed to be 
marginalised in offline settings, the debates around ‘who is a Cypriot’ online 
simultaneously challenged and reinforced ideas of cultural authenticity and authority ‘to 
speak as a Cypriot’. In section 5.5, one of the groups, ‘One Cyprus-One Cypriot 
Population’, is presented as a case study, illustrating how the Cypriotist character of the 
group is established and expressed and the ways the group operates online. However, 
the cohesion of the ‘imagined community’ created through the group is challenged 
internally; for some, its meaning ceases to exist when online politics does not convert 
into offline action. For others, on the contrary, who imagine themselves as participants 
in broader networks, it appears too limited and restrictive. 
 
5.2 ICTs and Peace in Cyprus: tracing lineages 
The role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in conflict-affected 
areas is acknowledged to be twofold: on one hand, they enhance communication 
between opposing forces, individuals and groups and therefore contribute to 
reconciliation and peace-building (Stauffacher et al. 2005); in terms of their negative 
impact, on the other hand, they reinforce conflict by permitting different expressions of 
hate, violence and war; such processes are labelled as cyberconflict, cyberhate or 
cyberwar (Karatzogianni 2009), terms that are mainly employed to highlight a new 
(although this ‘newness’ is often debated) technological but also cultural twist in 
modern warfare. This chapter deals mainly with the role of the Internet in its former 
description, as a tool for peace and reconciliation; however, conflict, tensions and 
disruptions are also discussed as inherent parts of the same process.  
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Communication between the two parts was very restricted in Cyprus after the division 
in 1974 and the crossing to the other side was not officially permitted until 2003, when 
the ceasefire line opened for the first time after the war. As Anastasiou (2002) 
illustrates, physical separation has been part of a wider process of non-communication, 
sustained through state policies, public discourses, nationalist influences and media 
propaganda. This hostile context to communication raised serious obstacles for the 
development of bi-communal activities, which were relatively limited until the 1990s 
(Constantinou and Papadakis 2001). Up to the mid-1990s, most of these activities were 
externally mediated and supported by organisations such as the UN, the Fulbright 
Cyprus Commission, the American Embassy and the European Commission. The bi-
communal movement peaked in the mid-1990s but faced a serious disruption in 1997, 
when the Turkish Cypriot administration decided to ban bi-communal exchanges; the 
ban lasted for more than a year and is considered to have played a detrimental role in 
the operations of the bi-communal movement (Anastasiou 2002). 
 
Technology was given an important role in the facilitation of bi-communal activities 
and workshops, especially in the 1990s. At the beginning, computing technologies were 
introduced to the Cypriot peace activists by foreign peace builders trained in using 
particular computer programmes to enhance communication and understanding between 
the divided Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Giorgos Sophocleous, one of the older 
members of the peace movement and participant in the bi-communal workshops in the 
1990s recalls the routines of his group under the supervision of the Fulbright scholar 
Benjamin Broom:  
 
‘Ben, every Wednesday, with his computer, facilitated our own 
dialogue from 6 till 9 in the evening at Ledra Palace and every 
Thursday he facilitated their own [Turkish Cypriots] dialogue. And the 
data that was collected was shared with the participants. For instance, 
we were constructing our own vision for the future and they 
constructed theirs and we could see how close they were’57.   
 
Without aiming at establishing an evolutionary or teleological connection between 
technologically enhanced peace activism in the 1990s and more recent uses of 
                                                 
57
 Benjamin Broome has extensively written on his method and experience as a facilitator of bi-communal 
workshops in Cyprus in the mid-1990s; see for instance Broome (1997, 1998, 2001, 2003). 
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technology for peace, it can be argued that the use of computing technology at the early 
stages of the bi-communal movement founded the conditions in which technology 
became a significant element in the peace building process in Cyprus. It is notable that 
members of the bi-communal workshops in the 1990s went on to expand on their 
technological experience, fascination and expertise.  
 
Giorgos Sophocleous is one of these individuals who connected his career and 
professional life with the peace movement. He was born in Cyprus and studied in 
Germany and the US before returning to the island. More than a decade after his first 
involvement with the bi-communal movement, he still considers himself a peace activist 
and runs an NGO involved in peace-building from his offices in central Nicosia. 
Amongst other projects, he was one of the founders of ‘Technology for Peace’ 
(Tech4Peace), a website designed to facilitate peace-building and dialogue; in this 
capacity, he assessed in one of our discussions the impact of technology on peace:  
 
‘When Denktaş forbade the crossings in December 1997, there was no 
way to carry on with the meetings. Only 3-4 groups carried on. So, we 
made the Technology for Peace. We tried to make an organising group 
that didn’t work out. Some other groups kept meeting in Pyla58, 
individuals. And there was a bi-communal magazine that came out, 
‘Hade’.  All this happened with no funding. But it was too little. The 
funding was all for the Americans who did the workshops. There was 
no funding for such things. It was only through individual 
contributions. If the UN gave funding, this would expand. The only 
funding we got was to establish computer networks between the North 
and South because at that point emails did not go directly from one 
side to the other. Technology helped at every point to some extent. We 
shouldn’t exaggerate its impact but it did help. The first time it 
facilitated the structured dialogue, which needed the technology. The 
Internet helped a lot, especially after the green line closed. At that time 
the Internet was very limited in Cyprus and people who were involved 
in bi-communal activities did not really know how to use it. So we did 
lots of training to those people. And we had two cafes with four 
computers on this side and four on the other side that were accessible 
to all people. We also had virtual workshops, having as a model the 
Israeli-Palestinian context. Next thing that technology was useful 
about was the portal in 2000 when we had the ‘Technology For Peace’ 
site. This is where people could advertise all the events. We had 
                                                 
58
 Pyla is a village that falls within the United Nations Buffer Zone and is still inhabited by both Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots. Papadakis (2005) has documented the politics of ‘co-existence’ in the village after 
the conflict. Because of these particularities, the village also became a place for bi-communal meetings 
between activists from both communities, especially when these were restricted elsewhere (Constantinou 
and Papadakis 2001). 
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thousands of hits in the first years. Now they are close to zero. The 
reason being that lots of other sites came out, like the UN site that 
advertised events and because we got attacked by hackers. They attack 
us all the time. The forum of the site never picked up. We were just 
too early. People did not even know what a forum is. We introduced 
all these concepts in Cyprus. At that time people didn’t even know 
about emails. Kaiti Kleridou59 was in our group. We got her a 
computer, we gave her 30 hours of lessons, we went to the presidential 
palace to train her just to have a person who could say ‘now I know 
what an email is, so I can send an email’.’ 
 
There are some important points to be raised here in relation to Sophocleous’s words 
and experience. First, like in other conflict affected areas, communication technologies 
have been employed in Cyprus to bridge the gap created by physical separation and to 
mediate peace. As externally introduced and imported at first, technology both 
materialised and abstracted peace building. Slides, charts and models generated by 
computing software contributed to a visual and tangible aspect to the peace process; on 
the other hand, the mediation of technology implied that, whereas a peace solution 
should be based on face-to-face interactions and human contact, it should, however, be 
processed through the ‘neutral’, ‘impersonal’ and ‘scientific’ mechanisms of the 
computer. In this sense, technology not only substituted for the lack of physical contact 
and communication but it also came to fill the vacuum created by subjectivity, emotions 
and tensions that were expected to rise in the face-to-face interactions of Cypriots of the 
two ethnic groups. 
 
However, this ‘sanitising’ of communication and peace should not just be taken as an 
inherent part and natural result of technology. It is rather imperative to examine how 
this process is experienced, understood and contested within the specificities of the 
Cypriot bi-communal movement, instead of pre-ascribing technology with a totalising 
role. Contrary to popular concerns about the all-consuming and homogenising effects of 
technology, social scientists have warned against technological determinism (Miller and 
Slater 2000; Hine 2000). In this light, the quotation above offers an important insight 
into the particularities of technological adaptation in the context of Cyprus.  
 
                                                 
59
 Daughter of former Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides. Because of her status as a public figure, her 
computing training seemed important in order to promote Internet and email use amongst activists. 
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In a place where physical separation has severely impeded communication, technology 
has been employed to overcome fences and barriers. According to Sophocleous’s 
account, technological ‘literacy’ became important for ‘peace-building’ from the 
perspective of both funders and the activists themselves. Understanding, therefore, the 
processes through which technological ‘literacy’ was integrated into the ‘cultural 
capital’ of peace supporters and activists helps us to further examine issues of inclusion 
and exclusion and ongoing debates about the role of technology within the bi-communal 
peace movement. 
 
The rest of the chapter will follow this pattern of unravelling the processes through 
which technology is understood, contested and debated within Cypriot initiatives for 
peace and re-conciliation. However, it has to be highlighted that I do not argue for a 
mere ‘localisation of globalisation’; such an approach favours a micro-level focus on 
how global processes (i.e. the expansion of communication technologies) are adopted, 
modified or resisted in particular localities. However, the term raises some issues when 
applied to the study of the Internet: first, it still assumes a distinction between the ‘local’ 
and the ‘global’ as separate domains, with the local being territorially defined and 
culturally specific and the global being conceptualised as boundless and supracultural. 
And, second, it still privileges the global as the site of change and agency as opposed to 
the local that is rendered to the role of a respondent. 
 
On the contrary, ICTs challenge the ‘localisation’ of culture and communities by 
enabling interactions across spatially separated contexts and contributing to the 
emergence of ‘imagined networks’ as opposed to ‘imagined communities’ (Green et al. 
2005). Castells (1996) sees these networks as dominated and exploited by privileged 
elites across different locations. They participate in a global stratum of power, in a 
global acultural space, from which the ‘local’ people are excluded as they remain tied to 
their territory and culture. Castells writes in the 1990s, when access to such 
technologies was indeed limited to the ‘privileged few’, however, his idea of culture 
appears reified and strictly defined in territorial terms. With the popularisation of ICTs 
and especially the Internet, more and more individuals, groups and organisations 
participate in and construct translocal networks; at the same time, as the example of the 
Cypriot peace activism demonstrates, these actors also (re)define both the local and the 
global through their translocal encounters. As Green et al. (2005) highlight, the 
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important point to consider here is that both networks and communities are ‘imagined’; 
they are just imagined in different ways; networks as boundless and non-territorialised, 
communities as bounded and territorialised. A study of ICTs provides a context where 
culture can be examined as a result of debates, conflicts and negotiations around these 
two different categories.  
 
With its popularisation, the Internet played an important role in Cyprus in the 
communication efforts of individuals, groups and organisations across the divide. With 
increasing access to computers and the Internet, bi-communal communication online 
ceased to be limited to a few websites designed for the very purpose of ‘peace-
building’. A wide variety of websites and forums that emerged hosted such 
communication, which was also enhanced with the increasing use of e-mail and other 
forms of online communication. In addition, a number of existing or newly emerged bi-
communal groups seized the opportunities provided by the Internet to strengthen and 
expand their group’s work and participation. Cynthia Cockburn (2004), in her book 
‘The Line’ describes how e-mail use enabled the organisation and operation of the 
women’s bi-communal group ‘Hands Across the Divide’.  
 
These developments can offer a possible explanation for the decrease of participation in 
‘specialised’ and formal websites, such as Tech4Peace. In other words, the 
democratisation of the Internet contributed to the decentralisation of bi-communal 
communication online. Murat, who lives in North Nicosia and works for a Human 
Rights organisation, narrated to me how his participation in a forum in the beginning of 
2000s led to the development of more ‘organic’ and individual relationships across the 
Green Line. Through the forum, Murat became ‘closer’ to few individuals with whom 
he continued to talk over online chat services, such as MSN, and to exchange personal 
emails. One of these individuals was a Greek Cypriot woman, a journalist, with whom 
he decided to meet after a year of regular online interactions. The meeting was arranged 
to take place in Pyla, as it was the only place at the time that they could physically meet.  
 
‘It was really late at night and I was a little scared but also so excited that I 
would finally see her. I had been in Pyla before but not by myself, but I 
thought it was worth it. I waited there for a long time but she never showed 
up. I couldn’t call her and I had no other way to communicate with her 
from Pyla, so, eventually I left. I don’t blame her, I understand. She was 
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probably afraid. I kept thinking about her for years. I met her after the 
green line opened in the dead zone outside Ledra Palace. There was an 
event going on, so there were many people around. I walked towards her 
and introduced myself. I never mentioned that night in Pyla. After all these 
years, it didn’t matter anymore.’ 
 
As long as the green line was closed and difficult to cross, individual and organisational 
contacts developed online. However, as the example of Murat demonstrates, ‘real life’ 
encounters were often arranged through online communication and were considered an 
important element of the communication process –in other words, talking via e-mails or 
MSN was never enough. These attempts for face-to-face meetings were some times 
successful, some times unsuccessful; but a general sense of frustration dominated when 
bi-communal groups were not granted permission to cross to the other side by their 
respective authorities or when individual meetings did not go according to plan; the 
night Murat waited futilely in Pyla was one of them. 
 
In this context, crossing the green line and managing to meet in ‘real place’ operates as 
a sign of commitment for the involved parties. Attending meetings across or on the line 
renders the participants visible and, therefore, potentially subjected to stigmatisation 
and condemnation by their respective authorities, media on both sides, family and 
friends. This experience is contrasted to online peace activism, which involves less risk 
and hence a lesser degree of responsibility. This distinction is illustrated in the 
willingness of Murat to understand and forgive a person who does not turn up for their 
meeting in the middle of the night. Although the offline meetings in these cases are 
often perceived as the verification of online encounters, online commitment is not seen 
as a guaranty for physical presence. 
 
This distinction between online and offline political activism dominates both academic 
discussions and everyday concerns and generates debates around the idea of ‘virtual 
community’ (Miller and Slater 2000). However, instead of naturalising such 
separateness as an expected result of the technology, we have to look at whether and 
how this distinction is produced and contested in specific contexts. In terms of online 
Cypriot activism, I will illustrate in the last part of the chapter that peace politics have 
been simultaneously enhanced and limited by competing understandings of political 
activism: one that stems from traditional understandings of politics and favours party-
based organised action; another that recognises online politics as complementary to 
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offline grass-root mobilisation and emphasises on the crossing of the Green Line and 
the physical meeting of the group; it is in other words tightly connected to a particular 
‘landscape of peace activism’ and its lineages can be traced back to the ways technology 
was originally introduced into peace-building in Cyprus. The third is concerned more 
with peace as a network and promotes the transnationalisation of doing politics. 
 
5.3 Facebook –Dynamics of Mediation 
By the time of fieldwork, the green line had opened and its crossing was allowed to 
those with valid documents, however, the Internet continued to be an important means 
of communication between members of the two communities. This trend relates to the 
fact that, after an initial period of excitement and high traffic across the green line, the 
crossings eventually reduced and continued to be treated on both sides with suspicion 
and hesitation (see also chapter 6). In this context, the Internet has remained a useful 
tool in sustaining relationships and organising action. Also, it has to be highlighted that, 
with its rapid expansion and democratisation, Internet mediated communication has 
become in recent years a more routinised and widespread everyday practice for 
Cypriots60 in general and not only across the dividing line. 
 
As explained before, whereas some of the ‘official’ websites dedicated to the ‘Cyprus 
problem’ saw a drop in their traffic, decentralised communication online had as a result 
the birth of a large number of forums or spaces where bi-communality was practised. 
Amongst a plethora of such virtual spaces, Facebook became a very popular site for the 
creation and operation of peace supporting groups. Initially a university based 
networking site, Facebook has rapidly expanded after it was opened to the general 
public in 2006. Since then, it has enjoyed great popularity worldwide and it has 
overshadowed previously available networking sites, such as MySpace and Hi5. 
 
In many ways, Facebook provides the same service to peace supporting groups as other 
online forums and email lists and in this sense functions as a development and extension 
of them. Facebook, however, has been welcomed by most of my informants as a very 
important tool that provided them with greater visibility, which was justified in a 
                                                 
60
 According to statistical research, 65% of Cypriots use the Internet daily. The most popular social 
networking site is Facebook, used by 98% of those Cypriots who are active on online social networks 
(CyprusUpdates 10/02/2011). 
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number of ways61. First of all, they found Facebook much more interactive in the sense 
that allowed them to create groups, post pictures, have discussion boards, see all the 
members of a group. This created a sense of a community that was more conspicuous. 
Unlike previously used chat rooms and forums that attracted those already ‘converted’ 
into reconciliation politics, Facebook groups are usually much more open and visible. 
One can become aware of them even without looking for them; for instance, through a 
friend’s profile. Unless there are restrictions, one can browse the discussion without 
becoming a member and if one wishes to join, this can happen at a click of a button.  
 
The terminology of ‘groups’ plays an important role in creating a sense of solidarity and 
connectivity among members. Unlike chat rooms and forums, where the format that is 
promoted is that of individual contributions, the participants of the bi-communal groups 
are actively involved into creating and maintaining a common ground, identity and 
agenda. This is usually demonstrated in the description section which appears on the 
main page of each group and where its character and aims as well as the codes of 
conduct for its main uses are outlined. 
                                                 
61
 In his portrayal of Facebook in Trinidad, Miller (2011: 201) uses the term ‘polymedia’ to describe the 
availability and utilisation of various types of media by people in their everyday life. ‘In a situation of 
polymedia, one technology is preferred to another because it seems a better medium for being emotional 
or for hiding emotion, for showing one’s face or foregrounding one’s voice, for having arguments or 
avoiding them, and above all for choosing between dyadic communication involving only two people or 
conversing within a much wider public sphere. There were many examples within the portraits where 
people considered carefully what Facebook was essentially good for before deciding to use this as 
opposed to some other communicative vehicle’. 
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Figure 3. ‘One Cyprus-One Cypriot Population’ - The entry page to a bi-communal Facebook group’s profile. 
 
On the first page the names of the administrators and officers of the group also appear. 
These normally include individuals who created the group or who are the most active 
participants online or who have the social and cultural capital to become so even if not 
active online; for instance, if they are well known activists or connected to other 
activists. Everyone else who joins the groups is a member. The administrators are 
usually the moderators of the group and demonstrate a lesser or higher level of 
‘ownership’ of the group depending on the context. They are the ones who can change 
text on the main pages and who can delete ‘inappropriate’ posts. Whereas the Internet is 
popularly assumed as a free and democratic space (Dibbell 1994), such hierarchical 
arrangement of the groups offers a glimpse into the normative framework within which 
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interactions operate that defines how inclusiveness and exclusiveness are negotiated and 
the ways particular power relations are constructed.  
 
What also contributes to defining the identity borders of the group is the visibility and 
existence of other groups alongside on Facebook, which normally represent the 
‘ideological other’. Unlike email lists and chat rooms, which are more individualised 
and thematically organised, on Facebook, groups can find and ‘see’ each other, browse 
each others’ pages and have access to members’ names. The groups are therefore built 
also in parallel or in response to each other and there is a constant monitoring over the 
performance and popularity of the ‘other’. As Ali, one of my informants who is based in 
North Cyprus told me, ‘I’ve always wanted to meet people from the south but I 
couldn’t. But now things are different. We have the best communication tool, the 
Internet and especially Facebook. It’s made things much easier…but also more difficult. 
For example, peacemakers get together and try to fix things up, right? But on the other 
side, nationalists get together as well…So we are not the only ones who are getting 
more powerful. That’s why it’s more difficult’.  
 
The group is circumscribed and strengthened when the interaction with the ‘other’ takes 
the form of ‘cyberconflict’. When member names or wall posts are erased the 
perpetrators are always alleged to be the members of ‘opposing groups’. These events 
usually involve calls for the group to re-emerge stronger and fight the attempted 
hacking. The following dialogue took place during such an incident62: 
  
Murat (Australia) wrote 
at 8:12am on January 31st, 2008 
People someone attacked the group again... 
 
Zoe (Cyprus) wrote 
at 9:49am on January 31st, 2008 
a massive re-invite is necessary again...we will build it up again...like 
we did before...they will not beat us! 
 
Nicolas (UK) wrote 
at 3:46pm on January 31st, 2008 
                                                 
62
 The original format and text of the posts, including spelling and grammar mistakes, are maintained 
throughout the chapter to give a picture close to how they appear online. The names have been changed, 
but the places of access that the participants declare as well as dates have been kept unaltered. 
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I can't believe this shit! seriously! They have two groups that have 
grown to 4000 and 1000, but we are still being hacked! what will stop 
them doing this again and what is facebook going 2 do about it? 
 
Zoe (Cyprus) wrote 
at 7:15pm on January 31st, 2008 
we MUST re-invite...i have everyone's name on a list (because i know 
this would happen)...if u want to help out let me know...soon i will 
start messaging people...i already got messages from devoted members 
asking what happened! hackers will only make us stronger...we will 
not stop and make them happy! 
 
Costas (London) wrote 
at 11:19pm on January 31st, 2008 
I know. its very annoying. Facebook said they wont do anything 
without a court subpoena. 
I am thinking of getting a specific performance order just to find out 
who did this!! 
Thank you for helping out, if everyone does the same we will be back 
to usual in no time! 
ONE CYPRUS, ONE CYPRIOT PEOPLE, ONE CYPRIOT 
NATION!! 
The spirit of cypriot unity will never die! 
 
Evrim (Cyprus) wrote 
at 11:34pm on January 31st, 2008 
Mates, number of members keep increasing in every minute! Thanks 
all..  
We stand stronger together!!  
 
Whereas hacking is difficult to trace and prove, it gives the opportunity for members of 
bi-communal groups to construct their ‘ideological other’ and therefore strengthen the 
group’s unity. From the exchange above, it seems that this ‘other’ is not only the 
‘opposing’ groups, ‘the nationalists’, ‘the fascists’, ‘the anti-Cypriots’; groups also often 
discuss themselves as hierarchically and ideologically different to the site that hosts 
them; Facebook. On one hand, groups are created on Facebook because of its popularity 
and the fact that allows them to be in a broader space of networks. On the other hand, 
members often distinguish themselves from Facebook, when this tries to censor them or 
fails to ‘protect’ them, like in the case above. 
 
This ambivalent encounter with Facebook is not particular to the Cypriot case. On one 
hand, the Internet more broadly and Facebook more specifically have been perceived by 
users, service providers and states as a fertile space for the emergence and development 
of marginal voices, alternative histories and counter-hegemonic discourses. It is these 
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counter-narratives and forms of resistance that create anxiety for institutions and 
governments in many contexts. The ban on Facebook in countries, such as Syria and 
Iran, has been interpreted as an attempt on behalf of these states to control anti-
government information and activism. The arrest of two young men in North Cyprus in 
2008 over allegations that they levelled insults against president Talat (Famagusta 
Gazette 30/11/2008), raised discussions in Cyprus about the attempt of the state to 
control information shared online. 
 
On the other hand, Facebook, a little like the MacDonald’s of cyberspace, has been very 
much resisted and critiqued in popular analyses for its rapid expansion, totalising effects 
on communication, policies to control and censor content. Some members of the 
Cypriot bi-communal groups subscribe to this discourse. They often feel that they use a 
medium, otherwise, different to their ideals, goals and principles. Besides debating and 
agonising over the effects of the site on peace activism, which will be discussed later in 
the chapter, they often protest against the commercialisation of information, the 
superficiality of communication and the interventionist policies of the site. George, one 
of the most active members in the groups, showed me when I met him in Nicosia a long 
exchange of emails between him and Facebook, when the monitoring team of the site 
insisted on him using a ‘real’ name, as the one he had been using sounded fake and was 
therefore picked up by Facebook administrators. ‘The crazy part’, said George, ‘was 
that when they sent me the message asking me to use my real name, they signed as “the 
Facebook team”. I told them that if they signed with their real name, I would sign with 
my real name’. After that George has followed a strategy of adopting real-sounding 
names that he keeps changing from time to time. 
 
This example illustrates the ways users articulate the relationship between their 
normative way of using the site and their experiences of it. When there is a big 
discrepancy between the two, this can often lead to a reduction of usage or even 
withdrawal from the site. Whereas the format and terminology of Facebook has 
influenced the ways in which Cypriot peace-promoting groups have organised 
themselves online, this analysis rejects a line of technological determinism by paying 
attention at the way users actively negotiate between their values and needs and the 
format of the site. On one hand, the medium has contributed to the formation of a group, 
as part of an ‘imagined network’ and to the self-identification of the members as 
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participants in this network. On the other hand, the identity of the group is also 
constructed and sustained against the overarching structure of Facebook.  
 
5.4 ‘A breath of fresh air’ -Facebook and diaspora 
Contrary to what was often repeated among those involved in the ‘politics of home’ in 
London about the cultural apathy and political indifference demonstrated by younger 
generations of Cypriots in London, as discussed in chapter 4, a large number of the 
participants in the bi-communal groups on Facebook are in the diaspora. The first 
generation Cypriots in London often say ‘Young people meet and talk now online’, in 
some cases in a hopeful and in other cases in a dismissive tone. This line reflects the 
two sides of a discourse about online activity; on one hand, it is celebrated as a 
progressive and encouraging way for doing politics, on the other hand it is seen as an 
extension of political weakness and disengagement. 
 
During fieldwork, many British born Cypriots seemed aware of the pro-peace groups on 
Facebook and they used them to follow up information, as a source of establishing 
connections with other Cypriots in Cyprus and in the diaspora and, in some cases, they 
treated their involvement in them as a demanding and important political activity. When 
I asked how one finds such groups, the answer for my informants seemed self-evident: 
‘Easy. Type in ‘Cyprus’’. Whereas ‘Cyprus’ here can be taken to imply particular 
territorialised understandings of identity, however, as suggested in chapter 4, the 
Cypriotist rhetoric of second generation British Cypriots in London involved redefined 
notions of both ‘Cypriotness’ and ‘Britishness’. Facebook offered the space for them to 
effectuate identities that corresponded to both perspectives, which were silenced or 
marginalised in offline diasporic contexts. Such processes of ‘expansive realisation’ are 
identified by Miller and Slater (2000: 11) as enabled by the Internet, when individuals 
use online spaces to realise identities, which they have not fully enacted in other 
contexts. 
 
At the same time, for Cypriots in London, Facebook became a useful and powerful tool 
in articulating their pro-peace voice and participating in political discussions and 
structures in Cyprus from which they claimed to have been previously alienated and 
excluded. Cynthia Cockburn (2004), for instance, describes how the inclusion or 
exclusion of the diaspora as members of the bi-communal group ‘Hands Across the 
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Divide’ emerged as a dilemma during the formation of the group in 2000; the inclusion 
of London Cypriot participants was feared that would divert, diffuse and complicate the 
aims and organisation of the group –based on a preconceived understanding of the 
diaspora as having a different perspective and agenda on the ‘Cyprus issue’. When it 
was finally decided that London Cypriots should take part in the e-mail list of the group 
and also participate in a bi-communal meeting in London, the author argues that 
previous concerns about differences and lack of common vision and agenda dissolved 
and that London Cypriots made a valuable contribution to the group. The incident, 
however, gives substance to claims by Cypriots in the diaspora that they had been 
politically marginalised in the decades after 1974 not only by the consecutive 
governments in Cyprus but also in the bi-communal, pro-peace contexts –and this was 
often the case even when Greek and Turkish Cypriots were flown to London to attend 
meetings, which could not take place in Cyprus due to the closure of the Green Line. 
 
Facebook, however, did not erase these tensions between the diaspora and Cyprus; on 
the contrary, it highlighted the struggle over cultural authenticity and political 
representation between these two contexts, as it allowed for open interaction and 
confrontation illustrated by the following exchanges on the wall of one of the groups: 
 
Socrates (Cyprus) wrote 
at 1:46pm on August 29th, 2007 
wat ever we do there will be promblems first a greek cypriot is rascist 
to all he english cypriot i seen it with my eyes vilagesthat say that 
charles are not cypriot. i dont realy like englsh cypriot acting tough but 
they are cypriot ike the turkish cypriots latinos cypriots siclines etc 
cyprus is for everyone  
 
Because of the spelling mistakes and the incomprehensibility of the above post, the 
administrator of the group interfered to clarify: 
Zoe (Cyprus) wrote 
at 9:27pm on August 29th, 2007 
i think what he means is that any one who is english cypriot (i.e. is 
more fluent in english that in greek) is looked at differently by the 
other greek cypriots. I think the point he was trying to make was that 
the reason why the english cypriots are treated with such distaste is coz 
they act like they are better than the rest of the cypriots due to their 
'englishness'. He doesnt, however, agree with racism of any sort. 
 
Zoe (Cyprus) wrote 
at 9:29pm on August 29th, 2007 
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it is true that greek cypriots dont like other cypriots from abroad 
because they act as if they are 'more educated' or 'wealthier' than the 
rest of the cypriots in cyprus...however, i think things in our generation 
are changing...for example, all the cypriots in Cyprus (aged 20+) are 
well educated coz everyone has a uni degree...therefore these 
stereotypes dont stem into our generation as much as in our parents 
generation. 
 
Yannis (USA) wrote 
at 9:54am on August 30th, 2007 
It's not a matter of liking or disliking the person itself. It is rather an 
issue of culture. While I do not like to use stereotypes, Cypriots 
experiencing life abroad and Cypriots never experiencing life abroad is 
an analogy similar to people never leaving their village and people 
living in a cosmopolitan city. There are vast differences, but nothing 
that should create either hatred or mistrust. On the contrary, we should 
be feeding each other with our unique knowledge and perspectives. 
 
Nicolas (UK) wrote 
at 12:15pm on September 1st, 2007 
i can agree with the last comment, but i do c a difference in the 
cypriots whether they are from england or from cyprus and i dont 
believe that I’m 'better than any cypriot from cyprus just because I’m 
from england' like Deanna stated below, 4 i believe that im just the 
same as them, but when i come over there are some (not as many as 
there used 2 be) that make u feel as if u r english n not welcome. but in 
the same breath i can say that ther r some cypriots from england that 
stand out from the crowd when they are over, 4 whatever reason but 
that doesnt mean we are all the same and i dont expect the same 
treatment!!!!!!!!! 
 
Yiannis (USA) wrote 
at 3:00pm on September 1st, 2007 
Nicolas, not recognizing differences is what brought as to the point we 
are today. I refuse to say that I am similar to every single person in 
Cyprus, or that anyone in Cyprus is the same as me. I do like my 
uniqueness, thank you very much. The whole point is recognizing 
differences and valuing them. We are all different, but that does not 
make the "other" inferior or superior. As the slogan for the European 
Cultural month was, All different, all equal. No? 
 
 
Zoe (Cyprus) wrote 
at 5:39pm on September 2nd, 2007 
of course no one is un-equal to anyone else - that was the point i was 
trying to get across - the only problem is that some cypriots who are 
raised abroad (in our parents generation, not ours) have tended to be of 
an entirely different mentality and often do treat cypriots in cyprus 
differently. I'm not saying that everyone is like that, but I was simply 
pointing out how many people in Cyprus view English Cypriots. Sorry 
if I offended anyone, that wasn’t my intention x 
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On a different occasion, another participant expresses a more polemical view:  
 
Jonny (London) wrote 
at 12:40am on February 27th, 2008 
sorry, last point: it's easy being a patriot living in london, i think it's 
much easier than actually living in the reality of cyprus. (though 
having said that i'm currently studying so away from cyprus) go tell 
the soldiers serving on the green line in nicosia that they should freeze 
their arses off and waste two years of their lives. why?  
 
And in a similar tone: 
 
Mehmet (London) wrote 
at 12:53am on March 5th, 2008 
Christos, those who left the island and built themselves new life 
elsewhere should let the Cypriots on the island govern their own 
affairs. It is really easy to be patriotic from a distance. 
 
Yiorgos (UVA) wrote 
at 9:22am on March 5th, 2008 
Likewise, its easy to support a cause when you stand to gain 
something from it that you otherwise have no relevant claim to. Why 
should my word be any less respected here? If we want to look at the 
bare bones facts of the issues, my family owned (and still holds title 
to) land that is now illegally occupied by a state that is not recognized 
by any country in the world aside from Turkey. Much of my relatives 
who were displaced and now live in Nicosia can say the same. Thus, I 
would be very much affected by any potential solution. Finally, if you 
are serious about your issue and are open to share it to the world, you 
should be ready to defend it in an intellectual manner, instead of 
conveniently dismissing my original point. 
 
Whereas ‘who has the right to speak as a Cypriot’ is a constant point of tension and 
argument in these groups, this struggle for dominance should not be interpreted 
exclusively as a ‘silencing’ and disempowering process for those participants who are at 
the receiving end of discrimination and accusations. In other words, instead of accepting 
such process as the ‘subalternisation’ of particular individuals and actors, Facebook 
offers the forum where these tensions, differences and contradictions are voiced and 
articulated and, therefore, become subject to negotiation and discussion.  
 
In this sense, many of the members in the diaspora insisted on describing the groups as 
‘a breath of fresh air’. Yiannis, a second generation Greek Cypriot compared his 
experience in the groups with a process of ‘coming out’. Born and raised in London by 
Cypriot parents, Yiannis had never been politically active, although he always tried to 
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keep up with what was happening in Cyprus. He grew up in South London, quite away 
and disengaged from the concentrated Cypriot population in North London, so he never 
had the opportunity to express and exchange his peace-supporting views. ‘I’d always 
had this kind of ideas and for a long time I thought I was the only one because I never 
spoke to my family about politics’, he said when we met in London, ‘but now I could 
find like-minded people; finally. When I first became a member, I felt like I was coming 
out, I was finally who I wanted to be’. Networking and interactive sites, such as 
Facebook, therefore, open up a space for engagement with peace discourses for a larger 
group of people, who have possibly been in the periphery of such discourses before and 
never engaged directly in them.  
 
However, although Yiannis logs onto his Facebook account regularly and he follows the 
discussions on some of the groups’ walls, he does not contribute often to these 
discussions. ‘Most of the times, I feel I have nothing to contribute as other people there 
seem to know better what’s going on. But I follow the discussions to learn the truth 
about stuff I read in the papers and to be informed about what’s happening in Cyprus.’ 
Many of the users of the Facebook groups I met during fieldwork acknowledged that 
they followed a similar routine to Yiannis’s –log in, read the discussions and leave the 
page. I actually found myself following the same process most of the time. 
 
This raises some significant points. First of all, Facebook, by bringing together in one 
site individualistic applications, such as personal mail, with more network-centred 
services, such as friends’ lists and group membership, has contributed to a blurring 
between these contexts. It has, therefore, become easier and more acceptable to move 
between these spheres –to become visible and ‘active’ in public but also to remain 
invisible through lack of activity and to ‘watch’ others. Many users, perhaps because the 
public is so close to the private, make the leap and join groups, in which they never 
contribute. This is why there are groups with thousands of members but fewer active 
contributors and the lack of activity often creates anxiety for the creators and 
administrators of the group as it raises issues of representation, credibility and 
responsibility. However, as the example of Yiannis illustrates, this ‘lurking’ is not 
always associated with passivity and political apathy but it may be connected to the 
individual positionality towards particular discourses and structures that is enhanced or 
limited by cultural capital. Yiannis’s Facebook ‘lurking’, therefore, can be understood 
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as a personal mechanism and strategy to overcome his self-projected ignorance and 
inexperience on the Cyprus issue and enhance his knowledge. 
 
If we then focus on the effortlessness, passivity and lack of responsibility as 
characteristics of political activism online (cf. Salter 2003: 138; Eriksen 2006), there is 
the risk of failing to grasp and understand cases, such as Yiannis’s. In this way, we can 
better appreciate the impact of networking sites, such as Facebook, as settings of 
information and knowledge vis-à-vis traditional media. Like Yiannis, many of my 
informants use the Facebook groups for access to information not provided by more 
structured media, such as TV and newspapers. And although Yiannis is talking above 
about ‘learning the truth’, most of them understand that information in this case is 
fragmented, highly subjective and contextual. Giorgos, another member of the groups, 
said once in a group discussion we had in a meeting in Cyprus on this issue: ‘I know 
there is chaos when everyone expresses their own opinion in the group wall but at least 
you can see this way many different points and perspectives and then form your own 
opinion. I sometimes play devil’s advocate and provoke people in the discussions 
forum, just to be able to get all these different perspectives. It’s better than watching 
TV, or reading a newspaper, or a history book isn’t it?’ This processual and fragmentary 
understanding of information and knowledge points to the emergence of new political 
subjectivities, who even in ‘lurking’ establish, accept and reproduce different definitions 
of permissibility and credibility of public discourses. Theorists argue that the Internet by 
fragmenting and facilitating pluralism cannot be conceptualised according to 
Habermasian notions of public sphere, which is characterised by consensus (Salter 
2003: 122). In this light, the format of exchanges in the Cypriot bi-communal groups 
opposes the homogeneity and consensus of the public sphere in Cyprus and the diaspora 
that has been dominated by nationalist and anti-nationalist, right and leftist master-
narratives. 
 
Whether this can have any political implications in ‘real’ life or it is just restricted to the 
Internet is something I will discuss at the end of the chapter. Here however, I need to 
highlight that, whereas for some members of the groups ‘invisibility’ and ‘lurking’ are 
mechanisms of coping with exclusion, others in the diaspora utilised the ‘visibility’ 
Facebook provides. ‘Cypriots United’ (CU), for instance, which was discussed in 
chapter 4, was founded almost simultaneously as its Facebook profile. Reaching a large 
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number of members on Facebook ‘enabled us then to go to politicians in London and 
show them that we represent people’, explained Serhat, one of the founders of the 
group. CU has since its creation organised events inviting participants from both Cyprus 
and the diaspora and has consolidated its presence as a pro-peace lobbying organisation 
for UK Cypriots. Emine, a student, who was born and raised in London and who 
became very active in some of the groups through discussions after one of her trips to 
Cyprus remarked: ‘Through Facebook, people in Cyprus know me and I know people, 
so I can be more active in what is happening there as well as when I go [to Cyprus]–it’s 
not like before.’ In fact, while I was in Cyprus, many times UK-based Cypriots who 
travelled to the island, including Emine, attended or even organised meetings with other 
members of the Facebook groups. 
 
Individuals in the diaspora, therefore, have utilised Facebook to create social and 
cultural capital and convert it into new political roles in the diaspora but also in Cyprus. 
This ‘long-distance peace activism’, to paraphrase Anderson’s (1998) term, diverts from 
the anonymous, responsibility-free online diasporic politics that Anderson identifies 
with ‘long-distance nationalism’. Unlike other Internet sites and forums, Facebook 
insists on the identification of individuals –even if they do not use their real names, 
participants can be identified through their photos, personal information or even 
network of friends. This renders individuals into a position of visibility within a 
transnational network, which gives them both new status as political players but at the 
same time makes them vulnerable to criticism and attacks. Serhat, who works as an 
editor for a London-based newspaper, receives tens of emails per week criticising his 
online activities, some of which take the form of explicit threats. 
 
What emerges from the discussion so far is that Facebook has enhanced the connections 
between the peace supporters in the diaspora and in Cyprus. It is notable that most of 
the groups were created by individuals, who live outside Cyprus and, also, most 
members are diasporic Cypriots. Although individuals in the diaspora may lack 
particular types of social and cultural capital in order to engage with politics in Cyprus, 
they can mobilize other skills that are necessary for participation on Facebook. For 
instance, language is a very important element. As the dominant language of the 
Internet but also necessary for the exchange of bi-communal or multi-communal 
dialogues, English is a prerequisite for anyone who wants to take part in the Facebook 
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discussions; English-speaking Cypriots in the diaspora, who often feel inadequate in 
terms of their command of Greek or Turkish when they visit the island, have an 
advantage online over non-English speaking Cypriots. 
 
At the same time, it is not only a diasporic cultural repertoire that defines the use of the 
Internet but the place of access also has an important role in how technology is 
interpreted and utilised. As the Internet affects and shapes particular localities, 
particular localities and geography also influence the use and effects of the Internet. 
There is an illustrating example from one of the meetings organised through Facebook 
in London for Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The meeting took place in a bar in central 
London. When I arrived I met Elena, the organiser of the meeting and Savvas, a Cypriot 
student who had been living in London for the past five years. After a while a few more 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots came in, some of them born and raised in Cyprus, others in 
London, but all of them based in the UK. No one knew each other from before but 
almost everyone seemed used to this kind of setting. One of the participants had already 
directed a peace-promoting film, another one was a member of a pro-unification party in 
Cyprus and the majority of the rest had already attended at least one bi-communal/peace 
event. Only for Savvas, a 26 years-old, it was the first time he met Turkish Cypriots in 
his whole life. He seemed overwhelmed and utterly surprised by the experience as he 
kept repeating at the end: ‘We agreed about so many things [with the Turkish 
Cypriots]’. He also explained why he had decided to come to one of the meetings at that 
particular point: ‘It’d be very difficult for me to come to one of these events if it wasn’t 
for Facebook. I had particular ideas before but went into one of these groups and started 
reading. And here I am. I wouldn’t go to one if it wasn’t in London. Here no one knows 
me. In Cyprus it’s very difficult to go to this kind of things. I don’t want people [who 
disapprove] to talk behind my back. I’m from Paphos, not from Nicosia. People are not 
used to this kind of things there and I wouldn’t feel comfortable to sit and have a coffee 
with a Turkish Cypriot in the middle of the town’.  
 
This account highlights the importance of place in accessing information technologies. 
Although the Internet is often imagined as a unified and universal medium, its effects 
and uses may depend on and be restrained by the cultural and social contexts, in which 
it is accessed. In this sense, the Internet enabled members of the diaspora to take up new 
political roles in local and transnational contexts, but London, as a particular socio-
 154
cultural locality mediated and reinforced the use and usefulness of Facebook for 
individuals like Savvas. 
 
 
5.5 ‘One Cyprus, One Cypriot Population’ 
 
During fieldwork, I followed the discussions and activities of most Cypriot bi-
communal and met with members in Cyprus and the UK. Most members tend to appear 
in the participants’ list of all groups. However, I particularly focused on ‘One Cyprus, 
One Cypriot Population’, as it seemed the most active and popular for a particular 
period. The group was created in 2007 in opposition and response to groups with more 
traditional nationalist messages, such as “Get the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
recognized as a country” and “Η ΚΥΠΡΟΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ - CYPRUS IS 
GREEK”. ‘One Cyprus, One Cypriot Population’ was one of the first bi-communal 
groups that were set up to promote peace and reconciliation and it attracted thousands of 
supporters very quickly. One of the creators of the group is Elisa, a Greek Cypriot, who 
studied in the UK and Canada for four years. As she told me, it was in Canada, when 
she first familiarised herself with Internet technologies and saw the potential of using it 
to promote peace in Cyprus. When she returned to the island, therefore, she decided that 
she had to create a group online. Like many other members of the group, she is fluent in 
English, as her mother is a British born Cypriot, so she had the necessary language 
skills to organise and facilitate a bi-communal online group. 
 
The group enjoyed great growth and activity especially a few months before the 
national elections in the Republic of Cyprus in February 2008 that resulted in the 
election of the pro-peace communist party in government and Dimitris Christofias as 
new president of the republic. Many people joined the group before the elections to 
voice their frustration against the old government and president Tassos Papadopoulos 
and to advocate for change. The posts here are indicative of the discussions that were 
taking place at the time: 
 
Achilleas (UK) wrote 
at 2:42pm on September 3rd, 2007 
Cyprus now is passing one of its most critical moments since the anan 
plan, the coming elections and the possibilities that will come up from 
that elections are very important! But these days the national council 
will take place to decide what kind of solution GC want, unfortunately 
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many are those who talk against any kind of federation and they dont 
hesitate to even say that division is the best solution!!!This policy is 
mainly supported by papadopoulos and his followers ( nationalist)! 
Its the first time in our history that some GC politics demand 
DIVISION of our country, division of our people! Lets all hope and 
work to stop papadopoulos from being re-elected, lets all say no to 
division!!!  
 
Yiorgos (London) wrote 
at 9:06pm on September 4th, 2007 
It was Marios Matsakis, a EURO MP from Papadopoulos’ party who 
said a two state solution is better than a Federation. Complete idiot, but 
unfortunately there are many in the DIKO hierarchy and other 
Papadopoulos supporters who agree with him. I’ll be behind 
Christofias 100% in the elections, for a federal solution. 
 
Serhan  (Cyprus) wrote 
at 10:07pm on September 4th, 2007 
DIKO must go down!!!... always support one Cyprus & always against 
occupation of militarist turkey... from now to eternity  
 
Yiorgos (London) wrote 
at 3:41am on September 6th, 2007 
DISY, who some of its members were part of EOKA B, now seem to 
be in agreement with the ''communist'' (in reality are moderate social 
democrats) AKEL as they are both clearly in favour of a federal 
solution. Never have these two parties agreed on anything Lol.  
 
Polls show that some left wing Akelistes would vote Kassoulidis over 
Tassos and right wingers would be prepared to vote Christofias. Only 
in Cyprus. 
 
Murat  (Australia) wrote 
at 1:32pm on January 10th, 2008 
Elections in both sides of the island are a big ugly joke. In north 
because of Turkish army and in south because of endless cycle that 
keeps spinning around same mentality and parties. Nothing will come 
out of it, come back here after the elections and you will see what I 
mean. Any serious attempt to solve the conflict in Cyprus means 
serious compromises for both sides` politicians and that would finish 
their political career, and I can`t see any "peace hero" who would go 
such extreme measures just for the sake of "peace", they will do 
ahything to glue themselves to chairs, which was what has been 
happening all the time. I am not pessimist but I believe being realistic 
means not trusting politicians with politics, like you wouldn’t trust 
generals with wars. 
 
Mutlu  (Uni Leipzig) wrote 
at 10:58pm on January 14th, 2008 
yep :) 
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tassos has a bad record anyway. firm believer in eoka, gombare of 
georkadjis (one of the creators of the akritas plan), cries on tv to get 
people to vote like he wants :P etc. etc. 
 
anyway, nationalism has always been a tool in the hands of 
imperialism. and it's very illogical; what difference does it make what 
blood flows through my veins? we all bleed the same color. it's the 
land that makes us who we are. even if i could trace my lineage 500 
years back to mainland turkey, it wouldn't mean a thing. it's cyprus 
that i miss when i'm away, not some other "motherland".. 
 
Nick (Cyprus) wrote 
at 2:34pm on February 3rd, 2008 
Hi everyone. The presidential elections are approaching fast and i 
believe it would be good for all the members of the group to have an 
independent clear and true picture of all three candidates. Could the 
administrators provide to the group a summary of the history of each 
candidate and their approach to the potential negotiations? I am sure 
that there will be no bias in favor or against any of the candidates. It is 
important for all of us and especially t/cs to know who will lead the 
negotiations on behalf of g/cs and not base their opinion on rumors and 
half-lies. Thanks:) 
 
Andreas (London) wrote 
at 2:23pm on February 20th, 2008 
Christofias got the support of DIKO by giving them 3 ministries 
including the foreign ministry, parliament presidency and most 
importantly, a decisive role for Papadopoulos on the Cyprus problem. 
 
The second round should send the same message as the first one did: 
"Papadopoulos go home!". 
 
Evren (Cyprus) wrote 
at 9:28am on February 21st, 2008 
i believe we should all be politically active... and do not trust the 
governments and politicians... of course it is our right to vote... but we 
should be watching the moves they make and criticise them actively 
and effectively... i think this is missing in cypriots' life... 
 
Zoe  (Cyprus) wrote 
at 7:32pm on February 24th, 2008 
Congratulations to Christofias for winning the presidential 
elections...we still have hope that our island will be reunited :) I hope 
this presidential decade will see a step forward in the reunification 
process...bye bye Tassos! 
 
As its name indicates, the group promotes a common Cypriot identity and Greek and 
Turkish nationalisms are condemned as the reasons behind the division of the island. On 
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its description page, the group agenda is set out: ‘ONE CYPRUS, ONE CYPRIOT 
NATION, ONE CYPRIOT PEOPLE. WE ARE CYPRIOT AND PROUD!’.  
 
 
Figure 4. ‘One Cyprus’ Facebook logo 
 
The bi-communal character of the group is certified in various ways. The language used 
is English, as opposed to Turkish or Greek and the contributors are often reminded of 
this rule, whenever they divert from English. Also, a good balance between Greek and 
Turkish names is maintained in the list of administrators and officers in the group. The 
visual material that is posted is carefully selected to avoid any Greek or Turkish 
connotations. Unlike the main pictures of most nationalist groups, the main symbol of 
One Cyprus is simple and minimalistic -although this relates to a general lack of 
symbols when it comes to Cypriot identity and Cypriotism. The pictures that appear in 
the albums are either of events organised through the group or scenic pictures of the 
natural beauties of Cyprus, of local produce and local traditions and practices, which are 
presented as common for all Cypriots avoiding divisive nationalist symbols. In that way 
the group adheres to particular formats, structures and symbolism that have 
characterised bi-communal Cyprio-centric events in the past few decades in such an 
embedded way that points towards a ‘banal peace-activism’, to paraphrase Billig’s 
(1995) term. Billig describes how the presence of national symbols is so routinised in 
everyday life that they become invisible. It is however, this invisibility that renders 
them powerful and embedded in people’s national consciousness and identity. 
Similarly, the aesthetics and methods of bi-communal politics in Cyprus have 
developed into a particular repertoire replicated so often that has been habitualised by 
individuals to the extent that it is employed and reproduced within new settings and 
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spaces. The ‘newness’ and separateness, therefore, of the Internet context is challenged 
through such practices, whose lineages are to be traced within offline realms.  
 
Although the group promotes a forward thinking by stating on its first page that ‘We 
cannot change our past! We can shape the future!’, many of the contributions and 
debates revolve around discussing the past. Personal testimonies come to challenge and 
fill the gaps of the dominant nationalist discourses on both sides. Stories of previous 
peaceful co-existence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots before the war are evoked, 
narrated and reproduced. ‘Unknown’ or ‘unofficial’ historical events become the corner 
stone of discussion and their importance is rediscovered and reinstated.  Individual 
memory and testimony, therefore, create a counter-hegemonic historical narrative that 
challenges Turkish and Greek nationalism: 
 
Zoe  (Cyprus) wrote 
at 9:16am on October 23rd, 2007 
My grandparents used to have Turkish Cypriot friends in their old 
neighbourhood in the north. Another old man that was working closely 
with EOKA during those years told me that it was an ideological error 
that divided tcs and gcs (and leftists from rightwingers as well), so it 
was not a simple case of racism. So, if we scratch the ideological 
differences there should be a high possibility for peace and 
prosperity...right? 
 
Zoe  (Cyprus) wrote 
at 9:19am on October 23rd, 2007 
And my grandparents live in a refugee area today, so there are also a 
few tcs living there. There are no problems between them. They 
actually exchange vegetables. My granny gives them lemons from her 
lemon tree and they give her parsley from their garden. It's actually 
quite sweet I think. So it is possible if we try! 
 
Most old refugees (which have a reason to be angry) are not as hostile 
as people who know nothing of the past. That's odd isnt it? 
 
Gregory  (Australia) wrote 
at 11:55am on January 14th, 2008 
My Grandfather, who was very powerful and influential in his town, 
and well respected by Muslim and Christian alike (and the Brits), was 
eventually threatened with his life, when a group of EOKA thugs came 
to his property to KILL him. The only thing which save him and his 
family was their huge Alsatian dogs which drove the mob away, and 
thankfully Pappou63 didn't have to use his rifle. My Grandparents 
realised that it was not safe for the family, and my Grandfather put 
                                                 
63
 Greek for ‘grandpa’. 
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himself into self-imposed EXILE, coming to Australia in 1950, and 
then bringing the rest of the family in 1955.  
To add insult to injury, my Grandfather returned in 1974 for a holiday 
and watched the whole island of Cyprus fall apart right before his eyes 
- something he KNEW would eventually happen from way back in 
1950. If most Cypriots were like my Grandfather, and had his 
pragmatism and foresight, we would not be in this mess today. 
Cyprus, please start using your brains!! 
 
The Cypriotist identity of the group, however, is not constructed along a linear and 
orderly narration of the past. Contrary to Pierre Nora’s (1989) expectations that due to 
an obsession with (dead) memory –that has replaced living memory- we will try to 
engage in the documentation of our past in the most accurate, systematic and 
professional way, what we get here is heavy miscellanizing (Hoskins 2009). Photos are 
posted in no particular order, most of the times with very little explanation or titling; 
information is fragmented and unsystematically presented; conversations are 
unstructured and often unfinished. This creates space for interpretation and negotiation 
of meaning, in a context where history and memory as subjectively experienced and 
partially constructed appears accepted and validated. 
 
The collective memory, however, here is not only produced through agreement and 
conformity but also through contestation and conflict. There are often contributions that 
challenge the main ideology and purposes of the group and usually this is achieved by 
attacking the overarching historical narrative that is being constructed. One such 
contribution that took the form of personal attack against one particular member of the 
group reads as :  
 
“Mr Panayiotou, you are another brainwashed little kid, who never 
bothered to read history himself but preferred to listen what the others told 
him, probably in edon64 or wherever . How can u have a Cypriot nation 
you moron? Seriously, so all the people from 2000BC until the 1920’s AC 
where no one ever question the greekness of its people and the island were 
stupid and you the the Νεο-Κυπριος65, dare to reject what all those people 
died for??? i pity you”  
 
Such contestation often fortifies the response and the identity of the group. Many of my 
informants found this to be the strength and weakness of Facebook. As one of the 
                                                 
64
 EDON is AKEL’s ‘United Democratic Youth Organisation’ [Eniea Dimokratiki Organosi Neoleas]. 
65
 Νεο-Κυπριος  means ‘Neo-Cypriot’ (see chapter 2 for the discussion of the term). 
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founding members of the group said, ‘before all hate mail and exchanges were personal, 
on MSN, emails etc. Now they attack us as a group, but this makes us stronger and 
ready to respond to the enemy…the nationalists’. 
 
The peace process on Facebook, therefore, is not always so peaceful but the tensions 
and contradictions do not always arrive from the outside. Some of the members of the 
group voiced their concern about the level and type of nationalism that it appeared to 
promote. For them, the future face of Cyprus seems to be negotiated in limited and 
exclusionary terms. Cypriots are interpreted to be those whose families have lived in 
Cyprus before the war and have stories and pictures to contribute about that period. This 
principle excludes the large numbers of Turkish settlers, who came from Turkey and 
reside in the Northern part of Cyprus and numerous migrants, who work and live on 
both sides.  More importantly, for some of my informants, such a narrow definition of 
Cypriotness does not correspond to the international and globalised character and nature 
of the Internet itself. Some of these informants use the Internet as a liberating space 
from ethnic, national and local identities. ‘The Internet makes you feel a citizen of the 
world’, told me Antonis, who spent a long time studying in the USA and he now lives in 
Cyprus. ‘It makes you think about multiculturalism. We need peace but not in the way 
they do it. Even their logo…one Cyprus, one Cypriot nation. It makes me feel like a 
Nazi.’  
 
Antonis used to be a member of ‘One Cyprus, One Cypriot Population’, however, 
because of these ideological differences he decided to withdraw and create his own 
Facebook group. This kind of schisms occur often and contribute to a fragmentation and 
decentralisation of the peace activities online, and are therefore highly disapproved. In 
addition, antagonisms and tensions often spill over offline contexts and they are then re-
introduced back to online contexts. During the Christmas holidays in 2007, ‘One 
Cyprus’ decided to organise an event in Ledra Palace hotel, in the ‘dead zone’ of 
Nicosia. It was considered to be a good time as it was before the upcoming elections in 
February 2008 and also because members who lived abroad could be returning to 
Cyprus for the holiday. Antonis’s group had also the same idea and organised an event 
but it did not go according to plan. The ‘One Cyprus’ group had their own event one 
day before his group and they secured the keynote speaker Antonis had approached, a 
well-known Cypriot documentary maker and activist. 
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These tensions are a reflection of two different visions of Cyprus online; one, promoted 
by Cypriotism aims at the creation of a common identity defined through particular 
territorial and cultural references, an example of an ‘imagined community’; the second 
one, is about an ‘imagined network’, promoting peace in Cyprus as part of a more 
globalised and multicultural terrain. When I discussed these issues with the founders 
and members of the ‘One Cyprus’ group, Elisa told me: ‘Not everybody is beyond 
nationalism and we cannot start talking immediately about other issues if we do not first 
build a common identity. Our terminology might be simple or simplistic but it is 
necessary in order to attract people who are not already ‘converted’’. This ‘strategic 
essentialism’ is founded upon a typical understanding of Cypriotism as a ‘good’ 
nationalism, which is selected not as an ideal but a necessary option within the 
discursive limits that the nation is imagined and envisaged in offline contexts. 
 
Internal tensions also emerge when members of the groups try to reconcile their ideas 
about the Internet with the ways they actually use it. Popular debates in Cyprus and the 
diaspora about online activism seem to correspond to academic debates about the 
definition and role of ‘virtual community’. Within these debates, some see online 
politics as a threat to traditional organised political action, as the fragmented, 
individualised and virtual political participation is based on passive and effortless 
understanding of politics that has no ‘real’ effects and deduces numbers from more 
traditional organised political schemes. Others argue that online activism should be 
accompanied by ‘real’ offline activism in order to have any effect and achieve political 
goals. In this sense, groups on Facebook are seen as important tools in disseminating 
information, mobilising members and organising action. Finally, fewer others see online 
politics as a new way of political participation that does not need to directly correlate 
online and offline political action; in this sense, it is concepts such as political activism, 
participation and democracy that need to be revisited and redefined. 
 
In terms of the first strand of thought, the Facebook groups have been received by 
official Cypriot political structures with suspicion and concern. Especially for the 
political parties of the Left that have traditionally been associated with bi-
communalism, the online groups raised concerns as they divert and fragment the 
parties’ ongoing projects. In my conversations with politicians from both AKEL and 
 162
CTP in London and Cyprus, they all seemed to agree that whereas these groups are a 
useful tool for recruiting new members and announcing events, they are also posing a 
risk when they are moving away from organised political schemes or when they are 
confined to online interactions. This idea is shared by members of the online groups, 
who also belong to political parties. They usually use the groups to advertise their 
party’s events and projects and to call for action through these organised groups.  
 
For others, however, the main aim of having the online groups is precisely to move 
away from traditional party politics, by promoting a ‘bottom-up’ type of peace-building. 
Many of the members express a fatigue of party politics in Cyprus and interpret the 
parties’ disapproval of their online activities as an anxiety over the loss of a monopoly 
of bi-communalism and peace activism. One evening, when I was in Cyprus, my friend 
Yiorgos, who studies in the UK, seemed particularly upset about this particular issue 
and said: ‘They think that you should only do politics through them. You don’t have to 
go through them in order to have relationships with the other side. I don’t want to 
belong to any party but I want a solution for Cyprus. I think we can do it by ourselves 
on a grass root level.’ 
 
In this light, the groups do not only represent themselves as an alternative to nationalist 
politics that have dominated the Cypriot context but also as a different option to 
partisanship in general that has characterised Cypriot politics, including the pro-peace 
leftist and communist parties on both sides of the island:  
Panos (America) wrote 
at 5:06pm on March 19th, 2008 
Our primary aim should be to open the borders of our brains. We, 
especially young people but we mustn’t be the only ones, should 
organize a gathering in Cyprus so as to talk about the problems that we 
face as concerns the co-existence between Greek-Cypriots and Turk-
Cypriots. We should firstly open the borders of our brains and then 
those of all people that live around us. Opening our brains will help all 
the “barricades” open in a magic way.  
We must isolate the minority called nationalism and not let it influence 
people. We must all take part in this gathering, both those involved in 
politics and those who do not. We mustn’t belong to any political party 
for this gathering. We may be single people that want a solution in 
order to live all-together peacefully. This gathering must be open to 
everyone. I am sure that this message-thought and desire at the same 
time is not only mine but it is also in many person’s brains 
 
 163
Elena (UK) wrote 
at 12:44am on April 5th, 2008 
hey guys! im thinking of organizing a meeting in the UK so that 
people studying here get the chance to meet each other.. especially 
people studying at the same universities..  
As a way to celebrate the opening of Ledra street (lokmaci), having no 
presentations involved, no politics involved.. just for socializing! what 
do you think? For any comments, suggestions, ideas etc,i will create a 
discussion topic. 
 
This grass root mobilisation, however, that takes place online does not always translate 
into offline action and this creates anxiety for many of my informants who seem to 
privilege offline political action (protests, gatherings etc.) compared to online action: 
Evren (Cyprus) wrote 
at 10:59am on January 8th, 2008 
i would like to suggess to focus on a strategy... it will not be enough to 
discuss on certain issues on facebook... we can have a program of 
action... to reach more people... for the cause... 
 
The opening of the Green Line had raised hopes that meetings, gatherings and protests 
would be more easily organised. The crossings of the Line have of course increased to 
both sides, however, many of the events organised online did not attract significant 
numbers of attendants –nowhere close to the numbers of people who participate, discuss 
and show enthusiasm online. In the summer of 2008, Yiorgos had decided to organise a 
bi-communal meeting upon his return to Cyprus from the UK for the holidays. For 
weeks, he advertised it on Facebook, created a discussion forum about the event and 
also recruited individuals to help him invite as many members as possible. As I was 
seeing Yiorgos almost everyday, I also became part of the organising process and I 
shared closely his enthusiasm and apprehension about the event’s prospects. The online 
responses were very encouraging and we decided to meet in bar in the centre of South 
Nicosia, famous for its relaxed and bohemian atmosphere. When we arrived at the 
garden of the bar, Yiorgos, who had been anxious about attendance, was disappointed to 
find out that only six people had turned up, including a Greek Cypriot man, Achilleas, 
who had been involved in the online groups, two friends of his, for whom it was the first 
time to take part in such a meeting, Achileas’s Turkish Cypriot girlfriend, Belkis, and 
one of her friends, both familiar with bi-communal events, and Serhan, a middle-aged 
man, who as much older had been involved in peace activism for longer than everyone. 
In the course of the night, four more individuals joined the gathering. 
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The meeting was interesting, especially for the two friends of Achilleas, who were 
introduced to this kind of setting for the first time –‘we used to be nationalists’, they 
said and Achilleas jokingly replied ‘you still are’.  They both seemed comfortable that 
they came along, although they admitted that Achilleas had dragged them there. 
‘Achilleas was never like us, said one of them, Marios. He was never really religious 
and he always used to argue with the teachers about history and politics. I was the good, 
pious and disciplined student’, he said, provoking laughter to the rest. However, 
although the recruitment of new ‘non-converted’ individuals is arguably one of the main 
aims of these meetings, Yiorgos and Serhan seemed very concerned about the low 
attendance and spent a large part of the night discussing the discrepancies between 
online activism and offline lack of participation. Their response has to be interpreted 
within the framework of peace politics as commitment to transcend physical boundaries 
and meet face-to-face, developed in Cypriot bi-communalism through the emphasis on 
particular ‘landscapes of peace activism’, discussed at the beginning of the chapter. 
 
After a few months and when Yiorgos tried to organise a similar meeting in London, he 
had a similar experience with low attendance. He got even more disappointed and he 
said: ‘This is the last time I’m trying to organise a meeting. It seems that you have to be 
someone known and to have the right connections, in order for people to show up’. 
Yiorgos felt that one needs to be recognised either as a ‘peace activist’, to have 
therefore a particular social and cultural capital, or to be politically organised through 
one of the mainstream parties. This illustrates that while Facebook has created new 
political subjectivities and has empowered individuals with new status and political 
roles, however, it should not be conceptualised as a virtual space independent of 
traditional social and political structures. The use and potentials of Facebook is 
enhanced or limited by an individual’s (lack of) social capital. However, to deal with 
this perceived inequalities, Yiorgos decided not to leave Facebook but to find 
alternative ways to use it. Whereas he became less active in the groups’ discussions, he 
created through Facebook a closed mail list of fewer individuals that he knew already, 
whom he felt it was easier to bring together, to organise and to mobilise for particular 
meetings. 
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But even on larger scale events, there is a discrepancy between the online support and 
the offline presence. On the 1st of September 2008, the Cyprus Peace Platform, an 
umbrella organisation that represents political parties and NGOs from both sides of the 
island, organised their annual protest/gathering in the buffer zone in front of Ledra 
Palace, which attracts media coverage and large number of supporters. On that day, 
300-400 participants gathered outside the historic hotel. After a couple of hours of 
presentations, speeches and singing, the participants dispersed quietly. Very quickly on 
the same night, pictures of the event were uploaded online with accompanying posts, 
comments and discussions that attracted a much larger number of interested individuals 
than the ones who took part in the peace protest. In some ways, the protest became 
secondary to the online exchanges; it became valuable as a stimulus for the online 
discussions rather than for its importance as an event. Whereas for some this seemed 
like a paradox, for others, like Antonis, who sees himself as part of a wider online 
network, it appeared as a positive sign that Cypriot peace activism is expanded and 
takes a broader and more inclusive form on the Internet. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated the ways, in which Facebook emerged as popular space for 
the articulation of Cyprio-centric discourses at a particular historical period. To 
understand, however, the format and uses Cypriotist groups took online, it is argued 
here, that they have to be studied in relation to the development and history of the bi-
communal peace movement in Cyprus. Far from taking a radical new shape, Facebook 
groups reproduced the structures, rhetoric and aesthetics of offline peace activism, by 
encouraging the communication between Turkish and Greek Cypriots as fundamental, 
utilising similar symbols and focusing on the (re)construction of a common Cypriot 
identity; a result of what has been termed here as ‘banal peace activism’. 
 
On the other hand, Facebook provided a new arena for the mobilisation and expression 
of individuals and groups, who shared experiences of marginalisation and 
‘voicelessness’ in offline settings. Cypriotism online did not, however, only develop as 
a counter-narrative to the rhetoric of ethnic nationalism that has dominated other social 
spheres. As illustrated, Facebook was utilised by some members to move away from 
peace politics traditionally organised through political parties or other official groups. 
Similarly, some British Cypriots found on Facebook a space separate from the political 
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centres in London, from which they felt excluded and alienated. What the Internet 
crystallised, however, is that whereas all these different members shared a language of 
Cypriotism, their understanding of and claims to Cypriotness varied considerably. 
Confrontation, agreement and disagreement are then part of the process through which 
Cypriotism is negotiated, internally contested and shifted online. This processual aspect 
of ‘how the nation is imagined’ makes it less plausible then to unreservedly identify 
particular groups, such as the diaspora, with particular types of nationalisms.  
 
Such observations also unravel that as much as the Internet offered an area for new 
identities to be expressed and articulated, its uses and effects are very much mediated by 
multiple and diverse existing structures and socio-cultural contexts. Whereas Facebook 
has given some individuals new political roles and status within local and transnational 
settings, for others, lack of social and cultural capital in offline contexts has restricted 
the ways they have experienced and utilised it. Technology use, therefore, is embedded 
in and enabled by broader historical processes and discursive domains.  
 
It is characteristic that after the first year of popularity, the activity in the groups started 
to increasingly reduce, especially after the election of Christofias and the beginning of 
the negotiations between the two sides in the island. On one hand, there was a sense that 
the aims of these ‘temporary communities of memory’ coming together had been 
achieved after the elections and an anti-climax in their dynamism was to be expected. 
On the other hand, it reflected disillusionment on behalf of some participants with the 
potential of Internet politics to translate into ‘real’ life activism. Such frustration, as the 
chapter argued, has to be connected with particular understandings of ‘bi-communal 
politics’, which in the Cypriot context often imply the commitment to transcend 
physical and ideological borders and meet face-to-face.  
 
This, however, does not mean an inherent failure and inferiority of online politics. 
Instead, it is argued here, we have to look at how the relation between the online and 
offline is constructed and understood in particular contexts in order to understand the 
ways it is implicated in more complex sets of power structures and relations. For, the 
privilege of online activism as opposed to offline political participation does not always 
signal lack of commitment and responsibility. As illustrated in the chapter, some 
individuals were enabled through the Internet to expand their membership into networks 
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that extended beyond the primacy of ethnic and national identities. For others, it is a 
mechanism of dealing with offline experiences of exclusion. This is why ‘lurking’ is 
often explained as a result of lack of particular types of cultural capital in the diaspora. 
And others cannot even reach places where peace activism is consolidated through 
physical presence.  
 
The following episode is an illustration of this last point. Days before the event Yiorgos 
organised in Nicosia, we crossed the green line to the North to meet with Mehmet, a 
very active member of the Facebook groups. Yiorgos insisted on him attending his 
event in the following days, as he would make a good contribution to the group. 
Whereas other Turkish Cypriots crossed the line and came to the meeting, Mehmet 
failed to turn up, which made Yiorgos disappointed and put Mehmet’s commitment as 
an activist into question. Yiorgos was unaware about something that some of us knew: 
that Mehmet, an active supporter of peace and Cypriotism could not cross the line 
because, although born in Cyprus, he is not recognised as Turkish Cypriot; his family 
came originally from Turkey, but this is something that he does not always disclose to 
others. 
 
Picking up from this incident, the next chapter focuses on discourses and experiences 
around the border in order to highlight how the opening of the Green Line in Cyprus 
revealed and created internal boundaries and power dynamics among those who were 
expected the most to cross it. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
Crossing the Line -Borders and Boundaries 
 
 
6.1 Introduction: Closings and openings without closure 
The Green Line in Cyprus had for decades symbolised, embodied and materialised the 
division between the north and south parts of the island. According to Hadjipavlou 
(2006) and Cockburn (2004), the line, which separates the capital Nicosia and the island 
into two parts, takes different names depending on one’s ideological and political 
stance: the green line, the ceasefire line, the dead zone, the demarcation line, the 
partitioning line, the Attila line, the no-man’s land or the border. 
 
First drawn in 1963 after the eruption of interethnic violence and later consolidated in 
1974, the line was rendered impenetrable for most Cypriots and communication across 
it had not only been technically disabled but also highly discouraged by the state and 
officials on both sides. During the closure of the line, crossings and bi-communal 
meetings required great organisational effort and demanded long bureaucratic processes 
as permits had to be granted to groups and individuals from both sides (Constantinou 
and Papadakis 2001).  
 
Bi-communalists faced public disapproval, which was very often articulated and 
expressed in national media and this collective experience of marginalisation played a 
pivotal role in the formation and self-identification of the peace movement. The 
overcoming of the separation and division became an important point in the agenda of 
the bi-communal groups but also a prerequisite for their existence and organisation; as 
bi-communal groups, their main purpose was to bring the two communities together 
with the ultimate purpose of re-unification and the erasure of the partition line. As 
explained in the previous chapter, the Green Line dominated the ‘landscape of peace 
activism’ in Cyprus and, quite paradoxically, the bi-communal movement concentrated 
and intensified their activities around and on the Line they sought to abolish. 
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The increasing visibility of the peace movement at the border is, according to one of my 
informants who was a participant in the first bi-communal meetings, what led to the 
tightening of crossing control and eventually the complete shut of the border that was 
implemented by Denktaş’s government in the North in 1997. George Georgiou, in his 
narration of the organisation of the peace movement at that time, suggested: 
After the summer of 1996 and the killings of Isaac and Solomou66 there 
was great disappointment and no one was listening to the few voices of 
peace. We had the great idea to contact the 15 diplomatic missions in 
Cyprus and organise an event. The American embassy responded and they 
were willing to help. A big party took place on the 30th of September. We 
got an award as peace leaders by the ambassador in a big event at Ledra 
Palace. Some people say that when Denktaş saw that, he panicked. 
Because up to then they had heard about people going and coming 
[through the Green Line] but they didn’t pay attention. They hadn’t 
realised the magnitude [of the movement]. After the awards ceremony, 
they realised the magnitude. No one will tell you this opinion of course 
besides some Turkish Cypriots. 
 
Even if the increasing visibility was not the sole or most determinant influence on 
Denktaş’s decision, the words above demonstrate that the crossings have been imagined 
and articulated as an important element of the peace movement. Moreover, crossing or 
the intention to cross became a recognising sign of the good peace supporter or 
epanaprosseghistis67 (supporter of rapprochement).  
 
When the border, however, unexpectedly opened in April 2003, its crossing became 
possible for all Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In the first days of the opening, in their 
thousands, Cypriots queued in front of the check points in order to visit the other side. 
Dikomitis (2005) identified three main attitudes towards the border and its crossing 
amongst Greek Cypriots in the period after the opening. One was that of people, mainly 
refugees, who travelled to the North to pay pilgrimage to their lost villages and houses. 
Then, there were those crossing to go to the beach, see friends or do shopping. And 
third, there was the category of non-crossers, Greek Cypriots, who objected to having to 
show their passports in order to travel ‘in their own country’ and to recognising, in this 
way, the ‘pseudo-state’ in the North.  
 
                                                 
66
 Greek Cypriot cousins, Tassos Isaac and Solomos Solomou, who were killed 5 days apart by Turkish 
para-military forces for trespassing the Green Line into TRNC territory.  
67
 The term has negative connotations and carries some irony when used by critics of bi-communalism.  
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This last perspective was founded in broader nationalist discourses in the South and was 
largely linked to the initial hesitancy of the Greek Cypriot state to take a clear stance on 
the issue of the border opening. As Demetriou (2007: 995-997) argues, in the first days 
of the crossings, the state was absent and the trips across the line happened outside 
institutionalised frameworks and, therefore, challenged the state apparatus. However, 
official authorities very quickly declared that only a state could recognise another state 
and, in this case, the citizens’ activities across the border did not mean recognition and 
legitimisation of the TRNC. This reshaped the political subjectivity of Greek Cypriots, 
as Demetriou concludes. ‘The state was thus re-instated as the sole agent of assuring its 
own ‘standing’ and ‘existence’. The domain of political subjectivity had not only been 
reduced, but was declared to have always been that much narrower’ (ibid.: 999). 
Hadjipavlou (2006) seconds this argument by explaining that although the opening of 
the border enabled contacts across the division line that could contribute to mutual 
understanding and peace-building, the effects of these contacts are limited because they 
are not institutionally supported and endorsed. 
 
Whereas these studies deal with issues of (non)crossing as inherent problems of 
nationalism and nationalist politics, the chapter diverts the focus here on the experiences 
of crossings among Cypriotists and peace-supporters in the diaspora and Cyprus. For, 
even for those who have fought the closing of the border, its opening has not necessarily 
brought closure. Bryant (2010) has illustrated how cross-border visits have very often 
not fulfilled people’s expectations on both sides of the divide in Cyprus and the opening 
of the border unravelled other deeper boundaries that set Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
further apart. Taking the argument further, the chapter illustrates how discourses and 
experiences around the border brought to the surface boundaries within Cypriotism and 
peace politics and highlighted old and new power dynamics among different agents. On 
various levels, the chapter brings together and encapsulates most of the issues and 
themes discussed already in the thesis: the politics of memory, internal divisions within 
the Cypriot Left, inter-generational tensions over ‘peace’.  
 
Both in the diaspora and Cyprus, peace supporters have traditionally advocated for the 
opening of the border, but the first parts of the chapter investigate why some of these 
same individuals have not crossed or rarely cross after the opening of the line in 2004. 
In section 6.2, it is argued that for some older peace supporters in the diaspora, non-
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crossing  emerges as an agentive decision to preserve particular memories and to avoid 
further displacement by visiting places that used to be home but are now ruined and 
strange. For others, however, crossings have to take place in a right way –and this is the 
way of the Left. In other words, section 6.3 unravels how Leftists see the current 
openings of the line as discontinuous with and disruptive to peace politics, as 
traditionally operated by the Left. Some British born Cypriots, who support peace, 
oppose both these approaches and emphasise the need for everyday use of the line as a 
means to peace. For them, I argue in section 6.4, the ‘green line’ has emerged as an 
empowering space, away from the socio-cultural conditions of either side of the island, 
in which British born Cypriots often find themselves marginalised. But although the 
green line in this case is imagined and envisaged as ‘everyone’s land’, it is not equally 
shared by everyone, and section 6.5, which deals with the affectivity of the border, 
outlines how emotive reactions at the border can unmask emerging power imbalances 
among those who support peace. The focus is shifted here from examining discourses 
about the border to looking at experiences of the border. The final section 6.6 carries on 
with this theme by narrating two journeys across the line. The journey, treated here as a 
liminal stage that is experienced outside the ordinary and the everyday, creates 
conditions that challenge habitualised political ideologies. As we follow the journeys, 
we are forced to think how experiences of crossings further problematise strict 
dichotomies such as ‘peace-supporter’/nationalist and crosser/non-crosser. 
 
6.2 Crossing the line of Memory 
By the time of fieldwork in 2006, many of the UK Cypriots, at least those who 
maintained close connections with the island, had crossed the Green Line to the ‘other 
side’ to see their old houses and villages. Memorabilia of the crossing had been carried 
back to London, which included photos of the visit, recovered possessions and gifts 
given to the crossers by the current residents of their ‘land’. It happened very often that 
when I visited Greek Cypriots in their houses in London that they would pull out such 
memorabilia, an act that was regularly accompanied by comments about the kindness 
and hospitality of those who welcomed them in the North. Many Turkish Cypriots also 
evoked similar experiences in their crossings to the South. During an interview with a 
Turkish Cypriot radio producer in his mid-50s, he showed me a collection of family 
pictures that the Greek Cypriot residents in his house outside Limassol had saved and 
returned to him upon his visit. He included them in an online album that he had created. 
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Whereas stories of crossing as a positive experience were many among Cypriots in 
London, there were also those whose narratives were dominated by a different rhetoric; 
and whose crossing experience not only did not contribute in bridging the gap between 
the self and the ‘other’ but, on the contrary, it reinforced it. Mr Christos, who migrated 
to the UK in the late 1940s, recalled:  
I decided to go and see my village in Morphou, because I’m getting old; 
who knows if I’d ever get the chance to go again. It was horrible. I really 
regret it. I went to my old house and the woman who lived there showed me 
some orange trees in the garden and said “These are my son’s”. I shouted at 
her and said “No, these are mine”. The woman insisted and I was getting 
angrier. How can she say that these are her trees? They are mine and no 
matter what anyone says, they will remain mine68. They don’t even take 
proper care of them. When we lived there, we had a big orchard; there are 
only a few trees left now. 
 
In parallel with such accounts, still among those who supported peace and re-
unification in the island, the majority had welcomed the opening of the border as a 
positive and promising political development for the island; as an opportunity for 
Cypriots in Cyprus to interact with each other and live together like Cypriots in 
London. For Cypriots in London, crossing the green line in Cyprus is primarily about 
visiting ‘home’ and the other half of ‘their country’ rather than coming into contact with 
‘the other’. After all, according to a common rhetoric followed by my informants, in 
London, Cypriots have co-existed side by side with no disruption. 
 
Theses crossings, however, as the words of Mr. Christos demonstrate above, involve 
distressing and dislocating experiences that shake one’s idea of ‘home’ and create the 
conditions of confrontation with new ‘others’. For, although in dominant nationalist 
discourses the distinction between Turkish Cypriots and Turks tends to collapse, both 
leftist and nationalist accounts among Greek Cypriots agree on the presence of Turkey 
and ‘the Turkish settler’ as a source of destruction, threat and pollution. 
 
Mr. Yiannis, one of my key informants at the Cypriot Centre is a devout communist, 
who left his village in Cyprus in 1948 and migrated first to Australia and then to the 
                                                 
68
 Trees here evoke notions of ‘rootedness’ and become metaphors of belonging to a particular soil. In 
terms of her work on gardens in Cyprus, Jepson (2006: 173) writes ‘[…] the soil represents the implied 
permanence of all that underlies the notion of home. Soil serves as a vessel for the dead of a nation and as 
something conjoined with underlying geology (and therefore with history)’. 
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UK. Talking about his village and the opening of the border, he said once: ‘I have 
sworn to myself that I will never go back. To see what? All that is ruined? But of course 
it’s all those Turks brought from Turkey who destroyed everything and not the Turkish 
Cypriots who used to live there before’.  
 
In a discussion with another of the regulars at the Cypriot Centre, Mr. Costas’s idea of 
staying away as a way of ‘fully being there’ became more explicit, when he 
characteristically said: ‘I have a photo of my village [and it’s enough] to look at.  I have 
a photo of my house. I don’t want to go’ (Eho tin photografia tou horiou mou kai tin 
vlepo. Eho photografia tou spitiou mou. Den thelo na pao). What Mr. Costas meant is 
that the old photos of his village and house, which he kept in a frame, were more 
representational of the way he had left them and he did not want to jeopardise this 
particular image by crossing to the North. 
 
Slyomovics (1998), in her account of Arab and Jew narratives of a Palestinian village 
that used to be inhabited by the former before it became ‘home’ for the latter, 
recognises the significance of the ‘house’ in the way identity is constructed through 
particular claims to memory. She argues that an ‘environmental memory’, the way we 
remember space, buildings and objects defines the ways our existence is shaped by 
them. To visit a ruined house that does not match our memory of it any more then 
means that we have to deal with the disruption this causes to the coherence through 
which we perceive the self. In order to avoid the de-stabilisation of identity, therefore, 
for Mr. Costas, the simulacrum, the representation of ‘home’ becomes effectively more 
real than the actual physical space, which is described as altered, inauthentic and 
strange.  
 
Such accounts point to what Herzfeld (1997: 111) has termed ‘structural nostalgia’, the 
recollection of the past as a ‘collective representation of an Edenic order –a time before 
time- in which the balanced perfection of social relations has not yet suffered the decay 
that affects everything human’. This however does not mean that individuals are always 
oblivious to the nostalgic elements of this representation and the constructedness of 
memory. In fact, in many accounts of crossings my informants discussed precisely how 
the very experience of crossing alerted them to the contradictions, inconsistencies and 
elusiveness of memory. I was once spending time with two Greek Cypriot sisters, who 
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had left their village in the North as refugees when they were very young girls. One of 
them, Maria, lives in the UK and she was visiting over the summer holidays her sister, 
Sophia, who lives in Nicosia. While narrating the events of 1974 and of the night they 
had to leave their house, they both realised that in many cases their memories differed, 
whereas in others they complemented each other. ‘We have told these stories so many 
times but every time we come up with something slightly different. I think we cannot 
separate now what we actually lived in reality and what we’ve learnt from listening to 
and learning the stories’, Maria said pointing out the processual and changing character 
of their accounts of the past. ‘Memory is very funny’, Sophia said, ‘when I first crossed 
and visited our village, everything looked so much smaller and insignificant than I had 
remembered all these years. We had a road next to my house that I remembered as 
huge…almost like an avenue. When I saw it this time I realised it was a narrow, muddy 
road that a modern car could barely go through [laughs]’. ‘Same with our house’, 
Sophia complemented her sister’s argument. ‘I used to remember it as really large and 
quite luxurious and now I wonder how we could even fit in there’. 
 
Social sciences, including anthropology, often try to deconstruct approaches to memory 
that see it as static; as a repository of true facts that one can access any time. As 
anthropologists, we often see such understandings of memory as essentialising and 
problematic. When memory is associated with nostalgia and romanticism, it is often 
analysed as a form of ‘false consciousness’ (see for instance Lowenthal 1985). In a 
modern perspective, memory then operates as a smoke screen prohibiting us from 
achieving historical truth. In a post-modern analysis, it creates the sense of a reality and 
totality that is inconsistent with the fragmentations, contradictions and processual 
character of history production (Rowlands 1994:139; see also Crapanzano 1991; Klein 
2000). Either way, theorists have often tended to see individuals as subjected to and 
mystified by their own mnemonic aptitude. 
 
However, as we see here, individuals are often aware of the distinction between 
everyday and anthropological understandings of memory. And although its 
constructedness and nostalgic qualities are often evident, they actively employ the 
romanticisation of the past in order to deal with displacement and dislocation. For 
crossings to visit ‘home’ may reveal not only that this home is not there anymore but 
also that it was never there in the ways it features in memory, on which the coherence 
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and narration of the present self is founded; crossing the line of memory is therefore 
sometimes more costly than crossing the green line. 
 
6.3 Crossing ‘the right way’ –for the Left 
The 3rd of April 2008 was a day of celebration for many –although not all- Cypriots; 
another checkpoint was opened in the previously closed Ledra Street/Locmaci. Shortly 
after his election as President of the Republic of Cyprus, Dimitris Christofias and the 
Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, agreed on the reopening of the main 
pedestrian street that runs through the old walled town of Nicosia and connects its North 
and South parts. Speeches, music and a festive spirit69 set the mood for the opening 
event that attracted many celebrators, passers-by, tourists and local and international 
media. The press worldwide hailed the news as an important step for peace, the 
international community sent encouraging messages and Internet sites were filled with 
enthusiastic comments. ‘Hey there mates. Ledra Street is open now. Next is to open our 
brains and cooperate to be able to kick all foreign troops out of Cyprus. For one Cyprus, 
one Cypriot population!!’, was the very first post on the wall of the ‘One Cyprus’ 
Facebook groups. Tens of other messages echoing similar sentiments and replicating the 
same tone appeared during the day. 
 
Very far from the green line but very close to Green Lanes, in the Cypriot centre in 
London, the regulars had gathered to watch the news about Ledra Street on the centre’s 
TV. As most of them are long-term AKEL supporters, excitement and praise took a 
more particular form and were mainly linked to discussions about the charisma and 
abilities of the newly elected president Christofias. ‘He’s just come into power and 
things are already changing’, Mr Kyriakos, a regular, was pointing out to a small group 
of four men gathered around him. This language of change and the celebration of a new 
era also featured in the speech that President Christofias gave a month later at the 
Alexandra Palace hotel in London as part of his UK visit. He reassured London 
Cypriots and AKEL supporters that the opening of Ledra Street, as a symbolic gesture, 
                                                 
69
 Some media reported that state officials also cut the ribbons of balloons to set them free during 
celebrations of the opening of the street. The use of balloons was particularly disapproved by those who 
were suspicious of and negative about the opening and it was interpreted as a way of underplaying and 
carnivalising the ‘Cyprus problem’ in its gravity. One of my informants in Cyprus,  who was very critical 
of the politics of the Left and of rapprochement in general, would never fail to repeat in every 
conversation we had about the opening of Ledra Street: ‘And those balloons! How ridiculous!’ 
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proved the commitment of the new government to peace and the willingness of the two 
Cypriot leaders to co-operate and engage in sustainable dialogue towards a solution. 
 
In broader public and political discourse, however, the significance of the opening of 
the new checkpoint was not reduced to its symbolic value for the conjoint efforts of the 
two major leftist parties in Cyprus, AKEL and CTP, which, for the first time, were 
simultaneously in power on each side of the division line. What was also celebrated as 
special about the opening of Ledra Street was its potential to facilitate more 
spontaneous, hassle-free and informal crossings, which would strengthen bi-communal 
relationships and could also eventually contribute to the regeneration and 
redevelopment of the old town of Nicosia. For, unlike other checkpoints in and around 
Nicosia, this is in a central location, it re-connects the two parts of a pedestrian street 
full with shops and cafes on each side, and it involves a very small –almost 
unobservable- UN-controlled buffer zone that eases the crossing to the other side. 
 
This ease of crossing as a theme kept emerging in the comments of many of those I met 
on Ledra Street in the summer of 2008, when I returned to Cyprus a couple of months 
after the checkpoint opened. One very warm evening, I was walking on Ledra Street 
when I accidentally met a family of London Greek Cypriots, whom I knew from the 
UK. ‘We are just coming back from crossing to the other side’, was their first sentence. 
‘We were just walking on Ledra Street and we decided to carry on walking [to the north 
side]. It’s so much easier now’. 
 
However, when I asked them if this meant that they would now cross more often, the 
father answered: ‘Not really. There is no point in going back and forth; the point is to 
have a solution’. This statement was repeated to me by other peace supporters both from 
the diaspora and Cyprus and reflected a situation, in which individuals, who in principle 
supported the political initiatives of the leftist leaders to open new checkpoints, in 
practice did not cross or crossed reluctantly. The justification of their stance was that 
crossing without a permanent solution of the Cyprus problem was pointless and 
counter-productive in the long term. 
 
This ambivalence towards border openings did not emerge exclusively in the margins of 
or outside the official circles of the Left in Cyprus. In the summer of 2008, I 
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interviewed the presidents of the youth party groups of CTP and AKEL, in North and 
South Nicosia respectively. They both share similar backgrounds and experiences as 
two young men, who have devoted much of their political careers supporting peace, 
rapprochement and co-operation between their two parties. Both of them are also 
considered promising career politicians in their respective side of Cyprus. However, as 
the leaders of their parties were celebrating the opening of Ledra Street, they both 
expressed reservations. ‘Openings and crossings have to happen in an organised manner 
and with some careful planning. We didn’t struggle all these years [as people of the Left 
and bi-communalists] in order to have this. I can even say that these openings are 
actually dangerous for peace and bi-communalism’, Michael Stefanou stated with 
disappointment. In the North of Nicosia, Evrim Sehinoglou, almost echoed the words of 
his Greek Cypriot counterpart: ‘It was probably counter-productive to have all these 
checkpoints opened. In a way, if people can cross freely, they have nothing to fight 
about, nothing to protest about. It becomes too easy.’ 
 
Both quotes conform to a rhetoric that sees the opening of the border at that historical 
point and under the particular political circumstances as threatening to the older peace 
efforts organised by the Left. The new arrangements allowed most of those who wanted 
to cross to do so outside orchestrated political efforts and party groups. Also, according 
to the same line of thought, such border arrangements potentially operate as a ‘safety-
valve’ for the continuation of an established status quo. For, if people cross and enjoy 
some of the benefits of a unified island, they are less likely to experience the frustration 
and disempowerment that normally lead to collective resistance and upheaval –the kind 
that happened in the North of the island before the opening of the border and the Annan 
plan. In other words, while the leadership of the Left in Cyprus were opening new 
checkpoints, a critical narrative had developed alongside and within the Left that saw in 
this ease of crossing an ease of doing politics, which was juxtaposed to their own 
‘traditional’ and right way of fighting for peace. 
 
The contradictions and tensions, however, were not limited there. Whereas in this 
common critical leftist rhetoric border openings are treated with suspicion as disrupting 
to Leftist peace politics, for others, disappointment and cracks in the relationship 
between the ‘two Lefts’ in the island were the cause rather than the result of peace 
supporters’ disenchantment with the green line. This was highlighted to me by Ilke, a 
 178
Turkish Cypriot man in his thirties, who moved to London in 2004 to work and study. A 
devoted member of CTP and a peace activist, he left the island with a ‘heavy heart’ after 
the rejection of the Annan plan by the Greeks Cypriots. Throughout my fieldwork he 
has also been one of the most consistent and outspoken critics of AKEL’s last minute 
rejection of the plan. In a discussion about the crossings, he said in a realistic-cum-
pessimistic tone: ‘Whenever I go back to Cyprus, I don’t cross back and forth. I fly 
usually to Larnaca because it’s easier for me to get a flight there. But that’s it. I cross 
once to the North to go home and then I only cross again to go to the airport on my way 
back to the UK. I normally have to find excuses to not go to the South, because in 
principle we support peace, reunification, communication. But I’m fed up with them, 
with AKEL people. I can’t say openly why I don’t cross, I prefer to find excuses, it’s 
better this way’. 
 
Ilke’s words contained a spirit of disillusionment with AKEL’s politics common 
amongst a number of Turkish Cypriot leftists in the post-Annan period. But what is 
more significant here is the mechanism he employs to deal with his ideological and 
political disappointment. The use of excuses or ‘the presentation of self’, to borrow 
Goffman’s ([1959] 1990) term, in different contexts and in front of different audiences 
offer ways to reconcile conflicting experiences and identities; those of a ‘good’ and 
long-term peace supporter, who does not wish to jeopardise peace and to publicly 
display disloyalty to his party with those defined by political fatigue and resentment.   
 
For some peace supporters, especially from the Turkish Cypriot Left, like Ilke, non-
crossing came as a reaction to the failures of the Greek Cypriot Left in the referendum 
and post-referendum period. For others, mainly Greek Cypriot leftists, non-crossing was 
a reaction to ‘easy’ politics that diverted from and disrupted their ideological and 
activist tradition. However, whereas these discourses were quite widespread outside and 
within the Left, non-crossing for peace supporters had often to be accompanied by 
apologies, explanations and maintaining a particular ‘public’ façade. 
 
This need for a public facade highlights the extent to which the Green Line has 
historically been invested with a prominent symbolic place in the ‘landscape of peace 
activism’ and leftist peace politics, as discussed in chapter 5. As the denunciation of the 
closed border has been part of the discursive repertoire and practices of the ‘ideal’ peace 
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supporter, the act of not-crossing challenges the official party line; disrupts an imagined 
continuity in the peace politics of the Left; and, moreover, interrogates fundamental 
aspects of being a leftist and a peace supporter as social identities. As there is much at 
risk here, some individuals strategically manage and try to reconcile the discrepancies 
between discourse and practice. 
 
Such political dualism is not experienced only by those, who live permanently close to 
the Green Line, but for leftists in the diaspora too. In the summer of 2008, many of 
those who had publicly been celebrating for the opening of Ledra Street in the Cypriot 
Centre in London, had the opportunity to cross it during their visits in Cyprus. Still, 
many did not cross or crossed a limited number of times to the other side, often evoking 
the unofficial leftist justification against border openings.  
 
Whereas diasporas are usually imagined both in academic writings and public 
discourses as inherently transnational, mobile and border-crossing, different borders 
carry different significance and are not considered uniformly penetrable by members of 
the diaspora. Also, as we can see here, borders are not always, at least on a symbolic 
level, the discursive products of nationalist ideas and sentiments. For some of the 
Cypriot peace supporters of the Left in Cyprus and in the diaspora, the decision to not 
cross was also informed by particular ideological struggles and historical processes 
within the Left itself. 
 
6.4 From ‘no man’s land’ to ‘everyone’s land’ –Reterritorialisation of the border 
One very warm afternoon in August 2008, Alex and his fiancée, Maria, two of my key 
informants in Cyprus, came to pick me up from my room, which was at the University 
of Nicosia student halls. The building is adjacent to the Green Line in Aghios Dometios 
and to two army grounds on either side of it. I used to spend evenings in my room’s 
small balcony looking at the border guards in the North and South parts of it standing 
for hours sometimes smoking or listening to music and I used to try to get a glimpse of 
‘the other side’, which was so close but directly inaccessible, due to the absence of a 
checkpoint. Alex was as fascinated by the location of my room as I was, and that day, 
he asked if we could go to the roof of the building so he could take some pictures. 
Taking pictures of army bases or of the Green Line is forbidden, but Alex was only 
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interested in taking pictures of the ‘other side’ and of the large Turkish flag that covered 
a big area of the Pentadaktylos Mountains in the North. 
 
We got to the roof and he had been taking photos for a while, when we got spotted by 
the soldiers from both sides of the border who were trying with gestures and shouting to 
warn us to stop, as they obviously thought that we were photographing them. However, 
the more the soldiers looked alerted, the more Alex kept taking shots and very quickly 
the soldiers from the Greek Cypriot side started coming towards us –with their guns 
clearly visible. Maria and I urged Alex to stop. ‘You are going to get us shot’, she kept 
repeating, simultaneously joking and panicking, but Alex did not even turn his head. 
After a few minutes Maria almost physically pulled him away from the roof and we 
went downstairs. We had to explain to the soldiers what we had been doing, but Alex by 
that time was very upset: ‘They don’t have the right to ask us questions. This is my 
island and I can go wherever I want; I can take photos of whatever I want. The Green 
Line is part of my island’. 
 
Born and raised in the UK by Greek Cypriot parents, he moved permanently to the 
island in 2006 with his Cypriot fiancée in order to get married and start a new life there. 
In the two years after his move to Cyprus, he completed his military service and 
managed to get a job as a researcher in one of the universities in Nicosia. He had been 
involved in projects that promoted research and academic co-operation between North 
and South and he was a member of bi-communal groups and participant in many bi-
communal activities. Although he seemed to have settled in very well and he spoke 
Greek fluently, Alex’s group of friends were mainly Cypriots born outside Cyprus, who, 
like him, had ‘returned’ to the island. Most of them were British born and the dominant 
language in the group was normally English. ‘It’s much easier to hang out with people 
who have the same background. They understand you better. And growing up in the 
UK, I’m used to being in a multicultural environment’, Alex told me almost 
apologetically in one of our first meetings in order to explain the particular 
demographics of his friends’ circle. To make a home ‘at home’, Alex created and 
participated in this social space, which he seemed devoted to expanding by always 
welcoming newcomers –usually English-speaking Cypriots and non-Cypriots, either 
living in or visiting the island.  
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During fieldwork, I crossed the Green Line many times with Alex and his friends –some 
times to attend an event, other times to just see friends. Most of these young second or 
third-generation ‘returnees’70 are supporters of peace and reunification and have 
relationships with ‘the other side’. Their ideological and political orientation, as they 
often claimed, was inspired and triggered by their understanding and experiences of 
multiculturalism in the countries, where they were born. Although Alex was involved in 
bi-communal organisations and NGOs, he always expressed his pride of having an 
‘organically’ grown multicultural group of friends that included Turkish Cypriots.  
 
Opposed to nationalist aphorisms but also left-wing reservations about border crossings, 
these peace supporters insisted that border openings were a very positive development 
for peace and communication and expressed no hesitancy or reservations to cross. As 
John, a British Cypriot and friend of Alex, who used to spend his summers in Cyprus, 
said once: ‘We cannot see the border with emotionality. Old emotions are those that 
keep the Cyprus problem a problem. We are influenced by how our parents feel about 
Cyprus but we have to move beyond’.  
 
Within this discourse, emotionality and long-established political ideologies are seen as 
negative residues of the past and as impeding progress and a solution for the island. 
They are, therefore, metaphorically talked about as bigger barricades than those of the 
physical division line. All these barriers, including the abolishment of the border, can 
only be outdone though openness, tolerance and the everyday practice of these 
principles. 
 
Informal crossings play a large part in this everyday practice of peace and the green line 
features here again as an important point of reference, however, with different meaning 
and symbolic value attached to it. As the words of Alex during the episode with the 
border guards demonstrate, there is a sense of ownership of the Green Line, of the right 
to be there, use it, photograph it. Whereas the quest is again a unified and peaceful 
Cyprus, the border is not treated as the embodied proof of irreconcilable difference, like 
                                                 
70
 Christou and King (2008) alert that the term has to be problematised before being employed as a 
descriptive category.  The concept of ‘return’ relates to ideas of where ‘home’ is considered to be in the 
first place.  Also, as already discussed in chapter 2, the return of the diaspora does not always bring the 
closure that is popularly assumed but opens up the space for counter-diasporic narratives, like in the 
particular case of British born Cypriots here. 
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in nationalist discourses, nor as the ultimate actual and symbolic obstacle to peace, like 
in traditional leftist rhetoric. Instead, the use of the border here is a means to peace. 
 
The term ‘use’ is employed to include a diverse set of practices beyond just crossing. A 
number of peace supporters have very recently started visiting and operating within the 
green line, or at least parts of it. One such part of the Green Line is that in front of Ledra 
Palace hotel and it has been in recent years under significant development and change. 
What used to be a so-called ‘dead zone’ (Papadakis 2005) of a few hundred meters, with 
old deteriorated buildings and only the Ledra Palace hotel in use by the UN-soldiers, is 
now a quite lively strip of land. The Goethe Institute has had a base next to the hotel 
since 2001, but through very recent initiatives other buildings have been re-opened and 
restored too. In 2008, the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR), a 
group of Turkish and Greek Cypriot teachers, who advocate for educational co-
operation and communication between the two sides, had just bought one of the old 
buildings on the site as their new ‘home’ with international funds. Another old house 
that used to belong to Armenian Cypriots has been turned into a multi-function 
building, that includes a restaurant, a café and conference rooms. It is privately owned 
and some international or bi-communal conferences and meetings now take place there. 
 
Clearly what is promoted through the development of this part of the Green Line is a 
spirit of co-operation, peace and cosmopolitanism and a detachment from the fixity of 
nationalist identities and symbols that presumably have dominated the island’s 
landscape. The French-sounding name of the café-restaurant, ‘Chateau Status’, after all, 
explicitly conveys this message of internationalism. A number of agents, including local 
activists, entrepreneurs, international funding organisations, the European Union, and 
the Cypriot state, seem to be co-operating -some times unintentionally- in turning this 
‘no-man’s land’ into ‘everyone’s land’. 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the place attracts individuals, who identify with or 
aspire to such cosmopolitanism, such as diplomats, NGO workers and international 
businesspeople. This air of ‘openness’ drew Alex and his friends to the Green Line too. 
Unlike many other Cypriots, they chose Chateau Status very often as a place of leisure, 
for a coffee or an evening drink. ‘Why should we go for a coffee in the South and not to 
the Green Line? It’s a good way to support peace, isn’t it? If more people get used to 
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doing it, things would be much better’, said Alex in one of our visits to the place. 
Another advantage of the place is that their Turkish Cypriot friends could join them 
easily from the other side.  
 
But what seemed particularly important is that they had the opportunity there to be 
around local and international like-minded people. As we were all sitting around a table 
in the back garden of Chateau Status one evening, Peter, a British born Cypriot, who 
went to live in Cyprus in his mid-twenties said: ‘I feel more at home in this place than 
anywhere else in Cyprus. Everybody speaks English here and people are more open. It’s 
Cyprus and it’s not Cyprus. It’s not the North, it’s not the South. It doesn’t have all the 
things I hate about Cyprus, I definitely feel more comfortable here’. Everyone else in 
the table, around eight people, mainly British-born, shook their head in agreement. 
 
So beyond the practicalities of meeting with friends and the ideological commitment to 
using the line for communication and peace-building, Peter’s statement presents the 
green line as a home inside and outside home that allows different identities to be 
articulated.  The long-term deterritorialised Green Line, where social life was absent, 
becomes through processes of reterritorialisation (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1988) 
and re-appropriation a separate space, where new social relations are mapped and in 
which these English-speaking peace supporters are safeguarded against their ideological 
and cultural marginalisation in the rest of the island. 
 
This idea of the green line as a safe haven was raised in a newspaper article by a peace 
supporting journalist, who imagines what an occupation of the Green Line would mean: 
 
‘Three weeks now the quite provocative idea has seemed to me more and 
more tempting. Moderate people, with lots of energy for the future, [living] 
in the heaven of abandonment! As people with environmental and human 
sensitivities, we will find again the footprints of the place, amongst the flora 
and fauna that have reoccupied this zone of the island from one side to the 
other. We will be able to move around easily; we will speak any language 
we find convenient to communicate about basic stuff; we will find again our 
tranquillity, away from the civilization [politismos] that ‘develops’ from 
both sides crunching mercilessly on the land, shores, hills and trees! OK, we 
will have less access to the sea but we will have tranquillity. In terms of 
numbers, we will be equal, in terms of Greek-speaking and Turkish-
speaking people of Cyprus, taking into account the percentages of those who 
supported a solution and in proportion to the overall population. We will 
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find the language, we will find the music, we will find the ways through our 
common experiences and our common vision. Don’t imagine an Amish 
community; we will enjoy whatever we need from civilization and we will 
move freely to any of the three zones we want, to work, see friends, to fulfil 
needs. Maybe with time, the minority of the dead zone will start to gain 
ground and to expand territorially, until they occupy what they deserve from 
future Cyprus. And if you try to encourage me by saying that we will 
become a boxing sack between the extremists on both sides, I have to 
remind you that, anyway, our life has not been very easy in a country, which 
decided through collective and democratic processes to kick away the future. 
Only before, there has to be demining [of the Green Line]! (Stefanou, 
Politis, 19/09/2010, p. 2) 
 
In its neo-romantic style, the article envisages the Green Line, as a separate strip of land 
that should be controlled by its ‘natural’ inhabitants; the plants, the animals, and the 
people who can organically live and want to live together regardless of nationality or 
background. As the Greek word politismos has a twofold meaning of both civilization 
and culture, the author seems to imply that what lies outside the green line is 
environmental destruction and uncontrolled development, results of civilization and 
progress, and nationalist and divisive ideologies identified with culture. 
 
Indeed, this perspective of an almost culture-free space differs from the idea of the line 
as a multicultural or cosmopolitan place that is currently promoted through the 
reconstruction and development of some of its parts. However, both lines of thought 
represent the border as the land of those who support co-existence and who find 
themselves not fitting in the socio-cultural context of either side of the island.  
 
Within this framework, the use of the border provides an empowering experience for 
many second-generation diasporic Cypriots, who find themselves culturally and 
ideologically marginalised in their everyday life in the island. Whereas, however, the 
‘internationalisation’ of the border gives voice and space to some individuals, others are 
still excluded from sharing such cosmopolitanism and/or are alienated by its current 
reconstruction and commercialisation. The next section discusses reactions to these 
processes, by looking at particular affectivities of the border. 
 
6.5 The affectivity of the border 
Whereas the opening of the border has facilitated movement across it, such crossings 
are not experienced by everyone in the same way. The physical and institutional 
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arrangement of the ‘dead zone’ has still multiple and variable effects on the 
subjectivities, identities and existence of those who cross and do not (or cannot) cross it.  
Following Navaro-Yashin’s (2007) study of documents in Cyprus in terms of their 
affective quality, I focus here on the affective interactions between individuals and the 
border. I engaged before with the ways the border appears as a representation, an image 
or an idea in public discourses and individual narratives; in the last section, I looked at 
the border in its physicality and materiality. I asked questions about what happens at the 
border rather than across it; how the border is laid out but also how it changes as a 
landscape; and in what ways the border layout produces different experiences. Here I 
focus on the diverse emotions expressed and produced at the border for those, who 
interact with it. 
 
This is not to say that the border has a particular essence in itself that is released upon 
those who cross it. As Navaro-Yashin puts it in terms of documents, ‘when placed in 
specific social relations with persons, documents have the potentiality to discharge 
affective energies which are felt or experienced by persons. My argument, then, is not 
that documents maintain autonomous or self-contained affectivities, but that they are 
perceived or experienced as affectively charged phenomena when produced and 
transacted in specific contexts of social relation’ (ibid.: 81). Likewise, in specific 
contexts, being at the border provokes emotive responses that are felt by individuals. 
 
Green (2005) has shown in her own study of borders in North-West Greece that the 
fixity and rigidity of the border promoted by the state is challenged by those who live 
close to it or cross it and has focused on issues of negotiation and plasticity. Although 
questions of what and where the border actually is help us to focus on how the border is 
discursively and performatively (re)configured, most Cypriots experience the 
materiality and physicality of the Green Line by crossing it through a checkpoint. 
 
I focus, therefore, here again at the Ledra Palace checkpoint because of its structural, 
architectural and functional particularities. As discussed above, for many ‘outward-
looking’, cosmopolitan peace-supporters, including diasporic Cypriots, this strip of 
Green Line provides an empowering and liberating space, where different identities are 
expressed and (re)formed. Many of these individuals, as it was also highlighted, see this 
part of the Green Line as detached from the geographical and ideological boundaries of 
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nationalism, which dominates the rest of the island. Associating emotional responses to 
(non)crossing with nationalism, for the cosmopolitan peace supporters, ‘emotionality’ –
almost synonymous to sentimentality here- towards the border is avoided, as it 
reinforces division and impedes peace-building. What I argue is that, whereas forward-
looking, this stance neglects and undermines other or others’ experiences at the risk of 
masking older or emerging power structures and relationships. 
 
To make this clear, I will refer to two independent examples of crossings, two 
ethnographic snapshots that were marked by the strong emotive and somatic responses 
of individuals. What is important in these cases is that both crossings were to the Green 
Line only, and not to the other side; affect was therefore produced at the very act of 
crossing and through the experience of the border, rather than of what is beyond. 
 
The first snapshot comes from a day in the summer of 2008, when I was following Mr. 
Yiannis and his wife, Mrs Toula, to the Ledra Palace Green Line. Already married in 
1974, they left the island in the same year for the UK. After staying there for a few 
years, they moved to Australia, where they have lived since. Mr. Yiannis is a leading 
figure in diasporic politics and a firm supporter of peace and reconciliation and his wife, 
although not directly involved according to her, always accompanies him in his 
activities. Whereas they go to Cyprus almost every summer and participate in bi-
communal and peace events, they had never crossed before the summer of 2008. I met 
them through friends the day, on which they had just come back from their first visit to 
Mr. Yiannis’s village in the North. They shared the same ambivalence towards the line 
and crossing as many leftists in the island and diaspora –that crossing without a solution 
is futile. 
 
The time that they were crossing the Ledra Palace checkpoint was only the third time 
they would have entered the Green line. They were going to attend a bi-communal 
meeting at Chateau Status and they had kindly accepted to take me along. However, the 
minute we passed the Greek Cypriot checkpoint from the South, Mrs Toula started 
shaking. ‘She gets very upset, would you please look after her and hold her hand?’, her 
husband asked me. We went into the coffee shop but while sitting around a table and 
sharing coffee with Mr Yiannis’s interlocutors, Mrs Toula’s somatic expressions of 
distress intensified. She was looking around inquisitively, sighing and shaking for the 
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whole time. Only when we were leaving the coffee shop, she said: ‘I can’t believe there 
is a café here, as if nothing has happened. A café in the middle of the green line, as if 
there was no war, as if we left for nothing’. 
 
Her somatic expressions of stress and her response to the border reminded me of a 
different crossing. It was by Mehmet, a young man in his early twenties. Mehmet lives 
in the North and is an active peace-supporter and heavily involved in party politics. 
Whereas his dream is to see Cyprus united, as he often says, Mehmet is not officially 
recognised as a Cypriot by the Republic of Cyprus. Although he was born in Cyprus, his 
parents came to the island in the 1980s from Turkey. Without the right ancestry and the 
right documents, Mehmet is not allowed to cross to the South71. The green line is as far 
as he can go. 
 
Mehmet would normally cross to the Ledra Palace checkpoint to meet with friends or 
attend events. Alex was one of his closest friends and most times Alex’s group would 
go to Chateau Status, Mehmet would join. He would always, however, look very 
uncomfortable there, which was remarkable for a very confident, sociable and outgoing 
person, such as Mehmet. One particular evening, while walking down the green line, he 
started sweating, shaking and getting upset. His group of friends kept looking at him 
and asking him if he was ok, to which he constantly replied ‘yes’. 
 
While I did not raise the issue at the time, I later asked Mehmet in an interview about 
his reaction at the border. ‘It all started when the border opened’, he said.  
‘I managed to cross the first day, as no one was really checking. It was 
great, the dream of my life had come true. When I tried to cross the next 
day though, there were long lines. I queued with the others, but when it 
was my turn, the Greek Cypriot policeman took me out of the queue and 
shouted at me: “You cannot cross, you are not a Cypriot, go back!”. It 
was so hurtful, the most embarrassing time of my life. To tell me 
something like this in front of everyone. Who is he to tell me if I’m a 
Cypriot or not? Since then I always get stressed at the green line, even if I 
don’t remember the episode, I still get this stress, I feel uncomfortable, as 
if someone is going to tell me to go back’. 
 
                                                 
71
 Only Turkish Cypriots, who hold valid documents of the Republic of Cyprus, are allowed entry to the 
South. Those who cross to the North and do not hold TRNC documents are granted a temporary VISA for 
90 days, which is stamped not on the passport but on a separate paper slip, as TRNC is not a recognised 
state. 
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If we are to locate power, borders are one context where the state becomes especially 
conspicuous and its control over movement of its citizens and aliens is directly 
experienced (Donnan and Wilson 1999). The fenced green line across Nicosia is 
guarded in different parts by soldiers on both sides, whereas to pass through a check 
point, crossers have to present their documents to the border control authorities of the 
Republic of Cyprus and the internationally unrecognised TRNC. I have examined 
before how individuals exercise their agency by challenging the fixity and control of the 
border through discourses and action. For some, however, border lines are more fixed 
than others. In Mehmet’s case, he traces his emotional response at/to the border back to 
the embodied traumatic memory of being singled out and excluded. At the same time, 
as his last phrase suggests, this sort of affectivity is also linked to his sense of limited 
agency to overcome the physical and ontological barriers that the border encompasses 
for him. 
 
However, it is not only state visibility and official use of force and control that makes 
the border a point of inclusion/exclusion. For Mrs Toula, it was the development, 
reconstruction and commercialisation of the green line that raised feelings of alienation 
and distress. She explained her reaction also in connection to her traumatic experiences 
of refugeeness and migration, which the border all these years symbolised in its 
emptiness and desertion. But the commercialisation of the border through new 
‘geopolitics of capitalism’ (Harvey 1985) in Cyprus, disrupted the connection between 
past, present and future. In this forward-looking landscape of the green line, Mrs Toula 
could not locate her past and, inevitably, could not identify her future. 
 
What is highlighted here is that the shifting landscape of the Green Line through 
processes of re-appropriation and re-territorialisation has empowered individuals, such 
as diasporic Cypriots, who otherwise felt alienated and estranged within the everyday 
political and cultural realities of life in the island.  It is understandable why for this 
group of peace-supporters, it has been important to move away from the emotionality 
that has dominated discourses and practices around the border. On the other hand, this 
empowering space is not equally shared by everyone who supports peace. As a group of 
those who have the right social and cultural capital and the right documents to enjoy the 
green line as ‘everyone’s land’ emerges, there are also those who feel more alienated 
there than ever. Their particular affectivities in relation to the border arise as embodied 
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modes of resistance to the new status quo. It is therefore important ethnographically to 
pay attention at these affectivities, because, as shown here, they unravel on-going, but 
also new and shifting power relations within peace politics at the border. 
 
6.6 Journeys 
Have Ithaka always in your mind.  
Your arrival there is what you are destined for.  
But don't in the least hurry the journey.  
Better it last for years,  
so that when you reach the island you are old,  
rich with all you have gained on the way,  
not expecting Ithaka to give you wealth.  
Ithaka gave you a splendid journey.  
Without her you would not have set out.  
She hasn't anything else to give you.  
 
(‘Ithaca’ by Constantine Cavafy) 
 
As the well known poem by Cavafy artfully suggests, a journey is a learning and self-
transforming process. Even in the best-planned journey, one may need to deal with 
contingencies, to follow new paths or to change route. One has to take a few minutes in 
front of a cross road, a cul-de-sac or a wall and think again about which is the right way 
to go. The journey involves experiences and encounters that invite us to reflect on our 
previous plans, revisit our decisions and respond to challenges. 
In this sense, the journey relates to the anthropological concept of liminality (Turner 
1969), an in-between stage that opens up the space for self-reflection, interrogation of 
one’s moral universe and habitus change. It provides opportunities for the articulation of 
a counter-structure, a reflexive and external perspective on an established status quo. In 
this section, I discuss in detail two crossings of the line that took the form of a journey; 
taken at different times by different individuals and in different contexts, however, both 
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journeys can be analysed in terms of their processual character and transforming 
potential. 
The idea of crossing as a journey helps us to challenge the fixity in popular 
understandings of the border, ‘home’ and political identities. Ethnographically detailed 
analysis of the journey allows us to examine how places and spaces are imagined, 
experienced and reconstructed during the journey and how they are invested with 
different meaning by different individuals. Rodman (1992: 640) has suggested that to 
understand the complex social construction of spatial meaning, we have to look at 
places as multi-locally and multi-vocally produced and Greek Cypriots’ crossings to the 
North are examined through such perspective. Moreover, the analysis of journeys here 
challenges rigid dichotomies, such as crosser/non-crosser, nationalist/peace-supporter in 
the Cypriot context, as it invites us to examine how individual agents manage the 
challenges to their political, moral and affective subjectivities that emerge in the state of 
liminality. 
Journey 1 
Chrystalla went to the UK in the autumn of 1974, at the age of fourteen, to continue and 
complete her education that was disrupted by war and displacement. Her family had to 
leave their house in Famagusta (Greek: Αµµόχωστος, Turkish: Gazimağusa) after the 
Turkish invasion in the summer of 1974 and they found refuge in Larnaca. At that time, 
they lived in uncertainty and anticipation; they did not know when the war would finish 
and when they would return to their house. ‘Because for some time, we really thought 
this was a temporary thing and sooner or later we would go back home’, Chrystalla 
recalls. As a good and ambitious student, however, she preferred to not wait and waste a 
year out of her high school. Therefore, in consultation with her parents, Chrystalla 
joined her aunt, who lived in London, to carry on with her studies, at least until the 
situation in Cyprus was resolved. Against her predictions and hopes in 1974, more than 
three decades later, Chrystalla still leaves in the UK and her parents have not left 
Larnaca; on the contrary, they have bought a plot of land and have built a house there. 
 
Their house in Larnaca also served many times as my own refuge during fieldwork in 
the summer of 2007. I had met Chrystalla in London, where she lived with her two 
teenage children, but we spent more time together during her holiday in Cyprus. She 
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visits her parents almost every summer for one or two months, but in that particular 
summer the family had also to deal with the constant presence and burden of a Greek 
researcher (kalamarou72, as Chrystalla’s father used to jokingly call me), who was 
always around asking questions. I was at the time very interested in the interactions 
between Chrystalla and her British born children and their local family.  
 
The first time I entered the house, I was welcomed by a large framed photo of 
Archbishop Makarios hanging on the wall of the living room. Very close to it on a 
bookshelf, there was a medal that had been awarded by the state to Mr. Michalis, 
Chrystalla’s father, for his contribution to the anti-colonial struggle against the British 
in the late 1950s. The decoration of the living room would have led someone familiar 
with the ‘aesthetics of politics’ in Cyprus to instantly draw conclusions about the 
ideological and political profile of the household. Mr Michalis had indeed been an 
EOKA fighter and he had been arrested and imprisoned by the British colonialists in 
1958 for a year. A devoted admirer of Makarios and a DIKO supporter, he very often 
reproduced his party’s official line in our discussions. However, he was also self-
reflexive and critical of the operations of nationalism in the island. But what the 
decoration of the living room failed to convey was that Mr Michalis’s wife, Mrs Mary, 
comes from a renowned communist family73 and, as an outspoken person, she 
challenged very often her husband’s narrations, ideological opinions and political 
interpretations. Mrs Mary openly accused the nationalists (including EOKA A’ in which 
her husband participated), the Great Powers, Turkey and Greece for her own and 
Cyprus’s misfortunes. When she felt that she overdid it with her anti-Greek talk, she 
would turn to me and apologetically say: ‘Of course the people who are present here are 
excluded’.  
 
                                                 
72
 Kalamaras (masc.) –kalamarou (fem.) meaning a person who carries a kalamari (pen).  It is used in 
everyday speech by Greek Cypriots to refer to Greeks from mainland Greece. As Argyrou (1996: 51) 
highlights, the term is used to demarcate a cultural boundary between Greeks and Greek Cypriots and in 
most cases it carries pejorative connotations. ‘The image of the kalamaras consists of a set of negative 
cultural traits that allegedly characterize mainland Greeks and set them apart from Cypriots (Kiprei). 
Mainlanders are said to be sly and deceitful, not to be trusted and to be kept at a safe distance at all times. 
For, as the rhetoric has it, they are sooner or later bound to take advantage of one’ (ibid.). 
 
73
 I had been introduced to Mrs Mary’s brother in London before I met her and I had the opportunity to 
see him again in Cyprus, in Mrs Mary’s kitchen. I had been told about their family’s strong communist 
links and action by other informants who come from the same village and knew the family before 
migration and displacement. 
 192
The differing political positions mixed with family stories and varied interpretations of 
past events would make the conversations in this household a micro-cosmic example of 
the debates over competing versions of history that take place in Cyprus on a broader 
level. And what I would eventually find out is that whereas there were repetition and 
recycled patterns in the stories told and heard in my refuge in Larnaca, there were also 
inconsistencies, ambivalences and contradictions in the narratives, about which the two 
main discussants appeared aware. These would emerge depending on what was being 
debated at the time, who was the audience and as a response to particular events in the 
present time. Although the couple had agreed to disagree, they also seemed to have 
accepted the flaws and shortcomings of their own arguments. But Mr Michalis and Mrs 
Mary had not been strangers to contradiction and irony in life; when they met in the 
mid-1950s, he was a young man dedicated to planting bombs and fighting the British 
colonisers, whereas she was a young communist working as an administrator in one of 
the British bases. Her ‘British’ salary was the family’s main income for a while, by 
which Mr Michalis sustained his anti-colonial activities.  
 
The discussions that took place in their house offer a good example of history and 
politics as performed on the stage of everyday life. Family history intermingles with 
broader historical accounts and memory is constantly reconstituted by actors operating 
in intrafamilial and intergenerational contexts. In this sense, Chrystalla’s trips from the 
UK to Cyprus every summer involved long journeys into the family and country’s past 
that would take off usually when everyone was seated around the kitchen table. 
Chrystalla was an active participant in her parents’ debates. She was often as surprised 
as I was to discover inconsistencies and modifications in the storylines and she would 
articulate her puzzlement in the form of questions at every opportunity. 
 
However, despite the diversity and plurality of political opinion within her family 
environment, Chrystalla most of the times took her father’s side. ‘I’m a nationalist’, she 
would often say even when I used to ask her about her Turkish Cypriot friends, whom I 
had met in London. ‘Individual friendship is a different thing’, she explained. ‘I’m a 
refugee and I cannot be like the peace lovers you meet up with. They will go out of their 
way to make Turkish Cypriots happy, I can’t’, she told me once in London. Another 
time in Cyprus, she offered to drive me to one of my interviews with a peace activist. 
Then she took again the opportunity to express her concerns about my encounters with 
 193
peace supporters: ‘You should be careful and not naïve about what these people tell 
you’.  
 
Chrystalla’s worrying extended to my regular crossings to the North side of the island 
too. She had crossed only once with her parents in 2003 after the line opened but she 
was reluctant to cross again, as she had found the experience very emotional and 
painful. On top of that, unlike other Greek Cypriots, who were welcomed by the 
residents of their old houses in the North and invited for coffee or food, Chrystalla 
described her visit to her Famagusta house as a negative experience; especially because, 
according to her narration, the people who lived in the house, settlers from Turkey, had 
not let her and her family go inside. I was, therefore, surprised when one day Chrystalla 
announced that she and her father wanted to take me for a day trip to Famagusta. She 
had received me in her house in the UK, in her house in Larnaca and it was now time to 
show me around ‘her’ house in Famagusta, therefore completing a planned tour of 
‘home’.74 
 
I accepted the invitation instantly; however, in the following days after our talk, the visit 
to Famagusta kept being postponed and Chrystalla’s anxiety about it growing. In the 
course of few days, she expressed the following concerns: the trip might be too 
emotional for her father; it might be unsafe for us to drive in the North; we might not 
find our way, as Mr Michalis had only been there once before (after 1974); the visit 
might bring painful memories back to her; this visit goes against her decision to never 
cross again; by crossing, we not only recognise the TRNC but we also support the 
economy. Her dilemmas covered a wide range of the reasons many Greek Cypriots 
provide for not crossing. But this phase of hesitation, contemplation and planning is 
what distinguished this visit from a casual, spontaneous crossing to a thought-out 
journey. 
 
Although I never challenged her decision to not cross, Chrystalla called me one evening 
and instructed that I should be ready to be picked up for our trip in the following 
morning. We had to leave early and there was one condition to be followed throughout 
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 Home is perceived here as consisting of all these different places and houses. Chrystalla never gave 
concrete answers to which place she mostly considered as ‘home’ and her answers varied depending on 
the context, time and other people’s presence. 
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the day: that in no circumstances we should buy anything in the North. ‘Not even water, 
even if we die from thirst’, as she put it75. 
 
Mr Michalis, Chrystalla and I drove through the Dekhelia British bases to reach the 
checkpoint on the way from Larnaca to Famagusta. It was a hot summer morning but 
there was already a queue of cars waiting to show their documents and purchase some 
car insurance for the North. Mr Michalis sorted out our paper work and we carried on. 
But whereas I had expected a narration of the place to start, after we crossed the 
checkpoint Mr Michalis turned up the music volume and the rest of the trip was spent 
almost in silence. We were going through roads decorated with Turkish flags, renamed 
with Turkish signs, roads once familiar but now strange and confusing for Mr Michalis. 
Rodman argues that ‘multilocality can refer to the reflexive relationships with places. 
An anthropologist, traveler, or anyone whose place has been transformed, for example, 
by a natural disaster or suburban development –in other words, anyone dislocated from 
his or her familial place, or from the possibility of local identity- is keenly aware of the 
contrasts between the known and the unfamiliar’ (2003: 212). As refugees, whose place 
has been altered, Chrystalla and her father responded to the strangeness of the landscape 
with silence76. The only thing clashing with their silence was the loud sound of the 
Greek rebetika songs coming from the speakers that made the car a familiar space as we 
were navigating through an unfamiliar place.  
 
After some time on the main road, however, Mr Michalis took a right turn, carried on 
straight into a smaller road and then turned again right into an even smaller street and 
then he stopped without turning off the engine. This is when the silence broke and 
Chrystalla hesitantly asked: ‘Are we going inside?’ ‘No, there is no point’, Mr Michalis 
answered looking distressed. We were outside their house; an old, small house with off-
white walls and a very small garden in the front. The outside paint was chipped, the 
garden door was rusty but a few pairs of shoes left neatly outside the entrance door 
indicated that the house was inhabited. I was prepared to get off the car and take a few 
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 This decision was loyal to some Greek Cypriot politicians’ stance on the crossings after the opening of 
the line, who advised crossers to not spend money in the North and to not contribute in anyway to the 
economy of TRNC. 
76
 Rodman cites Basso (1988) to highlight silence as a common response to the puzzlement caused by the 
interaction with an unfamiliar place (2003: 212). 
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looks around, when Mr Michalis pushed down the hand-brake indicating that it was 
time for us to leave. 
 
The ‘visit’ to their house was clearly an emotional and distressing experience for both 
father and daughter. Although this was the shortest period I spent with Cypriots visiting 
their house on the ‘other side’, my co-travellers’ protracted silence prohibited me from 
asking the questions that instantly sprung in my mind: why did we take the trip if we 
were to stay for such a short time? Why did we not even get out of the car? Was the 
purpose of the trip to see the house or not? Were Mr Michalis and Chrystalla so 
traumatised after the last time they visited the place that they did not want to undergo 
the same experience again? Did they just not want to overwhelm the residents of the 
house with our presence? Did they want to see only the exterior of the house, as this 
was the part that remained almost identical to the state they had left it (in contrast to the 
interior that had probably been altered)? However, it seems that no single question or 
answer could adequately cover the reasons behind the ‘uneventfulness’ of our visit; all 
these questions and many more need to be considered alongside to offer a fuller 
interpretation of the affective complexities that emerge in this context. And asking my 
informants explicitly for their reasons would have been an incomplete project. Rather 
than having ready answers, they could have also been using their silence to consider 
similar questions and to make sense of their subjective experience. 
   
While driving away, Chrystalla said, ‘Do you see how these people live? They don’t 
take care of anything. These Turks from Turkey are so backwards’. She was 
reproducing a common discourse amongst Greek and Turkish Cypriots against the 
settlers. The opening of the line meant that many Greek Cypriots could come into 
contact with the Turkish settlers, about whom they had been hearing for years. This 
resulted in new processes of ‘othering’, of separating the ‘indigenous’ Turkish Cypriots 
from the Turkish settlers, the first as the legitimate inhabitants of the island, the second 
as posing not only a demographic and political threat, but also a cultural one as 
expressed through arguments about their lack of hygiene and backwardness77. The 
dichotomy was mobilised –in ways described below- for the rest of the day in 
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 Although these encounters can also result to different and more positive stereotyping of the settlers, as I 
will discuss later (see also Loizos 2009: 76). 
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Chrystalla and Mr Michalis’s effort to interact with the unknown landscape and 
negotiate their way through it. For, after we left the house, the ‘real’ journey started.  
 
In contrast to the very short stopover at the house, Mr Michalis took his time driving us 
around the roads of Famagusta. We visited Chrystalla’s primary school, which was still 
running as a an educational institution; a building that used to be the workplace of Mr 
Michalis, when he was a young civil servant, and which had been bombarded during the 
war and has remained in that state; another property that they owned and it was now a 
public square. Father and daughter became more vocal about these sites especially as 
they were trying to identify them, remember them and visualise their past state and 
condition. But their talks never transcended the information-sharing level to become 
narratives. The family stories and memory mining that I had expected never really 
materialised. 
 
When we were concluding the tour of Famagusta and I thought that we were getting to 
the end of out trip, unexpectedly, Mr Michalis said: ‘It’s getting late, we need to find 
somewhere to eat’. It was the first time that occurred to me that although my co-
travellers had decided that nothing was to be purchased in the ‘occupied’ side of 
Cyprus, none of us had brought any food or drinks with us.  
 
Our driver took us outside Famagusta to the coastal village of Boğaz looking for a 
restaurant that was owned by a Turkish Cypriot, not a settler. It became an important 
quest to find a place, where we could be served food by Cypriots and not Turks who 
took over Cypriot land and property. This rationale became an important element in Mr 
Michalis and his daughter’s way of negotiating between the strict guidelines given by 
Greek Cypriot authorities and their own experience in and of the place. It cannot be 
argued with certainty whether they had made the decision to follow or break these 
guidelines before departure; but as the journey was opening new possibilities and was 
demanding for new decisions to be made, Chrystalla and her father took up the 
challenge of reconciling broader political rhetorics and their own ideological 
predispositions with new options that emerged ‘on the road’.  
 
We finally arrived at a local fish restaurant and the owner, a middle-aged Turkish 
Cypriot woman, welcomed us very politely in fluent Greek. Her ‘right’ choice of 
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language and communicative skills made her the first person, with whom the two Greek 
Cypriots made a conversation that day. After a nice lunch, Mr Michalis, content with his 
choice, said: ‘See? It’s different with Turkish Cypriots, they speak Greek, they 
understand us better; we understand them better’. 
 
As if this interaction was necessary to break the emotional numbness and distance of Mr 
Michalis and Chrystalla, on our way back we visited the archaeological site of 
Salamina, where we actually paid to see what is considered by Greek Cypriots their 
heritage and culture. We returned to Famagusta and sat outside a mosque and we even 
had another coffee in a café across it. We then drove to the Varosha78 area, where we sat 
at the beach and we had another drink at a nearby canteen. The waiter there was a young 
Turkish man, probably in his mid-twenties, who had been in Cyprus for two years. 
Unaware of my co-travellers’ concerns and reservations, he started sharing with us his 
life story: how he had come to Cyprus from Adana for a better life to escape 
unemployment and poverty; how he was willing to work hard to make it; and how 
Cyprus was becoming a ‘home’, which he was starting to accept and love. Even though 
Chrystalla and her father looked relatively uncomfortable during the conversation, she 
said afterwards: ‘These people come from poor backgrounds and they have to make a 
living too. This young man wants to survive; he doesn’t know anything about Cyprus, 
about us’. Mr Michalis shook his head agreeing. 
 
This reconstitution of the ‘settler’ not as threatening and impure but also as naïve and 
hard-working marked a shift in Chrystalla’s previous interpretations and descriptions. It 
was a concluding statement to a day defined by new options, constant decision-making 
and negotiations. ‘Step by step’ my informants’ moral worlds were challenged and 
reconstructed to include new encounters and experiences. 
 
The realisation of this process can be empowering, but also distressing, upsetting and 
up-rooting for an individual. On our way back, while being on a road taking us straight 
back to the check point, Mr Michalis suddenly took a turn. After a while I realised that 
we had gone back to their pre-war house. Almost in a ritualised form this time, we 
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 Very touristic and developed before the war, this is an area that has been abandoned and sealed since 
1974 by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Everything within the area remains almost as it was left in 1974, 
which led to the popular characterisation of Varosha as a ‘ghost-town’.  
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stayed for a few minutes outside looking at it with no comments and then we drove off. 
This second visit could be interpreted as a way of reinstating order into the unruliness 
caused by the journey during the day; a way of reclaiming structure; it was Mr Michalis 
and Chrystalla’s way of dealing with disruption and preparing to go back. And, needless 
to say, on the way back everyone was very silent. 
 
Fig. 5. The beach of Varosha and, in the background, buildings within the evacuated, fenced part of the town. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Chrystalla standing at the door of a Mosque and looking around. 
 199
 
Journey 2 
Whereas the journey described above took place in August 2007, when Tassos 
Papadopoulos was still the president of the Republic of Cyprus and the side-effects of 
the Annan plan were still strong, the political framework had shifted by the time of the 
journey followed here. In the summer of 2008, AKEL was in government in the South, 
Ledra Street had opened and a wave of hope for peace and re-unification had been 
encouraged by the new political developments. 
 
One morning in August, Alex called to invite me to join him for a trip to the North. 
Whereas most of our previous crossings had occurred in a spontaneous or informal 
manner, in our phone conversation on that August day, Alex asked me to prepare for a 
‘journey’ to the North. We would travel up to the tip of the Karpaz/Rizokarpasso 
peninsula, to reach the monastery of Apostolos Andreas (St. Andrew, the Apostle), a site 
of historical and religious importance for Greek Cypriots that naturally became a very 
popular destination for tourists and pilgrims after the opening of the border. However, 
our visit would have two main purposes. One was to see members of Alex’s family in 
Rizokarpasso, who were among the Greek-speaking egklovismenoi (entrapped/enclosed, 
as they are called by Greek Cypriots); Greek Cypriots, who had not managed to flee to 
the South after the Turkish invasion and have continued living in the North. The priest, 
who runs the monastery with his wife, is Alex’s uncle.  
 
The other purpose was to take Nick, a Greek Cypriot born and raised in London, for his 
first trip to the ‘other side’. Nick’s decision to cross came as a surprise. A few days 
before our journey, I had met and interviewed his father, Mr. Yiorgos, who had told me: 
‘I have no problem with Turkish Cypriots and I am quite open, but I’d never allow my 
children to cross to the other side’. Mr. Yiorgos had left to the UK after the war and 20 
years later, he and his family moved back to the island. In 1974, he and his brother were 
captured and taken as prisoners of war to Turkey, where they spent two months in jail 
before they were eventually released. The memories of violence and conflict haunted 
him during our talk: ‘I’m sorry I can’t tell you the same things as others’, he said, ‘but I 
can’t see how re-unification in these circumstances with Turkey over our head can 
work’. Nick’s decision to cross was never announced to his father and he used silence 
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as a negotiation strategy between his desire to visit the North and respect for his father’s 
views. 
 
This intra-familial divergence was not, however, the only concern, of my co-travellers 
before our departure. When some of Alex’s Turkish Cypriot friends heard that he was 
planning for a trip to the North, they expressed interest in joining us. Although meeting 
with his friends in the North had been Alex’s main purpose of crossing most of the 
times, on that particular occasion he seemed anxious about inviting them for the trip. 
For two days before our planned travel date, numerous discussions took place about 
who was to go on the trip. Alex had explained to everyone that because he wanted to 
show Nick and me around, he would prefer to go in one car. Also, fewer people meant 
that we could stick to a particular plan more easily and we could visit more places with 
less distraction. These explanations, however, did not seem to suffice for one of Alex’s 
friend, Mehmet, who called me one night inquiring about the trip. ‘We can join you for 
most of the day, but we don’t need to come all the way to Apostolos Andreas. We can 
wait near Golden Beach for you to come back’, Mehmet said. His statement conveyed a 
concern for the potential tension, which their presence, as Turkish Cypriots, could add 
in a visit to Greek Cypriots in the North; and it also implied that this was perhaps the 
underlying reason of Alex’s anxiety.  
 
This small episode highlights the importance of relationality and intersubjectivity in the 
experience of space and place. Whereas the crossings of the border in Cyprus opened 
the ground for researchers to investigate their implications on individual and collective 
identities, further contextualisation of these crossings are necessary in order to 
appreciate their meaning and experiential significance for particular agents. In other 
words, the focus on ethnicity and political ideology are not enough to understand why 
one chooses to cross (or not); attention also needs to be paid on when and with whom 
one crosses and how agents negotiate and reconstruct their interpersonal relationships in 
this process. 
 
In this context, whereas it became clear that this crossing was different to others, Alex 
avoided further discussions on his arrangement of the trip in an attempt to deal with the 
emerging tensions. At the end, he, his fiancée, Nick and his girlfriend picked me up in 
one car for our trip to the North. We crossed from Nicosia driving through the Aghios 
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Dometios check point. The minute we passed the border, Alex started a very eloquent, 
almost rehearsed narration, which explicitly reflected his knowledge of and familiarity 
with the place. Unlike Chrystalla and Mr. Michalis, Alex was not born in Cyprus and 
had never lived in the North, but his confident voice and geographical orientation, 
which came as a result of his multiple crossings to the North after 2003, manifested a 
particular ‘ownership’79 of the place that was missing in the crossing experience of my 
other co-travellers. 
 
Our first stop was in North Nicosia, in an area where Alex’s maternal family house used 
to be. His mother had gone to the UK in 1973 to study but after the war she decided to 
stay on, she got married and never returned to Cyprus. Her husband was a Greek 
Cypriot, whose family had left the island in the 1940s and settled in the UK. While Alex 
was still narrating the history of the family as well as that of the place, we drove off 
towards Famagusta, where we visited the beach and the Varosha area. Alex directed our 
attention to buildings with old bullet holes on them, guided us through streets with 
Turkish names and pointed at landmarks and monuments, like a proper tour-guide 
would have done. When I asked him about his knowledge of the place, he replied: 
‘What do you mean how I know the place? This is my country. The whole island is my 
country’. 
 
On our way to the North tip of the island, we stopped at the village to visit a place 
where Alex’s paternal family house used to stand. The minute we arrived, the Turkish 
Cypriot family, who lived in a small house on the property, came out to welcome us. 
Mustafa, a man in his early forties shared the house with his wife, children and his 
mother and they all seemed happy to see Alex, who had obviously been there before. 
We sat under the vine arbour in their garden and had coffee, sweets and home-grown 
grapes. Mustafa, the only English-speaker in the household engaged in small talk with 
Alex and the rest of us. When the conversation turned to politics, both Mustafa and 
Alex were very careful to maintain a consensus between them. Mustafa commented on 
the newly built mosque opposite his house, which he disapproved as something 
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 I use ‘ownership’ of the place and not ‘belonging’ to a place. The latter is commonly used in the 
literature, however, it often refers to the territorialisation of essentialised ethnic or national identities. By 
the very act of crossing, my informants here do not want to ‘return’ to a place where they belong, but to 
claim the whole island as their own (the idea of the whole island belonging to all Cypriots, common in 
Cyprio-centric rhetorics). 
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externally imposed on Turkish Cypriots; Alex, from his side, expressed understanding 
and pointed out that the reunification of Cyprus is imperative, if Turkish Cypriots are 
not to lose their identity and culture.  
 
After this conversation, we visited the small abandoned house attached to that of 
Mustafa’s, which was the original house of Alex’s family. When we entered the 
dilapidated building, Alex half-jokingly said: ‘It’s funny how in my grandma’s stories 
the house always sounded so much better and bigger than it is’. On our way out, 
Mustafa’s mother had packed grapes for Alex, who carried on joking by saying: ‘I came 
to collect my rent and here it is’ [pointing at the bag with the grapes]. 
 
Unlike Chrystalla’s and Mr. Michalis’s visit to their house, Alex did not show any high 
emotional reaction during this stopover. Such emotional detachment was not only 
particular to his family house but it was characteristic of his narration style throughout 
the trip. In his historicisation of places, Alex had avoided any nationalistic language, 
any distinctions of ‘us/them’ and he had tried to maintain an assumed objectivity and 
balance. Like many other young Cypriots, Alex had stated before that emotionality from 
both sides was one of the obstacles to a realistic and viable solution for the island.  
 
At the same time, the aspired objectivity in his engagement with the place and people 
reflected Alex’s moral responsibility towards his audience; particularly, Nick, whose 
first crossing to the North was treated by Alex as a ‘rite of passage’. I had followed 
Alex in many contexts across the border; however, he was particularly careful in how he 
replied to his co-traveller’s questions and concerns on that day, showing an awareness 
of his influence on this process of ‘initiation’. Nick also responded to the situation with 
an apparent distance and neutrality. Whenever he would make a comment about Turkish 
Cypriots, he would try to balance it out with a reference to Greek Cypriots and vice 
versa and he kept a reserved presence during our stopovers and encounters. 
 
All this, however, changed when we reached the monastery, where the priest and his 
wife welcomed us. As they took us around, they discussed some of the challenges and 
difficulties of their living as Greek Cypriots in the North and running a Christian 
institution that was constantly monitored by the Turkish authorities. Their life 
trajectories made Alex and Nick to abandon their realistic position and to engage in a 
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language that had not emerged before during the day. They suddenly employed a 
collective ‘we’ in their conversations in order to express their identification with our 
hosts as Greek Cypriots; and as it usually happens with a ‘we’, the category of ‘they’ 
also surfaced in the conversation, which, depending on the framework of the discussion, 
variably referred to the Turkish Cypriots, the settlers, Turkey or the Turkish Cypriot 
government. 
 
On the way back, Alex and Nick were more silent than before and still seemed affected 
by the conversations they had at Apostolos Andreas. ‘Sometimes you understand why 
people are nationalists’, Alex said referring to what he had experienced at the 
monastery; the rest of his co-travellers nodded approvingly. This shift of perspective 
was expressed through a particular emotionality, that all of them had critiqued before as 
an inherent problem of the ‘Cyprus issue’. 
 
We were heading towards Pyla, in order to cross back through the bi-communal village, 
however, as it was getting dark, Alex lost his way and we found ourselves in the middle 
of nowhere. Our ‘Greek’ mobiles were not working because of lack of signal and our 
‘Greek’ map did not match the Turkish-named roads. The landscape challenged Alex’s 
‘ownership’ of the place and shook his previous confidence in navigating through it. We 
finally stopped in front of a confectionary shop along the way to ask for directions. A 
man approached the car and Alex asked in English for the way to Pyla. The man replied 
in broken English: ‘Where are you from?’ Alex hesitated for a few seconds and then he 
said: ‘Hmmm…I’m Cypriot’. The man, who was a Turkish Cypriot, gave him a friendly 
smile and carried on: ‘We are all Cypriots, my friend, but from which side are you? 
Don’t worry, I’m asking so I know how to give you directions and in which language’. 
‘I’m a Greek Cypriot’, Alex answered reluctantly. 
 
This last encounter in a long journey further unsettled the cohesion in the narrative my 
co-travellers had initially presented in terms of their identity, political positioning and 
experience of the place. The materiality of the border and its existence as a political and 
social reality contrasted with their own attempts to overcome it and imagine Cyprus as a 
unified country. Also, the physical and social landscape challenged their ‘ownership’ of 
a place that eventually became difficult to claim as one’s own. And their encounters 
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along the way demanded that they take a side. Even though they left as ‘Cypriots’, they 
found themselves as ‘Greek Cypriots’ during the journey. 
 
Figure 7. Alex giving a ‘tour’ to his co-travellers. 
 
 
Figure 8. The entrance stairs to Apostolos Andreas and part of the church. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
Starting from the end, the two stories of crossings presented in the last part of the 
chapter and analysed through the framework of a journey, a liminal and out of the 
ordinary stage, sum up to a large extent the ways in which the boundaries between 
ethno-nationalist and Cypriotist discourses are blurred at least in terms of the modes 
they are deployed by individuals in particular contexts. The unexpected circumstances 
of the journey challenge habitualised rhetorics of those who take it and force them to 
resort to other discursive palettes that form part of their cultural repertoires. Whereas 
Chrystalla and Mr. Michalis started as self-proclaimed ‘nationalists’, after crossing the 
border they engaged in a process of negotiation of their political ideologies and values 
that transcended the boundaries, which they had set as condition before embarking on 
the journey. On the other hand, Alex and his friends, who emphasised on their Cypriot 
identity and their ‘ownership’ of the whole island, found themselves reproducing 
boundaries, which they sought to transcend in their everyday life. It was not only their 
encounters on the road that made them rearticulate their identity and reposition 
themselves accordingly but also the experience of a place, which was initially imagined 
as familiar before it became strange and alienating, rendered them to a condition that 
they had to proclaim themselves as Greek Cypriots. 
 
The transformative potential of such journeys, however, cannot be always exaggerated. 
Before returning, or in order to return, to the ‘normality’ of an established and familiar 
order, Chrystalla and her father revisited their house, as a reminder of what was lost and 
as a confirmation of their habitualised nationalist narratives. Making Pyla their last stop, 
Alex and his friends reinstated their belief that not only Greek and Turkish Cypriots can 
live together, but that in particular places they have carried on doing so. However, going 
back to the ordinary way of being, reinforcing the structure as Turner (1969) would 
state, is a means of coping in a conflict affected place like Cyprus, in which ‘the 
political problem’ has not only been discursively bounded but also polarised around two 
competing versions of nationalism; ethnic nationalism and Cypriotism. This is why 
individuals, in order to critically assess the status quo, find themselves deploying the 
version of nationalism opposite to the one they have habituated and embodied.  
 
As such processes can be disrupting to the ways the political self is located and 
constructed, the non-crossing of the border, the chapter has argued, is adopted as a 
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strategy of avoiding these experiences. For, the long-term closure of the border had 
allowed the development of particular ‘truths’ that its opening came to challenge as 
well-constructed ‘myths’. Whereas physical boundaries were lifted, other internal, 
social and cultural boundaries were revealed. These were not only between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots or nationalists and peace supporters. As the chapter has argued, those 
most committed to peace and the opening of the border became divided over their 
decision to cross or not to cross. For older members of the diaspora non-crossing of the 
border was part of a conscious decision to not cross the line of memory. For the two 
Lefts in Cyprus, the opening of the border revealed underlying boundaries between 
them; non-crossing therefore became a way of avoiding tensions and maintaining a 
public façade of solidarity. For younger British Cypriots, both of these approaches 
represented everything that was problematic about the ‘Cyprus problem’: emotionality 
and ideological rigidity. For them it was easier to cross to the Green Line than it was to 
cross out of it, as they felt alienated and marginalised outside the socio-cultural 
microcosm of this ‘everyone’s land’; which in all its ‘cosmopolitan’ character became a 
bounded empowering space for those who had the right types of social and cultural 
capital and alienating for those who lacked them. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In less than a year after the election of Dimitris Christofias as the president of the 
Republic of Cyprus and numerous official meetings between the president and the 
Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, which were popularly labelled as ‘peace 
negotiations’, the heightened hopes for a ‘fast solution’ to the Cyprus problem that the 
co-operation of the two leftist leaders had promised started deflating. The momentum 
created by the fact that the two ‘allies’ with long historical and ideological connections 
were in power simultaneously for the first time on either side of the division line had 
not delivered the expected results. The inability of the Cypriot Left to unite the island 
was consolidated in public discourses with the election of Derviş Eroğlu as President of 
the TRNC in April 2010, whose ideological and political commitments were seen as 
setting him far apart from Christofias. 
 
This historical turn was perceived by some Cypriots as a proof that Cypriotism, a 
discourse and political project identified with the development of the two Lefts in the 
island, had never been the right framework through which the ‘Cyprus problem’ could 
be resolved. For some Cypriotists on the other hand, the failure to achieve re-unification 
was not a sign of the weaknesses of Cyprio-centric politics but of the dominant role of 
outside powers, particularly Turkey, that once again obstructed Cypriots from deciding 
jointly about their own political future; Cypriotism therefore is still the only viable route 
for a re-unified and peaceful Cyprus. An (2011), for instance, promotes this perspective 
in a recently published article titled ‘Cypriotism can Pave the Way to Reunification’, 
where the responsibility of the Left, however, and particularly of AKEL, in pursuing 
such an agenda is critically assessed. 
No matter how conflicting their perspectives may appear, both pro-Cypriotist and anti-
Cypriotist accounts converge in understanding Cypriotism as a discourse that promotes 
unity and ‘sameness’ and that stands in opposition to the ethnic nationalisms in the 
island. Whereas then social scientists have studied exhaustively the development and 
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operations of ethnic nationalism in Cyprus as a fundamental requirement for examining 
the creation and consolidation of conflict, they have problematised less other types of 
nationalism, such as Cypriotism, which has often been studied as a form of civic 
nationalism that emerged as a counter-narrative to dominant ethno-centric rhetoric. The 
thesis has aimed to balance such focus by shifting emphasis on how Cypriotism is 
constructed as a discourse and how it is articulated and performed by agents in multiple 
contexts, revealing processes that point towards two main conclusions.  
 
The first is that the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism may be useful on a 
descriptive level, but in their everyday articulations, the boundaries between the two 
types of nationalism are blurred and difficult to circumscribe. Whereas the notion of 
civic nationalism has been founded on an acultural definition of citizenship, ethnic 
nationalism has been popularly understood as ethnocultural (Brubaker 1998). However, 
it becomes apparent in the thesis that what lies at the basis of the discursive deployment 
of Cypriotism is a preoccupation with defining the cultural core of a common Cypriot 
identity. In other words, ‘who is a Cypriot’ is debated around particular notions of 
cultural authenticity and heritage. The centrality of culture therefore in the ways the 
nation is imagined is far from exclusive to ethnic nationalism. The distinction between 
the two nationalisms is to be located in the different ways that a shared culture is 
defined and constructed rather than in the existence or absence of a cultural element in 
their articulation.  
  
The second conclusion to be drawn from the thesis is that Cypriotism, although 
understood as a unifying discourse is also divisive and internally contested. It has often 
been treated both in academic and everyday contexts as counter-hegemonic to the 
dominant nationalist rhetoric and politics due to its capacity to uncover and represent 
unofficial histories, suppressed memories and hidden voices. As a discourse, however, 
Cypriotism is produced and operates within power structures that privilege particular 
narratives and identities, whereas they marginalise others. It, therefore, provides the 
terrain where struggles over symbolic and political power take concrete shape and are 
carried out by different agents.  
 
Both conclusions, it has been argued here, are particularly observable in the study of the 
political connections between the Cypriot diaspora and Cyprus formed around Cyprio-
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centric ‘peace politics’. At a very particular historical period, when Cyprio-centric 
discourses emerged as more centralised in the Cypriot political scene, new spaces for 
‘homeland’ politics were created for Cypriotists in London, who engaged more 
dynamically in what I have called in the thesis ‘long-distance peace activism’. These 
new opportunities for political action and involvement, however, brought to light a 
number of old and new boundaries that found Cypriotists divided on intra-ethnic, intra-
diasporic and inter-generational levels built around debates over cultural authenticity 
and identity. The thesis has been concerned with how political subjectivities are 
constructed within these processes by looking at the ways multiple agents mobilise, 
articulate and perform particular identities through the language of Cypriotism. 
 
To follow the spaces, where such power dynamics emerge and take shape, the thesis has 
been based on multi-sited research following the discourse of Cypriotism in a variety of 
contexts. Although the opportunistic nature of the research has resulted to different 
amounts of time spent on each ethnographic site, it has allowed, however, to trace the 
connections between these settings and to examine how political subjectivities develop 
and operate in a transnational context. 
 
Chapter 2, therefore, starts from London, in order to examine how Cyprus and London 
as socio-cultural landscapes become symbolic resources in the ways cultural 
authenticity and identity is debated in the diaspora. It is argued that although Cyprus is 
imagined and articulated as the source of Cypriot identity, London figures as the place 
where an original Cypriotness has been preserved and nurtured. In both popular and 
academic discourses, life between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in London has been 
presented as safeguarded against the effects of physical separation of the two 
communities in Cyprus. Through a language of continuities between a pre-migration 
past and a diasporic present, Cypriotists in London often claim themselves as holders of 
an authentic Cypriotness, for which bi-communal co-existence is a prerequisite. Any 
ruptures to such co-existence are presented as externally introduced and a diasporic 
discourse of Cypriotism becomes the ideological framework through which disruptions 
to local relationships are negotiated and managed. Because of such understandings of 
authentic Cypriotness, co-existence in London becomes in these narratives a model 
paradigm of how a future re-unified Cyprus is possible and legitimises the primary role 
the diaspora can undertake towards this direction. 
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As most first-generation Cypriotists in London claim an affiliation to the Left, and 
particularly, AKEL, chapter 3 has dealt with the politics of the past as articulated 
through the main communist party in Cyprus. For older migrants, communism, as a 
form of habitus, becomes a cultural repertoire deployed to deal not only with past 
experiences of marginalisation in the pre-migration era but also to understand and frame 
experiences in the present. The operations of habitus, it has been argued, have to be 
located in the interactions between AKEL’s historical narrative and individual memory. 
The first is patterned on its supporters’ experiences and accounts and then it provides 
the language through which individual memories are articulated and expressed. Such 
memories that form and inform AKEL’s Cyprio-centric account of history have been 
treated as ‘hidden’ and underrepresented in the official historical narrative of the past. 
However, reviewing the agenda and objectives of ‘subaltern studies’, Pandey (2000) has 
alerted that ‘unofficial’ histories should not be treated as blocks of absolute truth but 
they should also been examined as constructed and embedded within power relations 
and structures. The memories and experiences of AKEL supporters in the diaspora are 
often interrogated as ‘incomplete’ because of migration, which renders them to the 
alienated position of ‘escapees of history’. The ‘unofficial’ history of the Left, therefore, 
although it emerges as counter-hegemonic, it encompasses other unofficial and 
underrepresented histories, such as those of diasporic individuals. At points of 
divergence between the unofficial history of AKEL and individual memories, the 
Cypriotist account of the past that the Left has promoted becomes internally challenged 
and contested. 
 
The politics of history as well as the history of politics, however, emerge also as a point 
of inter-generational tension in the diaspora. British born Cypriots are often associated 
in popular discourses with cultural apathy and dismissal of history, and are, therefore, 
presented through a language of ‘(in)authenticity’ as ‘in-between’ two cultures. Chapter 
4, however, has illustrated the dynamic and creative ways, in which British born 
Cypriots produce situational accounts of identity in order to deal with cultural 
‘silencing’. Cyprio-centric rhetoric was reformulated by some second-generation 
diasporic Cypriots by drawing a historical connection between bi-communal co-
existence in pre-war Cyprus and multiculturalism in contemporary London in order to 
reinstate definitions of both Cypriotness and Britishness that reflected their own 
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experiences. Moreover, through such discursive refashioning they engaged in ‘long-
distance peace activism’ not primarily to intervene in the politics ‘at home’ but to 
challenge ‘political centres’ in London, from which they were excluded. In other words, 
‘peace’ provided the platform on which inter-generational conflicts in the diaspora 
unravelled over political authority and legitimacy. 
 
To avoid, however, co-optation by the established political cores in London, British 
born Cypriots searched for autonomy in alternative spaces and the Internet emerged as a 
significant setting. Chapter 5 has traced the blossoming of Cyprio-centric peace politics 
on Facebook, the global expansion of which at that time coincided with a reinforcement 
of Cypriotism as a counter-hegemonic, anti-governmental narrative in the political 
scenery in Cyprus. The appearance of peace-promoting bi-communal groups on 
Facebook provided new opportunities for interaction and communication between 
diasporic Cypriots and those at ‘home’; at the same time, however, it opened up a new 
forum where debates over how the nation is imagined revealed that the definition of 
‘Cypriotness’ at the core of Cypriotism was not uniformly shared and divisions over 
cultural authenticity and the ‘right to speak as Cypriot’ were both challenged and 
reinforced online. Moreover, Cypriotists online were also divided over the very 
definition of political activism. Emerging out of what I have called in the thesis ‘banal 
peace activism’, Facebook groups followed the format and aesthetics of ‘traditional’ bi-
communalism in Cyprus, which has emphasised the need for face-to-face 
communication and offline mobilisation and visibility stemming from a preoccupation 
with overcoming physical separation represented by the emblematic Green Line. 
Whereas for some then the online ‘imagined community’ ceased to be meaningful when 
Facebook politics failed to convert into street action, for others, particularly diasporic 
Cypriots, online activism was privileged as a space where they could achieve social and 
cultural capital, which they lacked in offline contexts. 
 
Chapter 6 traced further the symbolic importance of border-crossing as an assumed 
ideological commitment of Cypriotists and peace-supporters. Discourses and 
experiences of the border, it was argued, highlighted old and new boundaries and 
encapsulated established and shifting power dynamics on most levels discussed 
throughout the thesis. For some of the first-generation Cypriotists, the opening of the 
border created an ontological dilemma over its crossing, as to go beyond the border and 
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visit one’s ‘old home’ posed a danger of crossing the line of memory and facing a 
present that does not match the ways the ‘self’ has been constructed and narrated. For 
leftists, the opened border appeared as an obstacle to ‘peace politics’ operated through 
organised party politics. However, the opening of the check points also made the border 
to be used and experienced as a bounded space, which diasporic younger Cypriots 
treated as a cosmopolitan zone that let them escape marginalisation in the socio-political 
life beyond it; but for others, this ‘everyone’s land’ created new alienating experiences. 
In this sense, I am in agreement with Bryant (2010: 29), who highlights in her own 
work: ‘It took the opening of the checkpoints to make me realize that borders are 
created not only through isolation but also through interaction, not only in their closure 
but also, and perhaps even more, in the act of crossing them’. The opening of the border 
required that other boundaries be collapsed and it was precisely these boundaries that 
often rendered the border non-crossable. For, as the two crossings narrated in detail at 
the end of chapter 6 illustrated, what is unsettling about crossing the border is the 
possibility of having boundaries blurred and intersected. As those committed to the 
nationalist rhetoric found themselves developing empathy towards the ‘other’, those 
most attached to their Cypriot identity had to take ethnic sides during the journey. 
Crossing ‘back’ then enabled them to re-enter and reinstate order, the way one imagines 
the self ‘as always having been as such’.  
 
The boundary, therefore, between ethnic nationalism and Cypriotism is not solidified 
but it is constantly performed and rebuilt by agents on either side. It is in these 
processes, however, that corresponding identities, such as ‘nationalist’ and ‘Cypriotist’ 
appear essentialised and homogenised. To go beyond these essentialisms, the thesis has 
aimed to contribute to ongoing anthropological discussions on nationalism in Cyprus by 
bringing together ‘the ethnography of the Cypriot diaspora’ with ‘the ethnography of 
Cyprus’ and examining how the nation is actively imagined, debated and (re)produced 
at a point when new spaces emerged for the involvement of the diaspora in the politics 
at ‘home’. It is ethnographic attention to these spaces, the thesis has highlighted, that 
reveals the ‘bad’ faces of a ‘good’ nationalism. To maintain a theoretical and 
methodological sharp distinction between different types of nationalism obscures and 
covers the internal gaps, silences and boundaries of Cypriotism. As Brown (1999: 300) 
has highlighted ‘[n]ationalism does have two ideological faces, civic and cultural; but 
its political character is surely protean rather than Janus-faced’. 
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At the time of writing this conclusion, young Greek and Turkish Cypriots have 
occupied the stretch of Green Line right between the Ledra Street/Lokmaci check points 
in Nicosia inspired by the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement that spread globally taking 
various forms. ‘Occupy the Buffer Zone’ through a language of common Cypriotness 
has claimed a shared space for members of both communities, who, while advocating 
for the re-unification of the island, acknowledge that ‘the Cyprus problem’ is largely a 
by-product of a globalised capitalist system and logic (Hurriyet Daily News, 
29/11/2011). It is characteristic, however, that the diasporic support group of the 
movement, ‘Occupy the Invisible Green Line-UK’, that is organised in London 
emphasise the need to overcome other multiple invisible boundaries besides the 
physical border in Cyprus; and conflicts over ‘who is a Cypriot’ continue to dominate 
the pursuing of peace for a future Cyprus. 
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